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Abstract

This thesis aims to create a secure and practical RFID security framework, particularly
on providing an adequate privacy model and an adversary model for RFID applications
where an authentication protocol for RFID tag is required. Our framework can be
used to assess the performance of RFID authentication protocols that are conformed
to a common system model. We ﬁrst look into other proposed privacy models and
compares their performances. We investigate their limitations on modelling some types
of RFID authentication protocols. Our privacy model deﬁnes what we want to achieve
when providing privacy protections to RFID systems. Examples like what we call a
secure system, what are the privacy goals and how we test an RFID authentication
protocols are deﬁned in our privacy model. Our adversary model addresses the abilities
of adversaries that cause harm to RFID systems. Its purpose is to capture the most
common and possible attacks to RFID systems that can be launched in the real world.
These modellings together provide us an eﬀective tool to look into the limitations and
possibilities of the RFID authentication protocol begin assessed. Based on our security
framework, we give an example RFID application on ownership transfer.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Chapter Overview
In the ﬁrst chapter of this thesis, we give an overall idea of what this thesis is all about. First a brief introduction to RFID security researches is
discussed, which leads to the motivation behind that has driven our interest in choosing this as our research topic. Next we state what we have
achieved in this work by giving a brief summary about the outcomes of our
novel contributions to the RFID security research community. Part of these
achievements have been composed into academic papers and published in
world recognised conferences and journal. Finally, we give an overall structure of this thesis.

1.1

Motivations

The Problem
To use one sentence to describe about this thesis, this thesis is about “An investigation
into the ability of low-cost RFID tag systems in providing an adequate level of privacy
protections in theory”. The ﬁrst question to ask is why RFID? The use of Radio
frequency identiﬁcation (RFID) has gained its momentum since a few years back. In
Australia, RFID services license has been granted to GS1 Australia by Australian
Communication and Media Authority (ACMA), a government agency that governs the
use of RF in Australia. EPC Global Australia has been working with GS1 Australia
on the RFID standard in Australia. Some of the early RFID applications including
livestock and pet identiﬁcation and auto tolling for drivers have been using for many
years in Australia. Other developing or potential applications include supplies and
equipments tracking being used by Australian Defense Force (ADF), aircraft parts
1
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tracking and veriﬁcation, mail monitoring by Australia Post, books and CDs tracking
in the State Library, RFID PayPass credit cards, ePassport, etc. Not to mention
retails, logistics, supply chains where RFID is originally targeting. It is not long before
Australian to adopt this technology into our daily life.
RFID is always being compared to the well accepted barcode systems. The very
nature of both technologies is to identify (or authenticate in some applications) any
objects from their digitalised attached information, which can be used to link up to
other stored records in a back-end database for further referencing. Although they
share the same nature, RFID on the other hand opens up many new possibilities that
are missing in barcodes. These include scanning without line of sight, much longer
reading range, batch processing etc. An object tagged with these tiny RFID tags can
be scanned and identiﬁed within a distance using an RFID reader, be it legitimate or
illegitimate. Such convenient technology has drawn people’s attention but we also see
a lot of concerns coming with it. For example, anyone with a compatible RFID reader
can obtain a full reading of all the RFID tagged items from any passersby without
their consent. The readings may provide immediate useful information like names,
addresses, product types etc. The best example and the one that raised the most
concern was the launch of electronic passports [45], which was when people became
aware of their personal privacy could be in jeopardise if these tiny devices are to be
infested into their everyday life.
This personal privacy concern can be separated into two categories: Data privacy
and Location privacy. The former is relatively easy to protect, simply encrypt the
data stored inside an RFID tag with a good encryption scheme and then manage the
decryption key properly within the system, which is what the e-passport did, only
that they have the key printed on the passport. The latter is a real challenge. Even
if the scanned readings are pseudonyms or encrypted, these unique numbers together
serve as a “personal number plate” for identifying any individuals. People’s concerns
are reasonable, especially when individual identities are bounded to these RFID tags.
We have been using RFID chips to track and locate house pets and we see human
implantation coming [44]. RFID technologies will not reach its full deployment so
much as barcodes have done if this tracking problem is not solved. This gave us enough
motivation to look into the matter deeper and answers the question why RFID.
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The Challenge
The next question to ask is how diﬃcult is the issue? RFID tag tracking clearly
violates the location privacy of RFID tags bearers. By matching the collected radio
signals sent from many RFID tags to a particular tag (or a batch of tags) using any
rogue reader, the bearer’s location, past and current, can be traced [14]. This privacy
issue has been one of the main topics in RFID research. Like when people talk about
the networks and attacks, you can always get an attack-free machine if you disconnect
yourself from the networks. A pessimistic way to prevent tag tracking is to “kill” the
tag by executing a form of deactivation command [81]. As pointed out in [75], this
will only sacriﬁce the beneﬁts and convenience provided by RFID technologies if we
ever want to take advantage of any potential services that rely on live working tags. In
order to keep the tags “alive” for any future uses while protecting the tags from being
traced, it is essential to create a communication protocol between legitimate tags and
readers that guarantees untraceability. In a real world application, RFID tags may
emit distinguishable radio signals due to hardware manufacturing diversities, which
allow simple tracing in the physical layer [11]. Of course, nothing could be built if it
already fails at the lower layers. Therefore we assume in this work that this physical
diversity has removed and focus ourselves on the protocol layer only.
If we consider RFID tags as some decent wireless devices, then we can easily port any
already established industrial proprietary cryptosystems to be used in RFID and start
preserving users’ privacy. In fact, the issue is even worsen when low-cost RFID tags are
in concerned. Due to pricing pressure, these low-cost RFID tags are characterised by
their passive nature (batteryless), low computational power and non-tamper-proof. We
see there are many ways to crack tamper resistant smart cards [1], so we are not relying
our privacy protection on this. Because of their lack of computational power, public
key cryptography is simply not feasible in these low-cost RFID tags, even standard
implementation of AES means too expensive for them [78]. Leaving us only simple
bitwise operations, XOR, CRC, and PRNG, etc. as the primitives to secure these tags.
Fortunately, highly optimised AES [26, 28] and SHA [27, 66] implementations for RFID
tags had recently become available, we can use them as the security building blocks.
But still, their implementation footprints are marginally over the current mid-range
priced tags. These altogether creates a very unique yet challenging environment for
RFID privacy researches. If we look at the published RFID papers list maintained at
[87], there are more than hundreds of proposed schemes aimed to solve this privacy
issue in RFID. However, many times a scheme is proposed, there is/are papers to attack
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it [6, 49, 90]. This shows the diﬃculties in trying to solve the privacy issue in low-cost
RFID tags with their limited resources and the urge to restore privacy for them.

1.2

Research Direction

In order to assess the performance of various RFID protocols, a formal security framework is needed. Moreover, we see the needs to have a uniﬁed security formalisation for
RFID to put a stop to the propose and then attack pattern due to the diﬀerences in
security deﬁnition. Our research focuses on seeking a generally accepted formal security framework to the challenging low-cost RFID environment. A security framework
consists of four parts:
• A system model that deﬁnes the components and the construction of the underlying RFID application.
• A security model that deﬁnes the security goals of the application and the experiments for privacy assessment.
• An adversary model that deﬁnes the abilities of the adversary.
• A protocol structure that has to be conformed.
We aware that we are not the ﬁrst one to propose a security framework for RFID.
With the many already proposed RFID security frameworks, we start our research by
reviewing their eﬀectiveness, in a sense how well they can capture the real world attacks
in many diﬀerent RFID application scenarios. Learning from each of their strengths,
we modify them into our security framework. Then we use this security framework to
test the performance of a family of RFID protocols, namely the Synchronised Authentication Protocol (SAP). We separate them into ﬁve diﬀerent classes and assess them
individually. Finally, we create an RFID application base on this security framework
that conforms to one of the SAP classes. Hence, we have the following objectives:
1. Identify the security threats in RFID applications and the real world practices.
2. Point out the security protections that are absent in current RFID products.
3. Review selected RFID security frameworks and comment on their eﬀectiveness.
4. Modify the reviewed frameworks to create a new one that suits our needs.

1.3. Thesis Structure

5

5. Classify current RFID protocols into types with similar structure.
6. Suggest the limitations of each of the RFID protocol types base on the modiﬁed
security framework.
7. Propose a new type of RFID protocol that performs better in the modiﬁed security framework.
8. Create an example RFID application (RFID ownership transfer) base on the new
protocol type.

1.3

Thesis Structure

This thesis is composed of 7 chapters. Chapter 1 (this chapter) gives an overall idea
of what this thesis is about. First a brief introduction to the general state of current
RFID researches is presented. The needs identiﬁed here have driven this work and the
objectives are clearly stated.
Chapter 2 provides a basic understanding to the security threats of RFID from
a high-level view. It compares RFID with barcodes to see the advance in this new
technology and the source of the security concerns. Some real world applications are
reviewed here and the industrial practices and countermeasures to the security threats
are discussed.
Chapter 3 introduces RFID protocols. It lists the system requirements that is
required in order to provide a secure RFID protocol. It also looks at most of the
common adversarial goals and the security protections usually seen in RFID protocols.
Chapter 4 reviews some early notable works on formal RFID modelling. Out from
the several modelling works, we selected the model by Vaudenay [93] and critically reviewed it. We obtained some inconsistence results to the Vaudenay model and justiﬁed
them here. We also suggested a ﬁx to this model and removed some redundancies to
give a more compact model under reasonable assumptions. These contributions were
put together into a paper and published in [70].
Chapter 5 presents a family of RFID authentication protocols with similar structures. We created four classiﬁcations for this family of protocols and assessed their
performance with the modiﬁed Vaudenay model obtained from chapter 4. We identiﬁed their impossibilities in achieving some certain level of privacy protections. Then
we go onto propose a ﬁfth type of protocol structure and use it to create protocols
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with better performance on privacy protections. These contributions were presented
and published in [71].
Chapter 6 describes our RFID ownership transfer protocol that takes advantage of
our ﬁfth protocol structure to provide a secure and practical RFID application example.
Our new ownership transfer protocol covered all of the identiﬁed security properties of
other ownership transfer protocols and we added four new properties ﬁrstly proposed
by us. This new protocol was presented and published in [72] and later extended into
[73].
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis.

Chapter 2
RFID Basics

Chapter Overview
In this chapter, we will give more backgrounds about the potential security
threats that could imperil the adoption of RFID into our daily life. First we
provide a basic understanding to the physical limitations of low-cost RFID
tags. A comparison between RFID and barcodes is given to clearly show
the source of the security threats. Even with all these issues in RFID, we
are beginning to see RFID being embedded into sensitive documents like
passports, credit cards, driver licenses and transportation cards, etc. Not
surprisingly, all these applications of RFID have their own security issues.
We review some of these applications, namely the transportation cards in
the UK (which use MIFARE chips) and the ePassport, passport cards and
driver licenses in the US (which use EPC Gen-2 chips). We discuss existing
practical attacks to these RFID products. We also summarise some of the
best practices supplied by the homeland security department of US and
the industry for the use of RFID. We draw important lessons that can be
learnt from their experiences. Following that we discuss some industrial
countermeasures.

2.1
2.1.1

Limitations of Low-Cost RFID Tags
A Basic RFID System

A basic RFID system consists of multiple tags, a reader and a back-end database
server. Similar to barcodes, each tag contains a unique ID stored in a microchip and
the microchip is attached to an antenna. Most of the RFID systems use low-cost RFID
tags, usually below 5 cents per tag [81]. These tags are passive tags, which do not have
7
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battery attached. They are powered by the strong RF signals emitted from the reader.
Because of this, the responding signals from tags to reader are comparatively much
weaker than the signals from reader to tags. Passive tags can be read within 6 metres
and sometimes even up to 45 metres under certain circumstances. Generally, the read
range will varies depends on the power output of the reader and the environment. RF
signal eavesdropping is believed to be elementary in the reader to tags communication
for both close proximity and long distance eavesdroppers; while it is usually harder
for the long distance eavesdroppers to eavesdrop on the tags to reader communication.
When an RFID reader broadcasts a query, all the surrounding tags are powered up
by its RF signal and response with their unique IDs or other information that can
be used as the unique pointers to their record in the back-end database. The reader
will then use these pointers as the reference key to load up any further information
with the help of the back-end database. It is not common for the tags to store any
more information other than their unique IDs to minimise the possibility to breach
personal privacy. Some of the ﬁrst generation RFID embedded credit cards do contain
the card holder’s name and expiration date in clear text. ePassports store even more
personal information like DOB, nationality and digitalised photo of the holder but in
an encrypted form. A privacy preserving application, on the other hand, will avoid
storing unique IDs as that will lead to easy tag tracking.

2.1.2

Security Dedication

Passive RFID tags are always equipped with very limited computational power and
very limited logic gates in the microchip dedicated to performing cryptographic operations. Sophisticated or industrial standard cryptographic operations are always lacking
in these tags. It is expected to have only 250-3000 logic gates within the microchip
dedicated to security functions, ranging from low- to mid-cost RFID tags [78]. Asymmetric encryptions or public key infrastructure (PKI) are not possible for low-cost
passive tags to perform at least in a few years time. Standard symmetric encryptions
like DES, AES, or cryptographic hash functions are also hard to realise in these tags
(standard AES requires 20000-30000 gates to implement [94] and standard SHA-1 requires about 15000 gates [4]). Recent researches have looked into this matter and tried
to create low-cost RFID tag ready block ciphers and one-way hashing functions, notably the 8-bit architecture encryption only AES-128 implementation by Feldhofer et
al. [26], which uses 3628 gates and the 8-bit architecture SHA-1 implementation by
McLoone [66], which uses 5527 gates. With these implementation footprints, however,
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Primitive
PRNG [14]
8-bit AES-128 [26]
8-bit SHA-1 [66]
32-bit SHA-1 [27]
32-bit SHA-256 [27]

Logic gate
1435
3628
5527
8120
10868
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Clock cycle
517
992
344
1274
1128

Table 2.1: Security primitives for low-cost RFID tags
they can only ﬁt into higher cost RFID tags currently. Table 2.1 gives a general idea on
the gate counts and clock cycles needed to get one output from some security building
blocks that can be used in RFID tags.
Notice that these limitations do not apply to the RFID reader. For example, ePassport use PKI to digitally sign the information stored on the tag. The tag here serves
as a transponder only, which simply responses with the signed information. It is the
reader that performs complex PKI operations to verify the digital signature from the
information received. Active tags (tags that have their own power sources attached) on
the other hand are more capable to perform these operations but are also more expensive. New PKI with elliptic curve can be realised with 12000-15000 gates for high-cost
RFID tags. Expensive active tags that are capable in running PKI or WEP/WPA are
less to be worried because these primitives can be used to construct secure wireless
communication protocols, which have been studied for long. Because of the reasons
above, the only possible security protections remaining in real world low-cost RFID
tags are : tag access key, tag kill pin code (which can be found in EPC Gen-2 chips),
random challenge generator and proprietary stream cipher (which can be found in the
MIFARE chips). We will go into details when we review these RFID applications.
Because there is still a big gap in the gate counts requirement for PKI than symmetric
key primitives, we will simply separate RFID tags into high-cost and low-cost tags by
those who can and cannot perform PKI. In other words, we are expending the range
of low-cost RFID tags to include also those who are capable to perform symmetric
key cryptographic and hashing. This is meaningful as we expect the cost of RFID
tags to go down in the future and as technology advances, we expect symmetric key
cryptographic and hashing to become standard features in low-cost RFID tags.
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Advances in RFID Technology

When barcodes were ﬁrst introduced, it did not cause people to concern so much
about the security issues. Clearly, it is not what barcodes nor RFID is designed for
that raised the alarm. What matters is how the RFID technology has advanced to
cause people’s concern. Theses considerable diﬀerences between barcodes and RFID
become the origins of the security threats. Three main advances from barcodes to
RFID can be identiﬁed.

2.2.1

Advance in Data Processing

It would not be so attractive to switch from barcodes to RFID if it does not increase
the eﬃciency in reading items. Consider a trolley full of items after shopping in the
market. It is very time consuming to scan the barcode of each item manually, one at
a time. It would be nice if all the items are read at the moment the trolley passes
through the cashier. RFID readers are capable to process multiple tags simultaneously
at a time, which is much more eﬃcient than barcodes where only one code is scanned
each time. This advance in data processing method has eﬀectively reduced the time
needed in the labour intensive scanning task, human errors created and extra handling
due to shrink or wear oﬀ of barcode printing. This is especially important in the supply
chain environment where usually a container contains hundred to thousand of goods.
But this also creates a problem. A reader read attempt will result in a failure if more
than one tags response at the same time because of the jamming or overlapping of the
RF signals. Some mechanisms are required to resolve this situation. Security threats
targeting these failure moments and exploiting the security holes in these mechanisms
exist. Extra eﬀort is needed to make sure these fundamental parts will not become the
tools for attackers to invalidate other security measures implemented for the system.

2.2.2

Advance in Data Communication

When a barcode is read, there must be a reader within line of sight. Hence most of the
time users can be sure that when the barcode is being scanned and by whom. Or at
least they can be rest assured that no one could have read the barcode if the printed
code is being coved. However, the penetrating RF signals in RFID mean that readers
can be anywhere within the signal range of RFID tags. Also, simply putting the tags
inside a shopping bag does not prevent anyone from reading them. This advance in
communication method eﬀectively allows the tags to be read by unseen readers, which

2.3. Security Threats Caused by the Advances

11

creates a security threat because tags data can now be accessed without the users’
consent. Extra security measures are needed as a consequence to make sure either: 1.
Only known/legitimate readers can access the tags. 2. One who accesses the tags must
be known. 3. Those who are unknown/unauthorised should learn nothing by studying
the responses of the tags.

2.2.3

Advance in Data Storage

The only information about the attached object in barcodes is printed out obviously. It
can be decoded and read by everyone, hence no one would have wanted to put down any
sensible information in such format. While RFID usually equips with some memory
storage spaces in the microchip, it is tempting to store more than just one unique ID
there in order to provide more kind of services RFID systems can handle. This creates
possible security threats when the stored information is something sensible or beneﬁcial.
It draws opportunists’ interests to reveal the microchip content, which results in much
more adversarial attacks than barcodes. Obviously, the stored information should not
be sent in plaintext when responding to reader queries (most of the time the unique ID
is needed to be protected as well) if there is also a certain level of privacy requirement
to meet other than the security requirements. On the contrary, the extra memory can
also be utilised to enhance the security of the RFID communications. Extra eﬀort is
needed to investigate on the proper use of these additional memory spaces to provide
secure protocols to protect the stored information from being read in an unauthorised
manner or leaked during the communication.

2.3

Security Threats Caused by the Advances

Based on the three identiﬁed areas of advance in RFID, we give an overview on most
of the known security threats targeting these areas in this section. We aim to create
public awareness for RFID users.

2.3.1

Threats Caused by Tag Collision

Although an RFID reader can batch process a group of tags and in the user’s view it
is only a single tag scan, the communication between the reader and the tags is in fact
still one to one, just because the switching from tag to tag is so quick to be noticed.
Example like the EPC Class 1 Gen 2 RFID system has enhanced the read rate from
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230 reads per second to 880 reads per second in the US (diﬀerent country has diﬀerent
regulation on the use of RF, which also aﬀects the actual performance). However,
no matter how quick the reader can process one tag response, there are still chances
where problem arouses. Tag collision happens when two or multiple tags response
together at the same time to the reader query. The tags have no problem on this,
but the reader will have trouble to process all these responses and the collision will
cause a read failure at the reader. An anti-collision mechanism is needed to solve this
problem. The basic idea is to reduce the number of responding tags per reader query
such that only one tag is singulated to respond to the reader at a time; hence the term
singulation protocol is named for this mechanism. There are two major singulation
protocols employed in RFID: tree-walking and ALOHA [11, 94]. Protocol ideas are
presented to help understand the nature of the security threat.
Tree-walking
In tree-walking, when a collision occurs, the reader will execute the protocol by instructing only tags with their unique ID start with ‘0’ (starting from the left most
signiﬁcant bit) to continue to response. Tags that match the request will response with
the next bit of their unique ID. If there is another collision, it means there are tags with
ID preﬁx ‘00’ and ‘01’ present. The reader will continue to send out another query for
tags with their unique ID start with ‘00’. This process continues until a full tag ID can
be determined. Then the reader will back track to the last collision point in the tree to
send out another query for the tags with unique ID start with ‘pref ix||1’. The whole
singulation protocol continues until no more collision is detected, which is when all the
collision points have been taken care of. With a list of presented tags completed, the
reader can start one to one communication with each of these tags.
An attack to reveal the unique ID in tree-walking
With the tree-walking protocol, however, the unique ID of any tag can be revealed,
even when it is stored in a secure format inside the tag. It is simply because the reader
is giving out 1 bit of information of the unique ID of a tag per each collision. The
attack is quite simple: consider an attacker who has any RFID device which is capable
to simulate tag responses. Whenever a reader broadcast a tag query, the attacker will
simulate a tag collision by sending out both 0 and 1 with its two antennas. In that
case, the reader will keep executing the tree-walking protocol until the second last bit
of any possible unique ID (if there are k bits altogether in a unique ID, the reader will
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give out all the bits information from the 1st to the k-1th bit). A tag that continues
until the very end becomes the victim tag because k-1 bits of its unique ID have been
revealed by the reader. With such attack, even though the attacker does not possess
the access key to read any tags or even if the communication between tags and reader
is properly encrypted, the vital information of the unique ID can be eavesdropped by
listening to the reader bit by bit.
ALOHA
In ALOHA, instead of giving out bit by bit instructions by the reader, when there is
a collision, the reader will instruct all the tags to response again but they will have to
ﬁrst wait for a random idle time before sending out the response. Base on the diﬀerent
random choice of each tag, the collision has a better chance to be solved in the next tags
to reader transmission. One may consider the tree-walking protocol as a deterministic
approach while the ALOHA protocol as a probabilistic approach.

2.3.2

Threats Caused by RF Communication

Clandestine Skimming
Skimming refers to unauthorised scanning of RFID tags without the tag holder’s consent. Obtained information can be used to clone tags or track any individuals. The
nature of passive RFID tags has provided a convenient way for attackers to study the
tags responses. These tags basically reply to every reader query. This is unavoidable
because neither the tags nor the reader are aware of the others presence before any
communication happens. Also because passive tags are powered by the RF signals from
the reader, it has to be the reader that starts the communication ﬁrst. As a result,
attackers can always obtain any tag responses at will. To allow the reader to identify
and authenticate a tag, the tag responses must have included its unique information,
be it in plaintext or even encrypted, for the reader to locate its record in the back-end
database; otherwise, even the legitimate reader could have no way to distinguish them.
Hence more or less some information about the responding tag is available to any attacker with a rogue reader. The challenge becomes whether the attackers can extract
useful information from these tag responses or not. Some physical means also exist to
protect the tags from being scanned clandestinely by blocking the RF signals.
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Eavesdropping with hidden rogue readers
Proper communication protocol design may prevent RFID tags from leaking unnecessary information to active rogue reader scanning. Tags can stop the communication
when the rogue reader cannot provide proper responses in correct format. But this
does not apply to passive eavesdroppers. While physical protection can only stop clandestine scans when the RFID tags are not in use, an attacker eavesdropping on the
communication between tag and legitimate reader has the same eﬀect as skimming.
Legitimate reader always completes the protocol with legitimate tags. Hence these are
chances for eavesdroppers to learn extra tag information where they could not have
been able to do it without the help of a legitimate reader. The high power RF signals
originate from the reader to tags are unavoidably received by attackers. Depends on
the distance between the tag and the rogue reader, tag responses can be sniﬀed as
well. Some may argue that this is not practical due to the much weaker output of the
passive tags. But since there is such possibility, communication protections at both
reader and tag ends are required.

2.3.3

Threats Caused by Storing Sensible Data

Tag Cloning
Tag cloning is especially easy for those RFID tags that only output a static value as
their unique ID. The required information is obtained with a scan to the tag. Attackers
simply record one of the responses sent from the victim tag to a legitimate reader. The
unique ID (so as other information) obtained from the victim tag can be copied to
another empty tag, which eﬀectively creates a legitimate clone. The clone tag simply
replays the same unique ID, which allows it to pass tag identiﬁcation and leads to
impersonation attack in some applications. Access control can help lowering the chance
an attacker to obtain the tag information. Random challenge response protocols can
further mitigate the success rate of tag cloning as replaying the same response will
most likely to fail in front of these protocols.
Tag Counterfeiting
For tags that generate diﬀerent responses per query, counterfeiting takes a further step
to emulate the responses of a legitimate tag. Even with random challenge response
protocols, full memory dumping and reverse engineering to these tags are also possible. This requires the learning of the stored key and simulation of the cryptographic
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algorithms if the RFID system has tag authentication protection. An attacker is assumed to be capable to perform such delicate task. Adding tamper resistance may at
ﬁrst glance seems to be promising but it comes with a higher production cost, which is
not suitable for low-cost RFID tags; besides, there is no guarantee on their resistance
ability [1]. Most of the time the emulation (counterfeiting) is done on a more complex device like a pda rather than to recreate a similar RFID tag. Hence an honest
and trustful operator can help spotting such attack attempt. Other than that, the
remaining solution to these threats is to mitigate the motivations to attack a tag.

2.4
2.4.1

Example RFID Applications in Real World
ePassport

International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) deﬁned standard for ePassport. ePassport stores what are printed in the personal details page as well as the digitised photo of
the holder. These information are digitally signed to guarantee data integrity but they
are not encrypted. There are also access control and tag authentication in ePassport.
The access key is the combination of personal details printed in machine readable format inside the passport. The cover have metallic materials inside to block RF signals
when the passport is closed.
Researchers have published their assessments to the security and privacy issues in
ePassport [45]. Like other RFID applications it is subject to tag tracking, which violates
the location privacy of the holder. The non-encrypted personal details and photo
can be eavesdropped easily, which violates personal privacy. Clandestine skimming is
also possible because most of the information used to derive the access key are easily
available (passport number, DOB) and guessable (expiry date). In other words, the
access key is not random enough. It is expected to brute force the remaining unknown
bits within a few hours.

2.4.2

US Passport Card and Driver Licence

These RFID embedded cards provide much less security protections than ePassport.
They are essentially wireless barcodes as described in a security assessment report [57].
The only protection is the protective sleeve that comes with the card. These cards
use EPC Gen-2 chips, which do not have tag authentication protection. The access
control feature is not turned on either in these applications. The unique ID is sent in
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clear text, meaning that tag cloning is possible and was demonstrated in the report.
Since there is no tag authentication, tag counterfeiting can be done even using only
oﬀ-the-shelf EPC tags. Emulation using complex device does not require an exact copy
to be made. If the border oﬃcer has not verify the facial details with the card holder,
then any fake copy can get passes.
The US Homeland Security also provide their assessment with countermeasures for
these cards, which we summarise below:
• The biographic data obtained from the back-end database using the card unique
ID will be veriﬁed by the oﬃcer with the card holder to detect cloned cards.
• Individuals should always put their cards in the supplied protective sleeves to
avoid skimming and tracking.
• Readers are placed within suﬃciently large physically protected area such that
illegitimate readers outside this perimeter cannot eavesdrop on the tag and reader
communication.
• Requires where possible that only the unique ID is transmitted during communication to minimise the impact to personal privacy.
• Individuals are educated during card enrollments about the permissible use of
RFID cards.

2.4.3

UK Transportation Card

The transportation card in the UK is called Oyster card, which is used as a mean
to replace tickets for public transport in London. Smartrider in Australia also use
this chip. These cards use MIFARE classic chip, which implements a stream cipher
and use a 48-bit access key (ePassport use 56-bit) for tag authentication purpose.
The manufacturer had not published the details of the design of the stream cipher
until recently, attacks to the stream cipher was found by researchers [33]. It turns out
that through cryptanalysis, the messages exchanged during the authentication protocol
contains enough information to recover the symmetric key in less than a second. This
is an example that the symmetric key can in fact be revealed through tag and reader
communication, although in our research, we assume in our adversary model that an
adversary can always obtain the symmetric key by dumping the tag memory content.
The authentication algorithm and the implementation of the stream cipher is now fully
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understand and full functioning code to counterfeit the card is available online. Two
important lessons can be learnt from this experience:
• Security through obfuscation (by hiding the details of the cryptographic algorithms) does not last long. Only through public reviews, tests and formal proves
can a good algorithm be created. As suggested by the RFID CUSP group, open
design is one of the three principles in security design.
• The security of RFID systems cannot rely solely on the tag or reader or the underlying cryptographic algorithm. In the case of the Oyster cards, although their
cards can now be cloned easily, the impact is not that much. Every transaction
of ticket purchases are logged in a database and processed everyday. Duplicate
IDs can be found and the cloned cards are marked invalid for further use. This
means that a cloned card can have at most one day life. In the case of the US
passport card, cloning is extremely easy but an honest oﬃcer can still catch the
cloned card since the biometric information will not match with the card holder.
These are examples that a secure RFID application should be backed by more
than one security components.

2.5

Industrial Countermeasures

Some industrial practices for each of the security threats we have mentioned will be
summarised in this section. For the example RFID products, we will refer to the EPC
RFID system and the ePassport in the US. It is better to have these as the examples
to see what the industrial practices are and how the industry deals with the various
security threats. Although from a research point of view, RFID systems are far from
secure, it is still worth to sum up the practices being adopted by the industry provided
that RFID products are gaining more and more interest commercial-wise.

2.5.1

Countermeasure to Tag Collision Attack

The bottom line here is to try to avoid leaking any information in any situation, no
matter how small the portion is. Hence it is best to avoid using tree-walking as the singulation protocol if the RFID product provides options to choose from. Comparatively,
although the ALOHA protocol is probabilistic, it leaks no information compare to the
tree-walking protocol. This becomes a good practice adopted by the industry. EPC
class 1 Gen 2 has advanced to use the ALOHA protocol instead of the tree-walking
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protocol, which was used in Gen 1. The advice here is that users should be aware
of the anti-collision or singulation protocol that is being implemented in their RFID
products as well. Higher level security measures like encryption or access control could
be invalidated at a lower level if an insecure anti-collision protocol is used.

2.5.2

Countermeasure to Unauthorised Tag Scan

Limited-range transmissions
To combat eavesdropping, reader should not send out excessive power signals or it
will just extend the eavesdropping range. By lowering the power output of the reader,
this range can be reduced and it can exclude those out-of-range hidden rogue readers.
This results in a closer proximity for the attackers to launch their attacks and forces
these eavesdroppers to get closer to the subject. It becomes easier to spot any hidden
readers. By doing so, those who try to read the tags will most likely expose themselves.
Encryption
Another important practice is to encrypt all the communication between tags and
reader. Low-cost RFID tags may not be capable to perform encryptions on the ﬂy.
But any stored content including the unique ID can be pre-encrypted and leave the
reader to do the decryption. This is always a best practice to prohibit active scanners
from harvesting useful information from tags responses by querying the tags. With a
proper encryption, those who are unauthorised will learn nothing from tags responses.
Access control
One of the main security measures of both EPC tag and ePassport is the implementation of basic access control (BAC). Keys are used in BAC to provide veriﬁcation and
authentication, sometimes they even provide encryption for a secure communication
protocol. With access control, only those who are authorised can read the information
stored inside the tags.
Take EPC as an example. Class 1 Gen 2 tags have a 32bits access key stored (it
was only 8bits in Gen 1) inside their reserved memory bank. When a tag has been
singulated, the reader holds a random 16bits handle generated by the tag during the
singulation process. The handle is used as a reference to this speciﬁc tag. If access
control is turned on in this tag, the handle also acts as a randomised key to mask
(XOR) the access key. Upon verifying the access key provided by the reader after
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two message exchanges (two 16-bit random handles masking for each half of the 32-bit
access key), the tag is unlocked for access to the information stored. The same process
can be used again to relock the tag or lock again a locked tag to turn it into a read
only tag forever. Notice that the 16-bit random handles are generated by the tag and
send in plaintext in the tag to reader communication channel. Clearly, using them to
protect the access key requires an assumption that it is hard for the attackers to sniﬀ
on the tag to reader communication channel. Because it is easy to sniﬀ on the reader to
tag channel, which is why the access key is needed to be XORed by these “half”-secret
random handles.
ePassport in the US also has BAC. First there is a symmetric en/decryption key
already printed on the passport pages. It combines of the passport number, DOB,
passport expiry date and three check digits. ePassport RFID tags are capable to
perform triple-DES encryption. First the tag generates a random number RT for the
reader. Reader will use the encryption key to encrypt this number together with two
of its own generated random numbers RR and KR for the tag. Upon receiving the
encrypted value, the tag will decrypt it and check if it contains the random number
RT sent to the reader earlier. Next the tag generates another random number KT and
sends to the reader the encryption of RR , RT and KT . After the reader has veriﬁed
RR is contained in the encrypted value, both the reader and the tag have established
a session access key using KR ⊕ KT as the common reference string to generate the
actual key. Again, security is based on the hardness for the attackers to obtain the
en/decryption key printed on the passport. Or we can say that once the attackers have
obtained all these information, there are nothing left that store in the ePassport will
interest them anymore. In fact, the only biometric information stored in the ePassport
that seems to have some value is the photo of the passport holder. Some countries also
store ﬁngerprints, which we would not recommend provided that the security is built
base on such a weak defense.
Faraday cages
A physical measure to solve these attacks is to simply block all the RF signals from
reaching the tags. RF shielding is one of the security countermeasures of the e-passport
in the US. Metallic mesh is wrapped inside the passport cover to prevent the passport
from being read when the passport is closed. Retail products are also available from
third parties in the form of shielded wallets which provides equivalent protection should
RFID VISA cards and RFID banknotes become more popular. In some sense, this may
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be the most practical security protection method but the reason to use RFID has lost.
Signal blocking
A more adaptive physical measure is the use of a signal blocking device, a blocker
tag [47]. It is a special RFID tag that simulates the presence of every possible RFID
tag within the signal range of the reader in order to obstruct the identiﬁcation of
any particular tags. It reverses the purpose of singulation protocols or anti-collision
protocols which allow a reader to determine which tags are present when multiple tags
are within range of the reader simultaneously. It works by sending out two responses at
the same time to trigger a tag collision whenever it receives a reader query. However,
like the ID revealing attack we discussed before, a blocker tag is exactly the tool
attackers need to launch such attack. Abusing the use of blocker tag also creates
troubles for other applications running nearby or even turns into a denial-of-service
attack.

2.5.3

Countermeasure to Tag Counterfeiting

No sensible data to be stored in RFID tags
Separating all the information that will attract attacks from the tags to more secure
back-end database server is a good practice. Use only the unique ID extracted to
bring up other related records and information. By doing so, only the ID of the tag
is compromised at the worst case. There can be other means like revocation to stop
attackers from using the compromised ID to do other misbehaviour.
Tag killing
Passive RFID tags are believed to have inﬁnite life. They keep on functioning even
when they are thrown away. Users should be aware of this and a proper way to depose
them is required. Instead of burning them in a microwave, EPC tags have this kill
command that can deactivate the tags at time of their ﬁnal use. Killing the tag can
eliminate the possibility that information inside the tag is leaked to anyone. The killing
protocol is similar to the one with access key. Both the kill password and the access
key are 32-bits values. However, this is not a reversible process, hence it should be
done with caution.

2.6. Conclusion
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Conclusion

RFID is not only an advance version of barcodes, it has many other potential that
cannot be found in barcodes. Yet such an advance in technology also brings in many
new forms of security threats. In this chapter, we have discussed some of the best
practices when using this new technology. We have also looked at some of the practical
industrial security countermeasures to these threats. We would like to add in here that
user education is especially important in addition to all the technical means. As our
research proved in the later chapters that low-cost RFID tags are impossible to avoid
tag tracking attacks, two of the measurements: shielding the tag at all other idle times
and user education, are important to mitigate the impact of tag tracking. The ﬁrst
one largely reduces the possible time of attack to the moments when tags are removed
from the RF shield. The second one tells the public what are the possibilities and
impossibilities of RFID tags. This is especially important in order to raise the public
awareness to the potential security and privacy issues coming with this new technology.
Best practices are of no use if users are not aware of the threats surrounding RFID.
There will not be a single answer on how to secure RFID. It is always situation and
application dependent. Hence knowing what RFID can and what RFID cannot should
be the base of all security measures.

Chapter 3
RFID Protocols

Chapter Overview
In the previous chapter, we have looked into the RFID basics. We compared
RFID with barcode, explained the security threats when deploying RFID,
listed some of the possible attacks and discussed some of the industrial
countermeasures. This gives us a general understanding of the challenging
environment that RFID is facing. In this chapter, we will give an introduction on RFID protocols. First we discuss the system requirements, which
is an important prerequisite for a secure RFID protocol. Then we will look
at some common security goals that RFID protocols can provide. The settings are specially catered for low-cost RFID tags, which have the claimed
security constraints as discussed in the previous chapter.

3.1

Functionalities of RFID Protocols

So far we have discussed the security threats to the whole RFID system, together with
some physical means to protect the system, like shielding the tag, jamming the RF signals, limiting the signal strength/range and killing the tag. Although all these physical
countermeasures can actually thwart the threats to RFID systems, it is not diﬃcult to
see their nature are devastating, in a sense that they are sacriﬁcing the communication
capability among tags and reader. Of course they are still good practices for real world
RFID applications because most of the low-cost RFID systems still do not have adequate security protections on their RFID protocols. To restore the full functionalities
of RFID system, security measures should be moved back to the protocol level.
We summarise the most common characteristics of low-cost RFID tag systems as
follow:
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• Secure back-end database server
• Secure and reliable reader to back-end communication
• Trustable reader (operator)
• Tag and reader are capable to generate random numbers
• Tag is at most capable to perform symmetric key cryptography and secure hashing
• Tag is unable to perform PKI cryptography
• Tag is not tamper resistant
With the above settings, low-cost RFID tag systems deﬁne a communication protocol for tags and reader, which can provide the following three main functionalities:
• Tag identiﬁcation
• Access control
• Tag authentication

3.1.1

Tag Identiﬁcation

Most of the RFID chips are supplied with a unique identiﬁcation number called tag ID
at manufacturing time, which gives the uniqueness to every RFID tag. Apart from the
tag ID, custom ID can also be stored in the tag memory. These IDs are entered into
the back-end database before the tags are being deployed. When a tag is being queried
by a reader, it will response with its unique ID (in clear text, encrypted form or some
pseudonym replacements). If the tag has been registered in the system, readers that
have access to the back-end database can use the information obtained to identify the
tag and locate its record in the database. This is the most basic functionality of RFID
protocol.

3.1.2

Access Control

RFID systems that provide tag identiﬁcation only will usually have their tags response
to every reader queries (even if the reader is malicious). Access control provides better
protection by having the tags respond to readers that hold a correct access key only.
The access key unlocks the tag to release further information stored in its memory
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[94]. Some systems allow these information and the access key to be rewritten. The
access key can also be used to lock a tag to become a read only tag, this feature can
be found in EPC Gen-2 tags. Access keys can also be unique to every individual tag,
like the ePassport example where it is derived from optically scannable data printed
on the passport pages. Random number generator is usually required on the tag side
to provide a challenge to the reader and to mask the access key. Because of the ﬁrst
three RFID system characteristics, it is assumed that an adversary cannot obtain the
access key via legitimate readers nor from the back-end database. However, since the
access key is involved in the RF communication, weak protocol design may reveal the
access key to the adversary, which is the case of the MIFARE cards attacks [33].

3.1.3

Tag Authentication

Access control allows the tag to verify the access key before further information is
released, which eﬀectively authenticate the reader. Tag authentication, on the other
hand, oﬀers authentication for the tag. Compare to tag identiﬁcation, the unique
ID supplied in a tag response tells the reader the claimed identity of the tag but
does not prove its validity (e.g. think about a message replay). In authentication, a
cryptographic protocol using shared symmetric key is usually required for the tag to
prove that it knows the access key and is able to response with a correct value under
random challenge supplied by the reader. This can be done in two message passes:
reader ﬁrst sends a random challenge and the tag replies with a response related to
that challenge. Reader authentication is done implicitly: if the reader is not legitimate,
it cannot obtain useful information about the tag identity; if it can, then it is legitimate.
For some applications, the tag requires additional actions like key updating only when
it has communicated with a legitimate reader. In that case, reader authentication can
be done explicitly by using mutual authentication protocol. This is usually done in
three message passes: reader sends a challenge, then the tag replies to that challenge
together with its own challenge for the reader, the reader produces a response related
to the tag challenge so that the tag can verify and subsequently updates its key.
Authentication protocol is not commonly seen in daily RFID products (e.g. the
passport cards and driver licences in the US) but is seen in more security critical
applications (e.g. ePassport and the transportation card in the UK). This protection
guarantees that simple message replay by an adversary is not possible thanks to the
random challenge and the symmetric key cryptosystem. However, since the low-cost
RFID tags are not tamper-proof, there is no guarantee on the secrecy of the symmetric
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key and even the random number generation and the authentication algorithms can be
revealed if the adversary is able to dismantle the tag to study the circuit design and
dump the memory content.

3.2

Prerequisites for Secure RFID Protocols

In an RFID protocol, the communication can be separated into two parts: at the
front-end where tag and reader communicates and at the back-end where reader and
back-end server communicates. A secure RFID application must be backed by a secure
back-end server. It is the ﬁrst defense of the whole system. We do not consider
applications where the back-end server is insecure. We require the back-end server to
be non-compromisable. Also, the communication channel between the reader and the
back-end server has to be secured by some secure network protocol before we can focus
on the security at the front-end. It is the responsibility of the system providers to
maintain a reliable and secure back-end or else all the security measures implemented
at the front-end will be rendered useless.
The second defense is the reader, which also means the operators of the service if
humans are involved. Legitimate readers are assumed to be used by honest operators.
Other system users may sometimes be malicious but never the operators. Besides
honest, they should also be trustful to perform security measures. For example, the
custom and border oﬃcers in the ePassport example should follow the protocol to
verify the facial details of passport holders faithfully even though the digital signature
veriﬁcation passes. In most RFID applications, legitimate readers always have a secure
online connection to the back-end server in order to perform any immediate information
lookups and any necessary information updates. Hence, most of the time the back-end
server and each of the legitimate readers are considered as a single entity to simplify
the technical context. Because of this, compromising any legitimate reader means also
gaining access to the secure back-end server, which is not allowed (i.e. not protected)
in most of these RFID applications. Some [9, 34] consider compromisable legitimate
readers in oﬀ-line RFID systems, i.e. these legitimate readers do not always have a
continuous connection with the back-end server in order to see how they perform in
terms of privacy protections. The results are either quite negative [34] or require a
non-compromisable time period [9] in order to preserve privacy. Comparatively, these
systems are less common to be considered.
For the above prerequisites, we have the following suggestions:
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1. To guarantee the ﬁrst defence, the back-end database server is better to stay
private and not to be publicly accessible.
2. Following point 1., those who can access the back-end database server must be legitimate. A security mechanism is suggested to authorise and authenticate all the
connecting readers (or operators if human is involved) such that no unauthorised
access is allowed.
3. Following point 2., there must be physical protection to protect curious or even
malicious outsiders from accessing the legitimate readers easily. Depending on
the applications, one may combine the back-end database and the reader into a
single device to be protected together physically if the risk for losing the reader
is low. This can satisfy point 1 and 2 at the same time if done correctly.
4. Following point 3., it is suggested to have another system to monitor the use of
legitimate readers, by whom, when and where. This also helps guarantee the
honesty of the operators.
5. Following point 4., it is suggested to keep log of all the access to the back-end
database server (e.g. access time, reader ID, queried information, etc.) such that
any adversarial activities can be traced should point 3. or 4. fails.
6. In case there is a legitimate reader being stolen, there must be some contingent
plans to stop the stolen reader from accessing the back-end database server again.
Best if the plans do not aﬀect the user experience of other current legitimate
readers.

3.3

Adversarial Attacks on RFID Protocols

From the point of view of a user, the security concern is more than just the authentication of the tag or reader but also his/her privacy of location (i.e. tag tracking).
Tracking is a unique security threat for RFID systems that targets personal privacy.
Through eavesdropping, an adversary can at least obtain some information about a
tag. Although these information can be encrypted or look random (if not in plaintext),
they are still unique per tag, otherwise not even the legitimate reader can identify
(and authenticate) this tag. These information serve as a personal number plate that
aids the adversary to track the movement and location of the tag bearer. Some secure
RFID authentication protocols try to randomise the tag key after each tag scan, but
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then again, the changes made to the tag outputs due to the randomised key must still
be identiﬁable by the legitimate reader, which shares the same symmetric key with the
tag. How well the low-cost RFID tag systems can perform under this limitation in
protecting tags from tracking is the main research topic of this thesis. We will discuss
more about the privacy issues in section 3.4.
Let us ﬁrst look at some common attacks that adversaries use on RFID protocols
to achieve their adversarial goals. Remember the three main functionalities of RFID
protocols: tag identiﬁcation, access control and tag authentication. Tag identiﬁcation
says nothing about whether the claimed ID of the tag is true or not. It suﬀers from easy
tag cloning. Access control authenticates the reader to the tag, but still the identity
of the tag is not veriﬁed. In a secure application, this is not enough. For now on, we
will only focus on tag authentication.
Adversaries who attack RFID authentication protocols are commonly assumed to
have the following abilities:
• Record communication content between legitimate reader and tags
• Communicate to any tags and reader
• Control the communication medium
• Dismantle tag to learn the cryptographic algorithms and obtain any stored data
With these abilities, adversaries can launch various attacks to RFID protocols. To
give ourselves a clear picture, we assume there are three parties: the RFID reader, an
RFID tag and an adversary. The goal for the reader is to identify the tag and requires
the tag to authenticate itself. The tag on the other hand replies to every reader
queries, authenticates itself to the reader without leaking any useful information that
will consequently violates any security concerns during the authentication protocol.
And the adversary tries to stop both the reader and the tag to achieve their goals by
a combination of the abilities listed above.

3.3.1

Desynchronisation Attack

To authenticate a tag, there must be some secret information that is “known” by the
tag only but not the others. Using this secret information, the tag can compute a
unique response and prove to the reader it is who it is. This is common as in other
wireless systems when computational power is not an issue. For low-cost RFID tags,
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a standard cryptographic calculation may become a burden. Hence it is proposed
in [43] a minimalist for low-cost RFID systems. At the system setup time, a list of
pseudonyms is generated for every tag. These values are also stored at the back-end
server, associating with the tag ID. The tag can reply with the next pseudonym for
each reader query and the reader will match it with the database to ﬁnd the true tag
ID.
Clearly, this protocol can authenticate the legitimate tags and diﬀerentiate the fake
ones because of the extremely small probability that an adversary can guess the next
pseudonym correctly. However, there is a problem when a tag runs out of pseudonyms.
Normally it may take a reasonable time before this happens, but an attacker can launch
a desynchronisation attack by querying the tag repeatedly. Since the tag will always
reply with the next pseudonyms, such attack will cause the tag out-of-sync with the
reader (i.e. the next pseudonym assumed by the reader is diﬀerent from the tag).
Eventually, the tag will exhaust all its pseudonyms and the reader cannot authenticate
this tag anymore. Hence a desynchronisation attack can lead to a denial-of-service
(DoS) attack. This DoS attack can result in simple tag tracking: desynchronise a
victim tag and if DoS happens later on, the victim tag is there. More desynchronisation
attack techniques are discussed in [49].

3.3.2

Man-In-The-Middle Attack

To overcome the limited pseudonyms exhaustive problem, it is best for the tag to be
able to refresh its pseudonyms or generate a new one for each reader query. Because
of this, [37] proposed an approach called “universal re-encryption”. In this approach,
the pseudonym stored inside a tag can be refreshed by the reader or any external
trusted devices. One application to this protocol is the RFID-enabled banknotes system
[46, 96, 98]. However, the re-encryption process has to be done privately and by a
trusted party because the new value is sent directly to the tag to replace the old one,
it suﬀers from easy denial-of-service attack, simply replaces the pseudonym with some
invalid value. [4] discussed other security issues in this approach. [85, 86] on the
other hand proposed a diﬀerent approach where the tag and the reader keep track
on a timestamp. The reader will send the current timestamp tc to a tag and the tag
will compare it with its own timestamp t. If t < tc , the tag will reply with a new
pseudonym computed using tc and update its timestamp t to tc ; or else the tag will
reply with a random value. The reader can compute on the same pseudonym using tc
to authenticate the tag. However, both of the proposed protocols are later found to be
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vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack in [49].
A man-in-the-middle attacker puts herself between a reader and a tag, connecting
them as a middle man where normally the signal range of the reader cannot reach
the tag. This means that all the communication between the reader and the tag has
to go through the attacker. During a protocol session, the attacker may adaptively
replace/swap/delay the communication content. This may require some cryptographic
knowledge. Like the attack on [37] requires the attacker to be able to compute a reencryption of the pseudonym. While the attack on [85, 86] is more elementary. It is also
addressed in the same paper. First the attacker replace tc to a large value tm (a future
time). Since tm > t, the tag will update its timestamp to tm . After that, this “future”
tag will not be authenticated by the reader because tm > tc and the tag will always
reply with a random value until tc catches up with tm . The man-in-the-middle attacker
has eﬀectively desynchronised this tag and causing a DoS to the tag temporary, which
as a result also leads to tag tracking.
Man-in-the-middle attack can also be used to reveal the shared symmetric secret
key. An example is the HB protocol and also its family. HB protocol is ﬁrst proposed
by Hopper and Blum [42], hence the name HB protocol. The protocol was targeted at
human to computer authentication, but Juels and Weis later on found the similarities
between RFID tags and human, where both have very limited computational power,
and based on the HB protocol, they proposed an RFID speciﬁc protocol called HB+ in
[48]. Following their work, a lot of other variants were proposed. To prevent running
out of pseudonyms, HB protocols use challenge-response to allow adaptive responses
based on the challenges given and the shared symmetric secret key, which can be
reused polynomially without worrying the exhaustive attack above. The computations
required are very easy. The original HB protocol requires only the tag to perform an
inner dot product between a k-bit random challenge and the k-bit secret key. The
response is an one bit message. Of course, any attacker can guess the result right half
the time. So HB protocols require the challenge-response round to repeat r times and
hence the probability of guessing all the results right (blind guess only) becomes

1
.
2r

However, a passive eavesdropper who captures enough valid messages can compute
the secret key by solving the linear equations. To overcome this, a random noise is
added to each response by the tag through out all r rounds. The idea is to alter the
response η of the time so that the reader will authenticate the tag if less than ηr
responses are invalid. The security of HB protocols is based on an NP-hard problem
called learning parity in the presence of noise. Juels and Weis noticed that the original
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Tag{xID , yID }
Challenge-response round:
Choose ν ∈ {0, 1} randomly
where P [ν = 1] = η
Pick b ∈ {0, 1}k randomly
Compute (a · xID ) ⊕ (b · yID ) ⊕ ν = z
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Reader{xID , yID }

−−−b−→
a−−
Pick a ∈ {0, 1}k randomly
←−−
z−→ Verify if z = (a · xID ) ⊕ (b · yID )
−−−

Figure 3.1: HB+ Protocol

HB protocol is not secure against an active attacker. The attacker can repeatedly query
the same tag with the same challenge. With high probability, the correct response can
be obtained if enough samplings are recorded because the noise only happens η of the
time. This is undesirable in RFID environment. They remedied this by an improved
version of the HB protocol called HB+ , where an additional blinding value is added.
Figure 3.1 illustrates this protocol.
Here the random noise ν is chosen to be 1 with probability η. The tag is authenticated if the accumulated number of incorrect z after r rounds is less than ηr. The
improvement made by Juels and Weis is the blinding factor b. If an active attacker is
to query a tag with the same challenge a, the response is still XORed by b · yID , hence
the eﬀect of the noise is further blinded. However, Gilbert et al. showed a man-inthe-middle attack in [36] for the HB+ protocol and subsequently for the rest of the HB
protocol family in [35]. They call their attack the GRS attack. The attack exploited an
additional information coming from the reader: the authentication result. A reader will
not send out an authentication result explicitly but instead it simply grants access or
not to the tag based on the result. By seeing an opened door or a successful transaction
for example, this becomes a side-channel information for the attacker. Take the HB+
protocol as example, the attacker launches her man-in-the-middle attack by altering
the challenge a by 1 bit. If after the alternation the tag still passes the authentication,
then the attacker knows the corresponding bit in xID based on the altered bit position
is 0, as changing the bit in a does not aﬀect the result. Otherwise, the corresponding
bit in xID is 1. The attacker repeats the attack for all other bit positions and ﬁnally
the whole xID can be revealed. This shows a powerful use of man-in-the-middle attack
to reveal the secret key in protocol level without physically tampering the tag.
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Relay Attack

RFID is especially vulnerable to relay attack. This is a powerful attack and requires
no cryptographic knowledge to launch such attack. Like the man-in-the-middle attack,
an attacker again stands between a reader and a tag but this time she does not need
to change any communication contents. The attacker who carries out this attack will
act as a tag to be authenticated and records the challenge sent from the reader. Since
the attacker lacks the secret information that is required to compute a correct response
to the challenge, she will need to ﬁnd a legitimate tag as the attack target. Later on
when an attack target appears, this challenge is relayed to the target by the attacker
and the valid response from the target is forwarded back to the reader. As a result,
the attacker can deceive the reader from believing that it reads a legitimate tag but it
was the attacker actually.
Timing is an important measure to defend such attack. Notice that in the above
scenario, the attacker has stored the challenge for a period of time before relaying it
to the attack target. A simple method is to assign an expiry time for each challenge
and response in the protocol (i.e. replying with a response computed from a challenge
that has expired will not pass the authentication). However, [53] has demonstrated a
nearly real time relay attack. In its settings, the attacker requires two devices namely
the ghost (which communicates with the reader) and the leech (which communicates
with the tag). Consider a scenario that the attack target and the attacker is queueing
at the cashier and use RFID credit card to purchase items. The attacker slips the leech
close to the target credit card. Through a wireless link, the leech is connected with the
ghost on a much higher bandwidth and faster link than the RF link between the reader
and the credit card. The ghost is presented to the reader to collect the challenge and
send to the leech in real time. The leech then relays the challenge to the credit card
and the response is forwarded back to the ghost through the fast wireless link. Finally,
the target credit card will be charged instead. It is estimated in [53] that the longest
distance between the ghost and the reader can be 50m apart. The leech and the RFID
credit card, although the card has a much less power output, can also be separated
about 50cm away from each other. It turns out that the close proximity assumption
(that the data acquired by the reader must be come from the card presented) does
not hold anymore. It is suggested that additional counter measures are needed. For
example, add a switch to turn on or oﬀ the RFID card, or an additional PIN code is
required every time a transaction is started.
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Tag{KID }
Slow phase:
Compute HKID (NV ) = R
where R = R10 ...Rn0 ||R11 ...Rn1
Fast phase:

Reader{KID }
N
←−−−V−−−

Generate random nonce NV
Compute HKID (NV ) = R̂
Generate random bits C1 , ..., Cn

Ci
←−−−
−−
RiCi
−−−−−−→

for i = 1...n, sends Ci
Verify if RiCi = R̂iCi

Figure 3.2: Distance Bounding Protocol

Another approach is to calculate the round-trip time of the messages being exchanged between the reader and the tag. This is called proximity check and is used
in distant bounding protocols. Distant bounding protocols are not designed only for
RFID originally. The ﬁrst distant bounding protocol was proposed in [13] by Brands
and Chaum. An RFID speciﬁc one was proposed in [40] by Hancke and Kuhn. Figure
3.2 illustrates this protocol.
Here KID is the shared symmetric key of the tag ID with the reader. H is a secure
hash function that hashes the nonce into a 2n-bits value R using the tag key during the
slow phase. R is then split into two n-bits portions R0 and R1 . During the fast phase,
if the tag receives a random bit Ci from the reader, it immediately responses with the
i-th bit Ri0 if Ci = 0 or Ri1 if Ci = 1. After n iterations the reader will receive n random
bits from the tag. If all n bits match the corresponding bits from the pre-computed
value R̂, then the reader can guarantee that the tag is within a distance d = c ·

tm −td
2

where c is the propagation speed of radio wave (or speed of light), tm is the round-trip
time and td is the computation delay on the tag.
Distant bounding protocols are speciﬁcally designed to thwart relay attacks. The
idea behind is to use the round-trip time measured and the speed of light to calculate
the maximum possible distance between the reader and the tag. Hence any delay in
receiving a message will result in a conclusion that the message is possibly being relayed
or the tag is not within proximity. The protocol consists of two phases: the slow phase
and the fast phase. The slow phase is for the tag to prepare computation extensive
calculations and the fast phase requires the tag and the reader to rapidly exchange
bitwise results of the computed value obtained in the slow phase. The bounded distance
will cause relay attacks infeasible and force man-in-the-middle attacks to expose within
close proximity. This area of research is another big topic in RFID, because it does
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not require complex computation to achieve its goal, it especially suits the constrained
environment of RFID. But because its security is based on some physical assumptions,
it is out of scope for our research. We will only give a brief introduction here.

3.3.4

Replay Attack

Replay attack is quite similar to relay attack, but this time, the attacker does not need
to carry out the attack in real time. During an authentication session, the reply from
an attack target is eavesdropped by the attacker and stored for later use. Next time
when there is a reader query, the attacker can response with the same reply and the
reader will authenticate the attacker as the attacked target. [94] is an example protocol
that stands against the desynchronisation attack and man-in-the-middle attack but
is vulnerable to replay attack as shown in [49]. A naive approach to ﬁx this is to
maintain a list at the back-end server of the replies provided by each tag. [14] suggested
that it is more appropriate to defend this attack by requiring the tag responses be
unique and unpredictable for every reader query. Usually this requires the use of
cryptographic hash functions. An example protocol that is resistant to replay attack,
desynchronisation attack and man-in-the-middle attack is proposed in [17].

3.3.5

Timing Attack

The protocol proposed in [17] is quite satisfactory as an authentication protocol for
RFID, it stands against most of the attacks discussed above (excepts the powerful
relay attack). There is more to consider when privacy is of concern. It is pointed out
in [49] that this protocol is vulnerable to timing attack. An attacker will try to gain
advantage using the timing information available during the protocol (e.g. the diﬀerent
elapse times taken for the reader to output pass or fail for the tag authentication) to
identify diﬀerent tags. First, the attacker keeps querying the attack target, in order to
desynchronise it. The protocol in [17] is not vulnerable to desynchronisation attack as
a legitimate tag can always re-synchronise with the reader. Although the attacker will
not be succeed in making the tag denial-of-service, she has a diﬀerent goal this time. All
she does is to “mark” her attack target and releases it back to the system. This action
does cause some changes to the authentication process. The reader, although it can
authenticate the attack target eventually, it does take a longer than usual processing
time (compares to other non-attacked tags) to ﬁnish the authentication. If the attacker
can distinguish this timing diﬀerence, she can identify her attack target again at a later
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time after the “marking” action. This is a violation to the tag bearer’s privacy. This
attack is considered as a side-channel attack. There is no solution to this yet but we
suggest the authentication process to take a constant minimum processing time that is
long enough to cover the longest processing time needed to authenticate a tag (possibly
been attacked). Hence it is not only the communication content that matters when
designing a new authentication protocol, how the algorithm is implemented such that
no attacker can gain advantage is also important.

3.4

Privacy in RFID Authentication Protocols

Because the communication between the reader and tags is over an insecure channel,
one has to assume that all the communication contents are available to an adversary.
Requiring a reader to authenticate itself to a tag does not help much as an adversary
can always eavesdrop on the communication without actively involving in it. It is also
possible for the tag to break the privacy of the tag bearer during the authentication
protocol if the protocol is poorly designed. Hence both authentication and privacy
have to be considered equally when attempting to design a secure RFID authentication protocol. In this section we will look at those privacy concerns that have been
considered in the design of RFID authentication protocols to protect the tag bearer’s
privacy.

3.4.1

Personal Privacy

The most basic privacy concern that can be seen in nearly every RFID authentication
protocol is personal privacy. It was ﬁrst seen in [94]. Though it was not formally
deﬁned in the paper, the author related this to “keeping the RFID tagged content
private”. Later on in [74], this is referred to data leakage or data privacy as in [41].
In that sense, one can understand this as a requirement that the content stored inside
an RFID tag (so as the tag ID) is kept secret to everyone and should not be revealed
during the authentication process. Only a legitimate reader within the same system
can understand these anonymous data to authenticate and identify the RFID tag.
An example protocol to demonstrate this can be found in [94]. Figure 3.3 is a
simpliﬁed version to illustrate this protocol.
Here H(.) is a cryptographic hash function and n is the total number of tags in the
system. In the protocol, every time when an RFID tag is queried, it will reply with an
metaID. In that way, the real ID of the tag is kept secret from adversary, who do not
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Reader{IDi , KIDi }

Tag{metaID}

Request
←−−−−−−−−−−
−−−metaID
−−−−−−−→ for i ∈ {1, n}, ﬁnd {IDi , KIDi }
s.t. H(KIDi ) = metaID
Figure 3.3: Personal privacy preserving protocol

Tag{KID }
Generates random R
C = H(KID ||R)

Reader{IDi , KIDi }
Request
←−−−−−−−−−−
R, C
for i ∈ {1, n}, ﬁnd {IDi , KIDi }
−−−−−−−−−→
s.t. H(KIDi ||R) = C

Figure 3.4: Location privacy preserving protocol

have any knowledge about the linkage between ID and metaID. In contrast, a legitimate reader that is connected to the back-end server can access all these information
such that the real ID (so as any other related information) of a tag can be looked up.

3.4.2

Location Privacy

This privacy concern appears in both [94] and [41]. This is another most important
privacy concern in RFID. It is referred to “tracking of individuals” or “behavioral
tracking/personal identiﬁcation by tracing tag IDs” as in [74] and deﬁned as Tag output
must be indistinguishable from truly random values. Moreover, they should be unlinkable
to ID of the tag. If the adversary can distinguish that a particular output is from a
target tag, she can trace the tag.
It is noted that the metaID protocol in [94] described previously, although it can
protect personal privacy, it fails to protect location privacy. Given that a tag will
always reply with the same metaID, any adversary can distinguish this metaID from
a random number (i.e. the metaID is itself a unique pointer). Although the adversary
learns nothing about the true ID and the related information of the tag, she can location
her target whenever she reads the same metaID. We will instead, use the enhanced
protocol in [94] to illustrate this privacy concern. Figure 3.4 is a simpliﬁed version of
this protocol.
Here || means concatenation. Every time when the tag is being queried, it generates
a new random number and hash it with its tag key. Now since the output from the tag
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Tag{s1 = H(KID )}
C = F (sk )
sk+1 = H(sk )
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Request
←−−−−−−−−−−
−−−−−C
−−−−→

for i ∈ {1, n}, ﬁnd {IDi , KIDi }
s.t. F (H k (KIDi )) = C

Figure 3.5: Forward privacy preserving protocol

is random every time, trying to trace a particular tag is impossible. Recall from the
previous section, however, this protocol is vulnerable to the replay attack. An attacker
can replay the random response R, C every time when a reader sends a query.

3.4.3

Forward Privacy

Since RFID tags are not tamper resistant, it becomes a privacy concern when an
adversary obtained the data stored inside the memory of the tag. If there is any
stored personal information, it is revealed to the adversary (i.e. breaking personal
privacy). If the adversary has also recorded the pervious communications between the
tag and reader, it may be possible for the adversary to link up the past authentication
sessions of the tags (i.e. breaking the location privacy). Hence making sure that the
privacy protections can be pushed forward from the beginning to the point where the
tag secret is revealed is of the same importance especially in the low-cost RFID tag
systems. [74] stated this forward privacy as “Even if the adversary acquires the secret
tag data stored in the tag, she cannot trace the data back through past events in which
the tag was involved. Needless to say, the adversary who only eavesdrops on the tag
output, cannot associate the current output with past output.”.
We will use the protocol in [74] as an example here to demonstrate this. Figure 3.5
shows this protocol.
Here H k (.) denotes the number of hashes applied. i.e. for k = 3, it means
H(H(H(KIDi ))). There are two cryptographic hash functions H(.) and F (.). Each
time when a tag is being interrogated, its internal secret information sk is updated to a
new value by H(.) at the end. This is here for achieving personal privacy and forward
privacy such that even if the current sk value is revealed to an adversary, she cannot
ﬁnd out the previous sj values for j < k because H(.) is non-invertible (one-way).
While the function F (.) is here for location privacy and forward privacy. If the tag
simply outputs sk = H k (KID ), sk+1 = H(sk ), ... in each authentication session, then
any adversary can identify the same tag as she computes sk+2 = H(sk+1 ) and see if
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there is a tag that outputs sk+2 .

3.5

Security Properties for RFID Authentication
Protocols

We have just looked at the three privacy issues in RFID. Personal privacy is easy to
protect, simply moves all the personal information from the tag memory to the backend server and stores only a reference key in the tag memory. Location privacy is also
easy, just makes sure the outputs of the tag are randomised, then the tag cannot be
traced. Forward privacy is relatively the hardest to guarantee. The tag key has to be
constantly changed and the tag outputs have to be appeared random. But even with
these, it may still be traceable in front of a timing attack adversary who can spot the
subtle diﬀerence of the time taken to identify a desynchronised tag than a normal tag.
The hard problem here is how to make an RFID authentication protocol that cannot
be made desynchronised and provides forward privacy at the same time? This is one
of the research topics in this thesis.

3.5.1

Example Scenario

To better understand the traceability problem in RFID, it is best to have an example
scenario in mind:
A military oﬃcer, named Bob, is going to carry out an important mission, which is
to deliver an advance high-tech weapon from the military base to a strategic site. The
weapon is equipped with RFID tag for authentication purpose. During the delivery,
Bob’s truck has to go through some check points, so that Bob’s assistance, Alice, who
is monitoring the progress of the mission at the military base, can verify the integrity
of the weapon through RFID scans at these check points. With the help of a secure
database server at the base, she can identify and authenticate the weapon based on the
RFID signals obtained. Fearing that the ﬁnal destination of the weapon will be exposed,
they have arranged some decoy trucks to join up during the mission. In the last check
point, they have possibly unloaded and swapped the actual weapon with one of the decoys
and then they split up and go on diﬀerent routes. An adversary, Eve, driving close to
these trucks on the road is now trying to ﬁnd out where the destination of the weapon
is. She is equipped with all the required RFID equipments to interact with the RFID
tags on the weapon and the decoys and also the readers at the check points. So she
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can either eavesdrop whenever Alice makes a scan or she can readily scan the tags and
even interfere with Alice’s scans. She has been scanning since the beginning to learn
about the signal content obtained from the weapon tag. She is going to use this trained
knowledge to identify the truck with the actual weapon out from those decoys. She is
now on her own to relate each piece of information she obtained through eavesdropping
and/or interactions to decide which truck she should follow so that the ﬁnal destination
is revealed.
In the above scenario, for simplicity, we assume there are only two trucks on the
ﬁnal leg. Of course, Eve could have successfully guessed the correct truck to follow
with a probability of

1
2

by a blind guess. The RFID protocol here is to limit Eve

from increasing her success probability non-negligibly higher than 12 . Initially before
the decoy trucks join up, by eavesdropping on Alice’s scans or actively scan the truck,
Eve can obtain a tag response that comes from the actual weapon. Hence in an RFID
protocol where a tag is designed to always give out the same response will simply allow
Eve to win. A more secure RFID protocol would have encoded the responses in a way
that only with the help of the secure back-end server should these responses be properly
decoded. As a result, the best Eve can do is to collect and study each response from
the weapon tag she obtained before the crew split up and relate these responses to the
responses now scanning from each of the trucks. This setups a challenge to Eve: To
ﬁnd out her target using the obtained RFID information from two trucks. Carefully
investigating the matter, we can have four diﬀerent security properties to assure Bob
that Eve will not success.

3.5.2

Anonymity

This is the most basic property: The outputs of the RFID tag should appear random
to anyone without access to the secure database server. i.e. each scan to a tag T will
result in a random string R. Formally speaking:
P r[R : R ← Scan(T ), R ∈ M] ≈ P r[R : R

rand
←
−−
−

{0, 1}∗ ]

This says that the probability of getting R within the output message space M from
Scan(T ) is approximately the same as the probability of getting a random string drawing from random space. This implies that an adversary has only a negligible chance to
distinguish between a meaningful output and a random string.

3.5. Security Properties for RFID Authentication Protocols

3.5.3

39

Unlinkability

Having anonymity only is not enough to assure Bob. It is suﬃcient to protect tags
from being traced if the adversary only has non-continuous access to tag responses.
e.g. Consider a protocol that the tag outputs {Ri , ri } where ri is a random number
and Ri = H(Ri−1 ||ri ) with H(.) being a secure hash function. Clearly, the outputs
all appear random thanks to the secure hash function and an adversary who obtained
only {Ri , ri }, {Ri+2 , ri+2 }, {Ri+5 , ri+5 }, . . . non-consecutive responses will have no way
to trace the tag.
But if the adversary is more powerful, who is able to monitor the communication channel continuously, then by obtaining the tag outputs {Ri , ri }, {Ri+1 , ri+1 },
{Ri+2 , ri+2 }, . . . , she can easily verify if this is the same tag by checking if Ri+1 =
H(Ri ||ri+1 ) or if Ri+2 = H(Ri+1 ||ri+2 ). Hence we should add another property, namely
unlinkability: The outputs of the RFID tags in each scan should be unpredictable to
anyone without access to the secure database server. Formally speaking:
∀i, j, Ri , Rj ∈ M, P r[Ri : Ri ← Scan(T )] = P r[Rj : Rj ← Scan(T )]
This says that the probability of outputting Ri in the ith scan is the same as outputting
Rj in the jth scan, even if j = i + 1. This implies that every output from a tag in the
output message space M is evenly possible.

3.5.4

Indistinguishability

Having the two properties above are not enough to assure Bob. They are suﬃcient to
protect tags from being traced if the adversary does not have access to another reference
tag. e.g. Consider a modiﬁed OSK protocol [74] that the tag outputs {Ci , Ci′ } and
′
′
Ci = F (Ri ), Ci′ = F (Ri′ ), Ri+1 = H(Ri ), Ri+1
= H(Ri+1
) where H(.) and F (.) are both

secure hash functions. Clearly, the outputs are all appear random and are unlinkable
thanks to the one-wayness of the hash functions.
So far the adversary has only considered the information leak from a single tag with
respect to a random source. Now if she turns to consider the outputs from another tag
instead of a random source, then she is able to relate the two tags and ﬁnds out her
target. Let the outputs of tag A be {Ci , Ci′ } and the outputs of tag B be {Ĉi , Ĉi′ }. Say
the tags will initialise R1 (R̂1 ) as r and R1′ (R̂1′ ) as
has r = 4 then we have {R1 , R1′ } = {2, 2} and

r+2
. If tag A has r = 2 and tag B
2
{R̂1 , R̂1′ } = {4, 3}. This glitch causes

tag A to always output Ci = Ci′ . If a random tag is given to the adversary at the end,
she can instantly point out tag A from tag B by checking if Ci = Ci′ . Hence we have
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indistinguishability to guarantee: The outputs of any two RFID tags in each scan
should be indistinguishable to anyone without access to the secure database server.
Formally speaking:
Deﬁne a game for indistinguishability (Game-IND):
1. An adversary is allowed to interact with any tag she likes, obtaining their outputs
RiT∗ .
2. After q1 interactions, she has to nominate two tags TA and TB in which she thinks
she can distinguish them.
3. One of the tags is picked randomly and gave back to her as T⊥ and the other one
is discarded.
4. She can then interacts with this unknown tag T⊥ and the other remaining tags,
obtaining their outputs.
5. After q2 interactions, she has to guess whether T⊥ = TA or T⊥ = TB , with
q1 + q2 ≤ q.
we say that for all poly(k) time adversary bounded by q:
P r[success in Game-IND] =

1
1
+
2 poly(k)

This says that the probability of guessing correctly whether T⊥ = TA or T⊥ = TB in q
number of interactions is only negligibly better than making a blind guess. This implies
that an adversary can only get very little advantage through the interactions. Note
also that what we say about something that is indistinguishable also includes the sense
that it is random and unpredictable because something that is static or predictable
can be distinguished easily. So any system that has the indistinguishability property
also has the anonymity and unlinkability properties.

3.6

Conclusion

Low-cost RFID tags are subject to many security threats: cloning, eavesdropping,
tracking etc. Under the current adversary ability assumptions, it seems that it is
impossible for these constrained tiny chips to avoid some of the stronger attacks on
the protocol level. Clearly, security should not be built solely on the protocol level. In
fact, security threats can be mitigated with the help of other parts of the systems, like
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an honest oﬃcer can help spotting a counterfeited tag. Besides, we believe through
user educations, the public awareness to the potential security threats in RFID can be
raised, which also helps mitigate the impacts. On the other hand, what interested us
most is the performance of RFID authentication protocols on the tag tracking problem.
Location privacy is the most important privacy issue in RFID application and a secure
solution is yet to be found. To make the situation even more complicate, we are
unavoidably compelled to consider also forward privacy (tag compromise problem)
and timing attack (a side-channel attack) due to the unique characteristics of low-cost
RFID tags. These problems are hard but challenging, which also form the core part of
this work.

Chapter 4
Our Findings on RFID Privacy Modellings

Chapter Overview
In the previous chapter, we introduced RFID protocols. We looked at the
system requirements and summarised most of the security goals commonly
seen in secure RFID authentication protocols. This gives us a picture on
the possibilities that one may expect to see in these protocols. In this
chapter, we will move onto discuss how we can formalise these security
goals into formal models for security evaluations. First we will give a critical
review on some of the early notable works about RFID privacy modelling,
especially the famous Vaudenay privacy model [93]. Then we will present
our ﬁndings on their inconsistency and discuss some contradictory results
that we obtained. Part of the results in this chapter has been published in
[70] at ESORICS 2008. We have the following contributions in this chapter:
• We give a critical review on most of the early notable works on RFID
privacy modellings
• We select two privacy models and show their inconsistence by constructing protocols that have diﬀerent results in each of them
• We fully review the Vaudenay privacy model and comment on its results
• We revise the Vaudenay privacy model and present our revised version
based on some reasonable assumptions
• We present our diﬀerent results comparing to the Vaudenay model and
justify our ﬁndings
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RFID Privacy Models

There are easily more than hundreds of proposed RFID protocols according to the
extensive RFID related publication list maintained in [87]. These RFID protocols are
of various types: tree-based, hash-based, symmetric, asymmetric, stateless, stateful,
lightweight, ultralightweight, deterministic, probabilistic, etc. A lot has proposed, yet
we are seeing more to come. It has been a phenomenon in the literature that in a year
a new protocol is published then there is/are paper(s) attacking it in the next year.
Some are fundamentally ﬂawed to being with, but more are because of the diﬀerent
understandings or deﬁnitions to the term “privacy” in RFID applications; furthermore,
what kind of adversary is being considered in the paper can also turn the tables. Take
PKC as an example, semantic security was used as a merit until IND-CCA2 was
introduced.
Security protocols nowadays are required to be formally proven secure under a
formal model before they can be widely accepted. It is very important for us to
emphasise that only with a formally deﬁned model, we can be sure that given an RFID
protocol, one can tell if it guarantees the claimed security or not and to what extend.
RFID, however, as an emerging topic in cryptography, lacks a uniﬁed common model
to formalise the security and privacy requirements for its special environment. An
RFID protocol can be proven secure in a paper on its own model, but the problem is
whether we agree that to be a good RFID model? Are the security goals properly set?
Is the adversary given with reasonable capabilities? Does it captures most of the real
world attacks? How is the application of the underlying system adequately deﬁned?
A formal model serves to model any possible real world behaviours of an adversary
does to the system. By deﬁning what are the resources available in the system, which
resources can be controlled by the adversary, what are the goals of the adversary and
how does she claim to be succeed, we can show that an underlying system is secure
or not against such adversary. To put it together, one is expected to see the following
components in an RFID modelling:
• System model – deﬁnes the system environment, parameters, constrains, assumptions and application
• Adversary model – deﬁnes the capabilities of the adversary, i.e. to capture the
targeting form of real world attacks that the protocol aimed to protect from
• Security model – deﬁnes the security goals of the protocol, i.e. short-listing
the security features that the protocol aimed to provide
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Since the main concern of the many security threats in RFID is privacy, we will
refer to the three models above as the privacy model. In fact, most of the proposed
RFID protocols aimed to restore privacy in the constrained RFID environment.

4.2

Early Works on RFID Modellings

We started our research in 2008, interestingly, among the hundreds of published works
in RFID researches, there were only very few attempts to provide a uniﬁed privacy
modelling for RFID. RFID has its uniqueness in its constrained environment, especially
with those low-cost RFID tags, which should receive a diﬀerent cryptographic view
then those more capable wireless devices. Hence, most of the case a direct reuse of
other wireless application modellings is not ﬁt for the purpose of evaluating RFID
applications, unless we are looking at mid to high cost range RFID tags, but that
does not worth the eﬀort for a meaningful research. In particular, low-cost RFID
tags are always considered to bear no tamper resistance, such that we have to also
consider the situation when a tag falls into the hands of an adversary, the stored
content (including any secret keys) inside the memory chip of the tag can always be
extracted by the adversary. This key-exposure-by-default setting is very essential in
RFID applications and plays a major role in RFID privacy modellings. Compared to
other wireless applications, security against key exposure may only be an added security
feature. This shows us the need of a unique privacy model for RFID. Of course, some
proposed RFID protocols come with their own privacy model, but because they are
not created in mind to be generalised into wider applications, porting them to other
protocols may not give fruitful results. To the best of our knowledge, we could identify
six notable works purely devoted for general RFID privacy modelling. We will give an
overview to some of them below.

4.2.1

The Ari Juels Model

Dated the earliest, Juels’s work [43] was the ﬁrst among the six to formalise a practical
privacy model with the physical boundaries of low-cost tags in mind. To reﬂect the constrained environment of RFID in his model, the adversary’s abilities are also restricted.
What he proposed in the paper is the notion minimalist cryptography for those lowcost (ﬁve cents) tags. The given example protocol uses only pre-stored pseudonyms in
the tag shared with the reader and uses XOR operation to update these pseudonyms
with one-time pads. For this simple bitwise only, without any cryptographic operation
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protocol to remain secure, the adversary is restricted to have only limited successive tag
queries and limited interleaving between tags and readers. The former aimed to solve
the tracking problem and says due to the close read range of RFID tags, a passerby
attacker would have diﬃculties to harvest more than two pseudonyms in most cases.
The number of successive tag queries can also be controlled by prolonging the tag response time through throttling mechanisms such that a tag can have more than enough
time to be refreshed back to a secure state with new pseudonyms before all the unused
pseudonyms are harvested. The latter aimed to solve the man-in-the-middle attack
thanks to the mobility of tags (i.e. tags wearers) and reader throttling (e.g. refuse
to engage in rapid succession with the same tag). Under these restrictions, tags can
always have endless supply of new pseudonyms, so that tag tracking by matching any
repeated pseudonyms is not possible.
We agree that this restricted model indeed guarantees non-trackable tag movements,
mainly due to the assumption limited successive tag queries. But the question is how
close this model captures the real world scenarios. Clearly, an online attacker will be
aﬀected by the close read range of tags and the proposed throttling mechanisms, but
if we consider also an oﬄine attacker, who is capable to launch a “holiday attack”
(accessing the target tag when the tag wearer is gone for a holiday as analogous to
lunch-time attack), that gives a much longer time for the attacker to harvest more
pseudonyms out from the tag. If we further consider an attacker who is capable to
spot the subtle response time diﬀerence between a normal tag and the target tag,
which has recently been queried a number of times to prolong its next response time
due to the throttling mechanism, then tracking will become possible again. These
attacks do not require any empowered adversaries to launch and are quite reasonable
in a real world scenarios.

4.2.2

The Gildas Avoine Model

Next in line is the work by Avoine (ﬁrst obtainable at [5] and later extended into a
technical report in [6]). According to [6], this work was the ﬁrst to formalise the traceability problem in RFID. There he deﬁned several oracles to represent the abilities
of the adversary as in other formalisations. Accessing these oracles is equivalent to
the interaction between the adversary and the RFID system. Instead of a restrictive
adversary modelling, Avoine considered a more general adversary commonly seen in
RFID by giving her an oracle access to reveal the content of a tag, only with the
limitation that such oracle can only be the last oracle to be accessed (i.e. no more
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oracle accesses are allow once the reveal oracle is called). All together there are ﬁve
oracles, other than Reveal (R), the rest are Query (Q), Send (S), Execute (E) and
Execute∗ (E∗ ). The traceability problem in RFID is formalised into two adversarial
goals, namely Existential Untraceability (Existential-UNT) and Universal Untraceability (Universal-UNT). Both are deﬁned as game-based security by playing a game
with the adversary on distinguishing the target tag out from two challenge tags. Thus
the privacy of a given RFID protocol is attained if the winning probability of the adversary in either of the games is only negligibly higher than 2−1 over all the random
choice of tags. Existential-UNT models an adaptive adversary who can choose the
attack instances to interact with the two challenge tags, while Universal-UNT models
a non-adaptive adversary who receives the interaction results of unknown instances for
each of the two challenge tags. The discontinuity between instances is to model a real
world adversary who may not monitor the target tag constantly but only temporarily.
Intuitively, breaking Existential-UNT means there is at least one possible instance
that an adversary can exploit to trace a tag and the opposite is there exists no instance
that an adversary can trace a tag; breaking Universal-UNT means a tag can be traced
at any instances and the opposite is there exists at least one untraceable instance. By
deﬁnition existential untraceability is stronger (i.e. the adversary is given with more
power) than universal untraceability, hence the former is harder to achieve. Therefore an RFID protocol secures against Existential-UNT attackers is automatically
secures against Universal-UNT attackers, or in other words, an RFID protocol that
fails Universal-UNT is also not Existential-UNT. But failing Existential-UNT does
not necessarily fail Universal-UNT. Hence the highest attainable privacy protection in
[6] is Existential-UNT.
We will cover more about Avoine’s model in the next section. What catches our eyes
is the ﬂexibility of this model. Especially the ability to choose the attack instances by
the adversary in the Existential-UNT game and the ability to choose the learning instances in both games are not commonly seen in other RFID formalisations. Also, with
the diﬀerent combinations of the choice of oracles formalise a variety of adversaries. For
example, there can be UNT-E, UNT-Q, UNT-QSE, UNT-QSER adversaries, in which they formalise an eavesdropping only adversary, a querying only adversary, an actively interacting adversary and an even stronger tampering adversary respectively. Notice that when
the model says Existential-UNT implies Universal-UNT, it is over the same choice of
oracles. For instance, Existential-UNT-QSE does not implies Universal-UNT-QSER,
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but Existential-UNT-QSE implies Universal-UNT-QSE. In addition, the chronicle order of learning and attack instances further deﬁnes Existential+ /Universal+ and
Existential− /Universal− adversaries, where it depends on whether the attack instances all (either chosen by or given to the adversary) happen chronologically later
than or before all the learning instances respectively. If they all happen before all the
learning instances, it is essentially a forward privacy attacker; otherwise, it is a backward privacy attacker. This shows that this is a very ﬂexible model that can accommodate many real world attack scenarios. Several RFID protocols are assessed using this
model and only the famous OSK hash-based protocol [74] is the most secure, which provides both Existential-UNT-QSE privacy and Forward(Universal− )-UNT-QSER privacy. Another hash-based protocol WSRE [94] provides only Existential-UNT-QSE
privacy but not Forward(Universal− )-UNT-QSER. These are examples to clearly show
the separation results between privacy protections oﬀered by diﬀerent RFID protocols.
However, the usefulness of all the oracles are not fully demonstrated, like the oracle E∗
is not used at all.

4.2.3

The Xiaolan Zhang and Brian King model

The ZK model (not to confuse with a zero-knowledge model) was ﬁrst published in
[97] and later extended into a journal version in [99], our review is based on the latter.
Instead of focusing on the abilities of the adversary, the ZK model tried to parameterise
some security quantities in RFID. First, it deﬁned ﬁve security properties, namely Perfect Identiﬁcation of tag Identity (PII), Authorized Perfect Identiﬁcation of tag Identity
with κ-history (APII), Authorized Perfect Identiﬁcation of tag Bearers with κ-history
(APIB), Indistinguishability of tag Identity with κ-history (INDI) and Indistinguishability of tag Bearers with κ-history (INDB). PII essentially means tag availability, APII
and APIB mean tag and owner authentication, INDI means tag data privacy and INDB
means indistinguishability of owner. Next, it proposed to parameterise the acceptable
error tolerance for non-legitimate tags (δ), the rejection error tolerance for legitimate
tags (ϵ), the maximal adversary advantage obtainable (γ) and the bounded history
size (κ). With all these security parameters, there can be (δ, ϵ, γ, κ) RFID APII/APIB
and/or (γ, κ) RFID INDI/INDB secure RFID protocols.
In fact, we are not too keen on the non-deterministic RFID protocols. During
our research, we only came across the HB genre and its variants [35, 36, 48] and the
protocols that build on top of PUF [12, 32] are of this category. They are not of our
interest, ﬁrstly because they are non-deterministic, meaning that even a legitimate tag

4.3. Inconsistencies in RFID Privacy Models

48

can get rejected by a legitimate reader under normal circumstances, not related to any
adversarial attacks. And secondly because they all use static shared symmetric keys,
which is deﬁnitely not privacy friendly in front of a tampering adversary. Therefore,
under the ZK model, we will have to consider only δ = ϵ = 0, which is (0, 0, γ, κ)
RFID APII/APIB. This eﬀectively reduces to a common probabilistic polynomial timebounded adversary with a winning advantage γ under the system security parameter
κ. Since the Juels and Weis model [49] also features this kind of adversary and is
stronger, we will focus on their model instead of this ZK model.

4.3

Inconsistencies in RFID Privacy Models

In an eﬀort to design a widely accepted privacy model for RFID, we can see there are
diﬀerent innovative designs proposed from the previous section. But before a model
is deemed widely accepted, we found inconsistencies in these models. A contradictive
result is shown by the well known OSK protocol [74] where this protocol was shown
to be secure under the Avoine model [6], but is considered insecure in the Juels and
Weis model [49]. In this section, we will look at these two privacy modellings of RFID
in details and discuss their implications. To better compare the two models, we have
simpliﬁed some of the notations a bit in order to focus on their core structures.

4.3.1

Untraceability in the Avoine Model

System model
There are communication channels between the back-end database and readers, and
also between readers and tags. Only the communication between readers and tags is
relevant to the traceability issue in RFID. Hence the communication channel between
the back-end database and readers is assumed to be secure or of no interest to an
adversary. The communication channel between readers and tags are further separated
into two channels: one from a reader to a tag (the forward channel) and one from a tag
to a reader (the backward channel). The contents of the data stored in the memory
of tags is also considered as a separate channel (the memory channel). Each of these
channels can be read or written by an adversary, except the memory channel where
writing to it is not allowed. It is also assumed that the contents of the tags are
independent.
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Adversary model
The adversary’s abilities are limited to the following oracles to obtain a realistic and
applicable model. A denotes the adversary. A tag is denoted as T , a reader as R and
a protocol as P. An instance of a protocol P from the point of view of tag and reader
j
is denoted as πTi and πR
respectively.

• Query(πTi , m1 , m3 ): this oracle models A sending a message m1 to T through
the forward channel and subsequently sending it the message m3 after a response
from T is received.
j
• Send(πR
, m2 ): this oracle models A sending the message m2 to R through the

backward channel and receiving its response.
j
• Execute(πTi , πR
): this oracle models A executing an instance of P between T

and R, obtaining the transcript of the communication on both the forward and
the backward channels.
j
• Execute*(πTi , πR
): this oracle models A executing an instance of P between T

and R, but only the messages sent on the forward channel is obtained.
• Reveal(πTi ): this oracle models A revealing the content of the date stored in T ’s
memory channel at instance πTi . This oracle can be accessed only once and after
that Query, Send, Execute, and Execute* cannot be accessed anymore.
Untraceability deﬁnition
i
Let R denotes the reader, T1 and T2 denote the two tags, πTi ∗ and πR
denote the

interactions obtained (i.e. messages sent and received) from a tag T∗ at instance i and
from the reader R at instance i. Let I = {i1 , i2 , ..., in } be a set of instance indexes
i
and ΠI (T∗ ) = {πTi ∗ |i ∈ I} and ΠI (R) = {πR
|i ∈ I} be sets of interactions obtained

from a tag T∗ and the reader R at instances I respectively. Let O(I, T∗ ), O(I, R) be
oracles access to tag T∗ and reader R that return the interactions ΠI (T∗ ) and ΠI (R)
respectively. Let q be the total number of allowed attack instances. Finally, let C
be a uniformly random function that models a challenger who gives the adversary A
necessary inputs. A re-phased version of Avoine’s untraceability game is deﬁned in
table 4.1.
The advantage of A for a given protocol P is Advuntraceability
(A) = 2 · Pr(Tb =
P
T ) − 1. If the advantage is negligible then P is said to be q − UNTAvoine secure.
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Expuntraceability
[q, C]:
Avoine
Learning stage
1. A requests C thus receiving her attack target T
2. A chooses instances I where |I| = n
3. A calls O(I, T ) and/or O(I, R) to receive ΠI (T ) and/or ΠI (R)
Challenge stage
1. A requests C thus receiving her challenges T1 and T2
2. A chooses instances I1 and I2 where |I1 | + |I2 | + n ≤ q and (I1 ∪ I2 ) ∩ I = ø
3. A calls O(I1 , T1 ) and/or O(I1 , R) and O(I2 , T2 ) and/or O(I2 , R) to receive
ΠI1 (T1 ) and/or ΠI1 (R) and ΠI2 (T2 ) and/or ΠI2 (R)
4. A decides which of T1 or T2 is T and output her guess Tb
Table 4.1: Untraceability experiment in the Avoine privacy model
Implication
Avoine deﬁned Existential Untraceability and Universal Untraceability in [6]. The only
diﬀerence is whether A or C controls the choice of I1 and I2 . Since existential is a
less restrictive deﬁnition than universal, and hence stronger, we selected it for review
here. According to the deﬁnition above, we can see that the attack target is ﬁxed
at the ﬁrst step (by a random choice of C). The adversary then choose her attack
instances (need not be consecutive) to interact with either the target tag or the reader
or both freely. She just need to weight and balance her number of attack instances in
the learning stage and the challenge stage such that the total number does not excess
q. During the challenge stage, she will receive two tags as her challenges, one of them
being the original attack target. She then interacts further with these tags and/or with
the reader if the total number of interactions has not excess q. Finally from all the
interactions she obtained, she needs to decide whether T1 or T2 is T .
Notice that we did not speciﬁc what exactly are the available oracle accesses
(i.e.O(I, .)) to the tags and reader by the adversary. This is only a choice of the
RFID system. Depending on diﬀerent applications and scenarios, there can be diﬀerent oracle accesses that are available to the adversary to model her ability. We aimed
to compare on the untraceability deﬁnitions only so it is enough at its current simpliﬁed form. For instance, we can allow the adversary to query on the tags and reader,
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or execute the protocol faithfully just as an eavesdropper will do. This is the same for
the following security modelling.

4.3.2

Indistinguishability in the Juels and Weis Model

System model
The system model is nearly the same as Avoine excepts that Juels and Weis consider
the contents of tags can be correlated and the adversary is allowed to write into the
memory channel.
Adversary model
It is simpler than Avoine but with some essential diﬀerences. The adversary is stronger
by giving her a new ability to write new content into the memory of tag.
• ReaderInit(): this oracle models A requesting R to produce a fresh challenge
cj
• TagSend(Tj , cj ): this oracle models A sending the challenge cj from R to Tj
through the forward channel and receives a response rj from Tj
• ReaderSend(Tj , rj ): this oracle models A sending the response rj from Tj to R
through the backward channel and receives its result
• SetKey(Tj , kj ): this oracle models A writing a new key into the memory of Tj
and at the same time overwrites the old key. Tj also outputs the old key hence
A can reveal it
Indistinguishability deﬁnition
Let O(T∗ ) and O(R) be oracles access to a tag T∗ and the reader R, which return the
interactions πT∗ and πR respectively. Let q be the total number of oracle access and C
be a uniformly random function that models a challenger who gives the adversary A
necessary inputs. Juels and Weis’s indistinguishability is deﬁned as the game in table
4.2.
The advantage of A for a given protocol P is Advindistinguishability
(A) = 2 · Pr(b′ =
P
b) − 1. If the advantage is negligible then P is said to be q − INDJuels

and Weis

secure.
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Expindistinguishability
[q, C]:
Juels and W eis
Learning stage
1. A can call a total of n ≤ q O(T∗ ) and/or O(R) to receive π(T∗ ) and/or π(R)
following her strategies
Challenge stage
1. A selects two tags T1 and T2 and submits them to C and receive back Tb from C
2. Remove T1 and T2 and add Tb to the current set of tags
3. Again A can call the remaining number of allowed oracle access O(Tb ) and/or
O(R) to receive π(Tb ) and/or π(R)
4. A decides whether Tb is T1 or T2 and output her guess b′
Table 4.2: Indistinguishability experiment in the Juels and Weis privacy model
Implication
Juels and Weis deﬁned indistinguishability in [49]. Juels and Weis allow the adversary
to adaptively choose her challenges. She can decide on her own choice of tags T1 and
T2 (if the system has more than two tags, otherwise, they will be a real and fake tags)
based on the information gathered in the learning stage. According to her strategies,
she may ﬁnd T1 and T2 more vulnerable than the other tags such that she can increase
her chance of success in the experiment. C randomly picked one of the submitted tags
and returns it as the adversary’s challenge. Further oracle access is allowed if the total
number does not excess q. Finally she needs to decide whether Tb is T1 or T2 .
We have simpliﬁed the original indistinguishability deﬁnition in [49] by removing
the system speciﬁc available oracle accesses. There is actually a SetKey(T , k) oracle
access to a tag T , which allows the adversary to set the internal key of T to her
choice of value k. This oracle is suggested to model an adversary’s ability to corrupt
“correlated” tags. Since the tags in our system are independent to each other, being
able to set a new key on some non-attack target brings no advantage to the adversary.
On the other hand, setting a new key on the attack target makes the adversary win
the indistinguishability experiment instantly. This powerful adversary ability is not
necessary in our context.
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Reader{IDi , KIDi }
Request
←−−−−−−−−−
C−−−→
−−−−−

for i ∈ {1, n}, ﬁnd {IDi , KIDi }
s.t. for j ∈ {0, q}, ﬁnd P RN Gk+j (KIDi ) = C

Figure 4.1: Protocol secure in the Juels and Weis model but not in the Avoine model

4.3.3

Analysis of the Two Deﬁnitions

There are some essential diﬀerences between the two deﬁnitions. Speciﬁcally the ability
to choose the attack instance in the Avoine model is missing in the Juels and Weis
model. As we already have the OSK protocol [74] proven secure in the Avoine model
and proven insecure in the Juels and Weis model. This shows some of the inconsistences
between them. We further construct an example protocol that is insecure in the Avoine
model but is secure in the Juels and Weis model to complete the inconsistency analysis.
Figure 4.1 presents the protocol.

4.3.4

Comparison

In the example protocol, we have a PRNG that takes in the tag key KID as the seed
and k is the k − th output of the PRNG. The outputs are pseudo-random. At the
system setup time, every tag is assigned a diﬀerent random key KID that serves as
the unique random seed per tag. These random seeds are also stored in the database
server in a table, which has two columns: the true tag ID and the tag key.
Now if we have a system parameter l, which represents the number of bits of the
output of the PRNG. Then we should set q = 2l (the maximum number of queries
allowed in the experiment). Otherwise the PRNG would have exhausted all of its
possible outputs when being queried the 2l + 1 − th time and cycled back to its initial
output. Such repeated values allows the adversary to trace the same tag. i.e. the tags
are untraceable if the total number of queries is less than or equals to q.
However, the above is true only if the attacks are carried out consecutively. If the
adversary is able to specify her attack instances, then the tags in this protocol will
become traceable by the following attack sequences even with q-bounded queries:
Claim: Protocol in ﬁgure 4.1 is insecure in the Avoine model but secure in the Juels
and Weis model.
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Proof: Avoine model
1. A requests the Challenger to receive her target T .
2. A chooses instance 1 and runs the protocol on the target tag T and receives
{C1 }.
3. A requests the Challenger to receive her challenges T1 and T2 .
4. A chooses instance 2l + 1 and runs the protocol on tag T1 and receives {Ĉ2l +1 }.
5. A checks if Ĉ2l +1 = C1 , if true, then outputs T1 as her guess; else outputs T2 .
As it is shown that it only requires 2 queries (which is ≪ q) for A to trace the
same tag. A only fails if there is a collision in the PRNG (i.e. P RN G1 (KID1 ) =
P RN G2l +1 (KID2 ), where KID1 and KID2 are the random seeds assigned to T1 and T2
respectively), which is negligible. Hence A can success with high probability.

⊓
⊔

In fact, it makes sense to allow an adversary to request for speciﬁc attack instances
when launching her attacks. In reality, even though an adversary is not attacking, those
tags and reader are constantly communicating to each other. This changes the internal
states of them and may beneﬁts the adversary. In some applications, the number of
tag scans is quite predictable (e.g. an RFID-enabled door pass used at an entrance
gate). If the protocol has a shorter cycle or the random function has some defects that
repeats a pattern once a while, then this can be exploited by an adversary even she is
not monitoring her target continuously.
Proof: Juels and Weis model
The adversary is bounded by q as the maximum number of oracles accesses it can make.
The repeating cycle for the PRNG in the example protocol is 2l = q. By deﬁnition, a
PRNG is pseudo-random if it is hard to distinguish from a random permutation drawn
from it and a random permutation drawn from {0, 1}l . Hence within the bounded
number of oracle accesses, the PRNG performs as a random number generator and the
adversary sees no diﬀerence from Ci and a random reply.

⊓
⊔

The analysis on the Avoine model and the Juels and Weis model tells us that a
uniﬁed RFID formalisation is needed to obtain consistent results, which leads to our
next step: to look into an even stronger RFID privacy model by Serge Vaudenay.
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A Strong Privacy Model for RFID by Vaudenay

We presented here an even stronger privacy model for RFID. This gives new meaning to
what it means by a secure protocol. Clearly from the example protocol in the previous
section, PRNGs with known cycle will not be secure under our new deﬁnition, which
gives a strong message to RFID protocol designers to abandon the use of PRNGs in
their protocols. This leave us with random oracle (hash functions) and encryption
(both symmetric and asymmetric) schemes as our tools to secure RFID protocols. It is
still an open question that whether untraceability can be fulﬁlled with hash functions
only. Because of the limited computation power in RFID tags, public key cryptography
is unlikely to ﬁt in and made practical. Serge Vaudenay proposed a new strong privacy
model for RFID in [93] with eight classes of privacy levels. He concluded his paper by
showing that strong privacy in RFID is impossible. Furthermore, an open questions
whether forward privacy without requiring public key cryptography (PKC) is achievable
or not was raised. We ﬁrst summarize the Vaudenay model here, in particular the terms
that will be used frequently in the following sections. Readers should refer to [93] for
the complete deﬁnition and more information.

4.4.1

System Model

An RFID system is deﬁned by the composition of two setup algorithms and the actual
RFID protocol.
• SetupReader(1s ) is used to generate the required system parameters KP and
KS by supplying a security parameter s. KP denotes all the public parameters
available to the environment and KS denotes the private parameters stored inside
the reader and will never be revealed to the adversary.
• SetupTagbKP (ID)

1

is used to generate necessary tag secrets KID and SID by

inputting KP and a custom unique ID. KID denotes the key stored inside the
tag, rewritable when needed according to the protocol. SID denotes the memory
states pre-set to the tag, updatable during the protocol. A bit b is also speciﬁed to
indicate this newly setup tag is legitimate or not. An entry of the pair (ID, KID )
will be added into the database of the reader to register this new tag when b = 1.
Otherwise, if b = 0, the reader will not recognize this tag as a legitimate tag and
1

this b notation was not explicitly speciﬁed originally in [93] for this algorithm, we see the need to
add it to make the description more precise.

4.4. A Strong Privacy Model for RFID by Vaudenay

56

no entry is added. Notice that KID and SID are not public and are not available
to the adversary unless the tag is corrupted.
• the actual protocol used to identify/authenticate tags with the reader.

4.4.2

Adversary Model

The following eight oracles are deﬁned to represent the abilities of the adversary. We
may remove and omit some details in some of the deﬁned oracles but their main functionalities are still maintained.
• CreateTagb (ID) allows the creation of a free tag. The tag is further prepared by
SetupTagbKP (ID) with b and ID passed along as inputs.
• DrawTag() returns an ad-hoc handle vtag (unique and never repeats) for one of
the free tags (picked randomly). The handle can be used to refer to this same
tag in any further oracles accesses until it is erased. A bit b is also returned to
indicate whether the referencing tag is legitimate or not.
• Free(vtag) simply marks the handle vtag unavailable such that no further references to it are valid.
• Launch() starts a protocol instance at the reader side and a handle π (unique
and never repeats) of this instance is returned.
• SendReader(m, π) sends a message m to the reader for a speciﬁc instance determined by the handle π. A reply message m′ from the reader may be returned
depending on the protocol.
• SendTag(m, vtag) sends a message m to the tag determined by the handle vtag.
A reply message m′ from this tag may be returned depending on the protocol.
• Result(π) returns either 1 if the protocol instance π being queried completed
with success (i.e. the protocol identiﬁes a legitimate tag) or 0 otherwise.
• Corrupt(vtag) returns all the internal secrets Kvtag

2

and Svtag of the tag deter-

mined by the handle vtag.
2
Originally in [93], Kvtag was not included in the description. They assume that Kvtag is always
extractable from Svtag . We add Kvtag here to make the description clearer.
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The interface (the environment) that provides the access to these oracles for the
adversary also maintains a hidden table T , which is not available to the adversary until
the last step of the privacy experiment (to be reviewed below). When DrawTag() is
called, a new entry of the pair (vtag, ID) is added into T . When Free(vtag) is called,
the entry with the same vtag handle will be marked unavailable. The true ID of the
tag with handle vtag is represented by T (vtag).

4.4.3

Privacy Experiment

The privacy experiment that runs on an RFID protocol is deﬁned as a game to see
whether the adversary outputs True or False after seeing the hidden table T . At
the beginning, the adversary is free to access any oracles within his allowed oracles
collection (which deﬁnes diﬀerent classes of adversary) according to his own attack
strategy. Once the adversary ﬁnishes querying, the hidden table T will be released to
him. The adversary will then analyze the table using the information obtained from
the queries. If the adversary outputs True, then he wins the privacy experiment.
To measure the privacy level of an RFID protocol, a blinder is constructed to simulate Launch(), SendReader(m, π), SendTag(m, vtag) and Result(π). If the adversary
can still win with a similar probability in the above experiment even in the present of
a blinder (hence the simulations do not aﬀect the winning probability too much), then
his attack strategy is considered to be trivial. i.e. either the simulations are perfect or
the attack strategy does not exploit the simulated oracles. If for all the possible attack
strategies from this adversary, we can construct a blinder (possibly diﬀerent) for each of
them such that they are all trivial attacks, then the RFID protocol being experimented
is called P -private where P is the privacy class. Let A be the adversary and AB be
the same adversary blinded by the blinder B, then |Pr[A wins] − Pr[AB wins]| = ϵ can
be used to express the above measurement where ϵ is a negligible value.

4.4.4

Privacy Classes

The eight privacy classes are distinguished by diﬀerent oracles collections and diﬀerent
natures on accessing Corrupt(vtag) according to the strategies of the adversary.
• Weak : A basic privacy class where access to all the oracles are allowed except
Corrupt(vtag).
• Forward : It is less restrictive than Weak where access to Corrupt(vtag) is
allowed under the condition that when it is accessed the ﬁrst time, no other
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⇒
⇒

Weak
⇓
Narrow-Weak

Figure 4.2: Relationship of the 8 privacy classes in the Vaudenay model

types of oracle can be accessed subsequently except more Corrupt(vtag) (can be
on diﬀerent handles).
• Destructive : It further relaxes the limitation on the adversary’s strategies compares to Forward where there is no restriction on accessing other types of oracle after Corrupt(vtag) under the condition that whenever Corrupt(vtag) is
accessed, such handle vtag cannot be used again (i.e. virtually destroyed the
tag).
• Strong : It is even more unrestrictive than Destructive where the condition for
accessing Corrupt(vtag) is removed. It is the strongest deﬁned privacy class in
Vaudenay’s privacy model.
Each of these privacy classes also has their Narrow counterparts. Namely, NarrowStrong, Narrow-Destructive, Narrow-Forward and Narrow-Weak. These classes share
the same deﬁnitions of their counterparts only there is no access to Result(π).
By relaxing the limitation on the adversary’s attack strategies from Weak to Strong,
the adversary becomes more powerful. One can see that the privacy level is increasing
from Weak to Strong if the protocol is secure against the respective class of adversary.
Hence, for an RFID protocol to be Strong-private, it must also be Destructive-private.
Likewise, to be Destructive-private, it must also be Forward -private, and so on. And
then for a P -private protocol, it must also be Narrow -P -private since the Narrow
counterparts are more restrictive. With all these implications, the relations between
the eight privacy classes are depicted in ﬁgure 4.2.

4.5

Our Reﬁned Vaudenay Privacy Model

Having observed the classiﬁcation of privacy presented in [93], we show that these eight
privacy classes can be reduced to three privacy classes under appropriate assumptions.
Hence, we provide a simpliﬁed privacy classiﬁcation in RFID but by no means it is
being crippled, rather, it is more handy to use. Based on our simpliﬁed classiﬁcation,
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we show that the strongest privacy level is indeed achievable, in contrast to the result
presented in [93]. This is a positive result that supports the use of RFID in practice.
We also answer the open question in [93] by pointing out the possibility to achieve
forward privacy without PKC, both within the formal model and in practice.

4.5.1

Preliminaries

The following basic assumptions will be used in the following parts. We note that these
assumptions have been used in the existing works as well, and hence, they are not
unreasonable. We consider an RFID system with one reader and many tags, in which
their relationship is always many to one, i.e. all the legitimate tags are identiﬁable
by a legitimate reader and only this legitimate reader can identify them. During an
execution of the RFID protocol, only a single tag will be involved in the communication
with the reader in each instance, i.e. an appropriate and secure singulation protocol
is always assumed. The reader may need a back-end database server to help with the
identiﬁcation process. The link that connects the reader and the back-end database
server is assumed to be secure and always reliable and available. The reader can retrieve
necessary data whenever required. Hence, we consider the reader has online connection
to the server and together they can be regarded as a single entity. The back-end server
is secure and cannot be attacked. Furthermore, due to this requirement, the reader
is not corruptible and all the data stored in reader side are secure. Only the wireless
link established between the reader and the involving tag during a protocol instance
is insecure. Tags are not tamper-proofed. All the internal secrets stored, the memory
contents written and the algorithms deﬁned are assumed to be readily available to the
adversary when a tag is corrupted. The reader will always initiate the protocol by
sending out the ﬁrst query message (may contain a challenge) as the tags are passive.
Notice that whenever we mention the data inside the reader, we do not necessarily
mean they are stored in the memory of the reader. Rather, they may actually retrieved
from the database server in reality. Data management is also another advanced research
topic in RFID researches to solve access rights problem, provide support of multiple and
oﬀ-line readers, etc., in particular for the supply chain environment like [61]. Although
there is such a separation, it does not aﬀect our discussion as we merely focus on the
communication between tags and reader.
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New Privacy Classiﬁcation

In this section, we ﬁrstly comment on the privacy model deﬁned in [93]. In particular,
we comment that the separation of eight privacy classes is rather excessive and unnecessary for most of the RFID protocols under proper assumptions. Then, we provide
our simpliﬁed privacy model that will merge some of the privacy classes into a single
class. The main aim of this section is to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For protocols without correlated keys and do not produce false-negative
results, the eight privacy classes can be reduced to three major privacy classes if the
adversary only makes “wise” oracle access.
The “no false-negative” assumption that we will incorporate also appear in Lemma
8 of [93] where narrow-forward and narrow-weak privacy classes are reduced to forward and weak privacy classes respectively (i.e. from eight classes to six classes). The
lemma assumes that any legitimate tag will always be identiﬁable, which means no
false-negative is possible. Hence, accessing the Result(π) oracle is not signiﬁcant as
1 will always be returned. As a result, the separation between Forward (Weak ) and
Narrow-Forward (Narrow-Weak ) becomes unnecessary. We further extend this to the
strong and destructive classes and consider also the false-positive case in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. If the privacy model considers only RFID protocols that are correct and no false-negative is possible and we assume that the adversary A only makes
“wise” oracle access whenever A has a non-trivial attack strategy, then the separation
between narrow and non-narrow classes is unnecessary.
The idea of proposition 2 is that if we can be sure and verify that the RFID protocol
being examined will never give out false-negative, then we can examine the protocol
only according to the deﬁnition of the privacy classes Strong, Destructive, Forward and
Weak by assuming a “wise” adversary. This means that whether the Result(π) oracle
is accessed or not, it does not aﬀect the privacy experiment results. We can remove the
necessity of this oracle and reduce the eight privacy classes into four privacy classes.
Before prooﬁng the proposition, we have to deﬁne what is “wise” oracle access and
redeﬁne what are trivial and non-trivial attacks. We also introduce perfect blinders
and partial blinders.
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Wise adversary
An adversary A who is “wise” on oracle access will not make any oracle access that
is redundant, or in other words, brings no advantage to him in attacking privacy of
the protocol. We argue that this deﬁnition can be deﬁned naturally as although the
oracle access is available to A, if the access will not provide any help to A during the
attack, then naturally A will not access it anyway. Simply speaking, A will not waste
any oracle access. More formally, let S and S ′ denote two diﬀerent attack strategies
of A in the privacy experiment for the same privacy class. Let q and q ′ be the total
number of oracle accesses after executing S and S ′ respectively. S deﬁnes a “wiser”
oracle access strategy compares to S ′ if and only if Pr[AS wins] = Pr[AS ′ wins] and
q < q ′ . Overall, a “wise” adversary can be generally deﬁned such that for all his attack
strategies, the total numbers of oracle accesses are always minimal. Of course, such
general deﬁnition of “wise” is not speciﬁc enough because q is not known before the
end of attack. Speciﬁc rules are needed to keep q minimal. Consider the following as
the special properties of our “wise” adversary:
• No access to the same oracle (if not probabilistic) with the same input twice.
• No access to oracles where the results can be precisely predicted.
Property 2 may be too general and should receive more justiﬁcation. However, to
serve our purpose in reducing the privacy classes, it is enough to focus on the Result(π)
oracle only, i.e. if a certain result is expected, the “wise” adversary will not access the
Result(π) oracle. Indeed, if the RFID protocol is Correct, then any legitimate or
non-legitimate tag should be identiﬁed correctly, i.e. if the protocol instance π was
completed for a legitimate tag, then Result(π) should return 1; otherwise, 0 should
be returned if it was a non-legitimate tag. This should be true as long as there are no
adversarial attacks or the attacks are insigniﬁcant. We say that an attack is signiﬁcant
if and only if it causes the Result(π) oracle to return an opposite result. This means
that if there is a signiﬁcant attack on a legitimate tag, then Result(π) would return
0 instead of 1, and we have a false-negative; if there is a signiﬁcant attack on a nonlegitimate tag, then Result(π) would return 1 instead of 0, and we have a false-positive.
Notice that we do not need to consider incorrect identiﬁcation here where a legitimate
tag with ID a is identiﬁed as ID b because the Result(π) oracle will only return 1
either way, making it indistinguishable by looking at the returned value only. After
all, impersonation is not the goal of the privacy adversary.
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Redeﬁning trivial and non-trivial attacks
By deﬁnition, if there is a blinder B such that |Pr[A wins] − Pr[AB wins]| = ϵ where
ϵ is a negligible value, then we say that the attack by A is trivial, otherwise if the
value is non-negligible then the attack is non-trivial. It naturally follows that we can
express this diﬀerence in the success probability of A under normal oracle access and
simulated oracle access as the potential advantage loss of A because A has a diﬀerent
failure probability during the interactions with simulated oracles due to abortion of
the blinder. We deﬁne this disadvantage as DB abort = |Pr[A wins] − Pr[AB wins]| =
|(1 − Pr[A fails]) − (1 − Pr[AB fails])| = |Pr[A fails] − Pr[AB fails]|. Hence, DB abort
is the diﬀerence in the probability that A will fail after the introduction of B and if
DB abort = ϵ, then the attack by A is trivial; otherwise if DB abort = θ where θ is some
non-negligible value, then the attack by A is non-trivial.
Perfect blinder
A perfect blinder B̄ is a blinder that can simulate all the four blinded oracles (Launch(),
SendReader(m, π), SendTag(m, vtag) and Result(π)) perfectly such that DB̄ abort = ϵ.
Partial blinder
Similarly, a partial blinder Ḃ is a blinder that has at least one of the four blinded
oracles where the simulation is not perfect. i.e. Ḃ will have a chance to abort if an
imperfect simulated oracle is being accessed. Notice that we may or may not end up
with DḂ abort = θ because A may or may not have eﬀectively exploited the imperfect
simulated oracle(s), it depends on the attack strategy of A.
We have the following lemma that changes a partial blinder to a perfect blinder.
Lemma 1. A partial blinder can be viewed as a perfect blinder if and only if the
adversary does not eﬀectively exploit the imperfect simulated oracle(s).
Proof. Let Ḃ be the partial blinder where at least one of the four simulated oracles is
imperfect. Let O denote the set of simulated oracles, then we have Op be the set of
perfect simulated oracles and Opc be the set of imperfect simulated oracles. Op ∪Opc = O
and Op ∩ Opc = ∅. Let O′ be the set of non-simulated oracles and let E ∗ be the event
that an abortion happens in oracle ∗. (if part) It is easy to justify that Pr[AḂ fails]
′

′

′

= Pr[E O ] + Pr[E O ] = Pr[E Op ∪Op ] + Pr[E O ] = Pr[E Op ] + Pr[E Op ] + Pr[E O ]. Since
c

c
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the adversary does not eﬀectively exploit the imperfect simulated oracle, which means
′

Pr[E Op ] is negligible. Note we also have Pr[AB̄ fails] = Pr[E Op ] + Pr[E O ], which is
c

basically Pr[AḂ fails] - Pr[E Op ]. i.e. |Pr[AB̄ fails] - Pr[AḂ fails]| = ϵ. (only if part)
c

Suppose the adversary did eﬀectively exploit the imperfect simulated oracle, then we
have DḂ abort = θ, which can not be a perfect blinder for DB̄ abort = ϵ

⊓
⊔

Corollary, we can divide the following similar lemma that changes a partial blinder
of one privacy class to a perfect blinder of another privacy class using a similar proof.
Lemma 2. A partial blinder of a stronger privacy class can be viewed as a perfect
blinder of a weaker privacy class if and only if the imperfect simulated oracle is not
available in the weaker privacy class.
We do not repeat the proof here as it is very similar to the pervious proof. Clearly,
not using eﬀectively is an analogue to not available. These lemmas are general, which
applies to any oracles and privacy classes. But since our goal is to show the relation
between Narrow and Non-narrow classes where the Result(π) oracle is available only
to non-narrow classes, without loss of generality we will speciﬁcally use the Result(π)
oracle as an example in the following proof. Let A be the adversary who attacks any
Non-narrow privacy classes and AN be the same adversary who attacks the Narrow
counterpart of the corresponding privacy classes. Our goal is to show that |Pr[A wins]
- Pr[AN wins]| = ϵ in any situations provided that there is no false-negative and the
adversaries are “wise”. We are now ready to prove the proposition.
Proof. The signiﬁcance of calling the Result(π) oracle is when there will be an opposite output, i.e. getting 1 when it supposes to be 0 or vice versa. This means that at
least some of the attack sequences in the attack strategy have signiﬁcant eﬀect to the
protocol, which makes the reader misidentify a legitimate tag as a non-legitimate one
(false-negative) or a non-legitimate one as a legitimate one (false-positive). Otherwise,
it would not be “wise” for the adversary to access Result(π) if he did not execute
any signiﬁcant attacks since either 1 or 0 will be the guaranteed output for legitimate
or non-legitimate tag. Indeed, the adversary always knows this fact (whether a tag is
legitimate or not) when he calls DrawTag() to obtain a handle to a tag where a bit b
is also provided to indicate the legitimacy of that tag. According to the behaviour of
the blinder B in simulating the Result(π) oracle, there can be diﬀerent situations as
described in table 4.3:
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Legitimate
Non-legitimate
False-negative
False-positive

True oracle
1
0
N/A
1

Perfect simulation
(vtag, 1) ← DrawTag()
(vtag, 0) ← DrawTag()
N/A
1 ← ResultB (π)
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Imperfect simulation
(vtag, 1) ← DrawTag()
(vtag, 0) ← DrawTag()
N/A
unknown

Table 4.3: Simulation results of the Result(π) oracle

Since we have the hypothesis that there is no false-negative, we do not need to
consider it in the proof. We now have four cases to consider: i) when the attack is
trivial, ii) when the attack is non-trivial and there is/are imperfect simulated oracle(s)
other than ResultB (π), iii) when ResultB (π) is the only imperfect simulated oracle
but A does not make eﬀective use of it, and iv) when ResultB (π) is the only imperfect
simulated oracle and A exploited it eﬀectively.
(Case i) Consider when the attack strategies of A are all trivial. Then, by deﬁnition, the four oracles Launch(), SendReader(m, π), SendTag(m, vtag) and Result(π)
must be simulated successfully without non-negligibly aﬀecting the success probability
of the blinded A. Since the simulation is perfect, A should expect no advantage gained
by accessing any one of these blinded oracles in compare to when they are not blinded,
i.e. we always have a perfect blinder B̄ such that DB̄ abort = ϵ where ϵ is some negligible
value. Hence the RFID protocol is secure in the an non-narrow class. As the narrow
counterpart is a subset of the non-narrow class, the protocol is also secure in the corresponding narrow class. As a result, protocols are both secure in narrow and non-narrow
classes if the adversary’s attacks are all trivial, which makes the separation unnecessary.
(Case ii) We consider when A has a non-trivial attack strategy. This means that there
is at least one of the four blinded oracles that failed to simulate the real oracle perfectly.
Suppose that it is not the ResultB (π) oracle which is/are imperfect or if ResultB (π) is
imperfect, there is/are other imperfect blinded oracle(s). Since the imperfect blinded
oracle(s) other than ResultB (π) is/are available to both the narrow and non-narrow
classes, which means A can always launch non-trivial attacks through them, i.e. the
RFID protocol is not secure in both classes anyway, hence the separation is unnecessary.
(Case iii) Suppose that it is now only the ResultB (π) oracle which is imperfect. Then,
we have a partial blinder Ḃ. Assume that A did not make eﬀective use of ResultB (π)
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during his attack; then by lemma 1, the partial blinder Ḃ of the non-narrow classes can
be viewed as a perfect blinder B̄ for the same privacy classes. Also by lemma 2, Ḃ of
the non-narrow classes is also a perfect blinder of the narrow classes since ResultB (π)
is not available in the narrow classes. Since the blinder is perfect in both classes, A’s
attacks can only be trivial and the RFID protocol is secure in both non-narrow and
narrow classes. Hence, even if ResultB (π) can not be simulated perfectly, there is no
diﬀerence in the privacy experiments for both classes if the imperfect ResultB (π) is
not exploited eﬀectively.
(Case iv) Now for A to exploit the imperfect ResultB (π) eﬀectively, A must cause
an opposite output to happen when accessing ResultB (π). Since false-negative is not
possible as it is the hypothesis, we only need to look at false-positive, i.e. getting 1
instead of 0. False-positive happens when a non-legitimate tag is wrongly identiﬁed by
the reader as a legitimate tag. Let us denote this event as E. Assume that A is “wise”
enough not to waste any oracle accesses. When E occurs, A must have done some
signiﬁcant attacks to a non-legitimate tag or else the protocol is simply incorrect. In
order to attack the tag, A must have obtained a handle vtag to this tag, which means
A must have called the DrawTag() oracle. Recall that DrawTag() returns vtag and a bit
b indicating whether vtag is legitimate or not. Since vtag is non-legitimate, we have
b = 0. Recall that DrawTag() is not simulated by the blinder B, B can also observe
the returned pair (vtag, 0) when DrawTag() is accessed by A, hence B must also know
vtag is a non-legitimate tag. Since B does not know KS , B has no way to tell if the
reader will accept vtag or not for A may have attacked vtag at any moment, hence B
may not be able to output the same value as the real Result(π) oracle. B can only
hope that whenever A accesses the ResultB (π) oracle, A must have already attacked
vtag successfully, hence B can be constructed to simulate ResultB (π) by returning 1
if π is the protocol instance with vtag where (vtag, 0) is observed when DrawTag() is
accessed. The simulation is perfect as long as A performs signiﬁcant attacks to vtag,
which causes the results change from 0 to 1. The simulation will fail when A makes
the ResultB (π) query for the protocol instance where vtag is not being attacked. In
that case, B should return 0 instead of 1. However, this should not happen because
this contradicts the second property of the “wise” A who will not waste any oracle
accesses as he knows that the reader must be able to identify a non-legitimate tag (i.e.
returning 0) if it has not been attacked. Hence A would not have called ResultB (π)
for the protocol instance with vtag when A did not perform any signiﬁcant attacks
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to vtag. At the end, B can simulate the oracles perfectly in front of the “wise” A
and hence DB̄ abort = ϵ, making A’s strategy trivial, which contradicts that A has a
non-trivial attack strategy. Hence A would not have let E occur, which becomes case
⊓
⊔

iii.

This proof shows that the Result(π) oracle will never help the adversary if the
RFID protocol being examined renders no false-negative. Furthermore, the adversary
should not waste time on causing a false-positive since the attack should be on privacy
and not on impersonation nor unauthorised access. In other words, from all the possible
attack strategies of A, there will be no Result(π) queries if the RFID protocol being
attacked does not give out false-negative. One can also extend proposition 2 to include
RFID protocols where false-negative occurs with negligible if not zero probability with
the same proof. Now, we have obtained the result that a P -private adversary’s strategy performs as best as a Narrow -P -private adversary’s strategy under proposition 2.
Hence, we have reduced eight classes to four classes, as follows.
Strong

⇒ Destructive

⇒

Forward

⇒

Weak

Next, we analyse the usefulness of the destructive class. In fact, it is also mentioned
in [93] that the purpose of separating the strong and destructive classes is unclear. The
destructive class is a rarely happen privacy level. Perhaps, this is the reason why there
is no example provided, which is secure for this class in [93]3 . Therefore, we come up
with the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If the privacy model considers only RFID protocols that use no correlated keys among tags, then it is unnecessary to consider the destructive classes (both
narrow and non-narrow).
In other words, the destructive class is only useful to examine RFID protocols where
the tags share some correlated secrets. Such type of protocols is not common in RFID.
We only came across three constructions in [8, 21, 69]. The motivation behind these
protocols by providing correlated key protocols is to reduce the workload and time
required to lookup a matching key to verify the tag in the reader side. In most of the
proposed RFID protocols under symmetric key settings [10, 16, 24, 38, 54, 74], it is
unavoidably to engage in an exhaustive key search process in the reader side in order
3
Notice that the example provided in [93] for the narrow-destructive class that use independent
keys is no diﬀerent from a protocol for the narrow-forward class, while the example given that uses
dependent keys is insecure in the narrow-destructive class.
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to compute and match the response of any tag from all the possible keys stored inside
the database. Attempts to solve this problem by providing some means to keep tags
and the reader synchronized on the next expected key to be used [37, 41, 85, 86] are
found to have security loopholes [6, 49]. Furthermore, Juels exploited this to attack
various protocols by constructing side-channel attacks thank to the obvious diﬀerent
key lookup time detectable from each protocol session in [49]. A recent attempt to
provide a constant lookup time [15] turns out to use a one-way trapdoor function,
which is considered as one of the public key settings. Hence, there is still no eﬃcient
protocol known to solve this issue under symmetric key settings.
Additionally, correlated keys protocol under symmetric key settings can reduce the
number of keys search to a logarithmic scale but with a sacriﬁce on strong privacy [69]:
any corruption of the tag will degrade the privacy level because a tag stores not only its
secret keys but also keys that share with other tags. One typical example of a correlated
key protocol can be constructed using log2 n keys for n tags. Suppose there are 8 tags in
the system. One can generate only 6 keys, namely: K0a , K0b , K0c , K1a , K1b , K1c . Each tag is
equipped with a unique set of keys, i.e. T ag1 ← {K0a , K0b , K0c }, T ag2 ← {K0a , K0b , K1c },
... T agn ← {K1a , K1b , K1c }. It is easy to verify that these tags can be uniquely identiﬁed
by checking at most 6 instead of 8 keys as in the independent key protocols by the
reader. However, corrupting any one of these tags provides the adversary with a full
potential to distinguish each of these tags responses. Damgård [21] provided a result
on the tradeoﬀ between the number of correlated keys and the number of corrupted
tags as:
ctu
ctu
+
v
v−u
where c is the number of keys stored in each tag, v is the number of diﬀerent keys
per column, t is the number of tags queried by the adversary and u is the number of
corrupted tag. As long as the result of the formula is negligible, the protocol is secure.
In our example given above, c = 3, v = 2 and u = 1, hence we have

3t
2

+ 3t ≤ ϵ, which

means t < 1, i.e. the protocol is secure only if the adversary does not query any tag at
all, or simply the protocol is never secure against tag corruptions.
From the above discussion, it is clear that correlated key protocols are extremely
weak against tag corruption. One can only expect the protocol to be secure if t, u <<
v << n << v c . In the model of [93], since there is no limitation on either t or u, there
can be no correlated key protocols that is secure in both strong and destructive privacy
classes. The proof of proposition 3 follows.

4.6. Our Diﬀerent Results From the Vaudenay Model

68

Proof. Recall the destructive class deﬁnition, after calling Corrupt(vtag), the same
tag handle vtag is not allowed to be used anymore. It is clear to see from the deﬁnition
that this destructive corruption cannot provide the adversary any additional advantage
in winning the privacy game if each of the tags is independent to each other. In order
for the Corrupt(vtag) oracle to become signiﬁcant under the destructive class deﬁnition, the corrupted internal secrets Kvtag and Svtag have to be useful in some following
oracle accesses (if it is useful to the results obtained from some pervious oracles, then
we have gone backward to the forward class). Since the corrupted tag of handle vtag
cannot be accessed again, the secrets must only be used on some other tags. If the
tags are independent to each other, Kvtag and Svtag would have revealed no information
about any other tags. As there is no eﬀect on other tags, the simulation of the blinder
can be easily constructed, making the adversary’s strategy trivial and hence the attack
⊓
⊔

is insigniﬁcant.

Combining the above results, the destructive class is rather not very meaningful. It
is only useful to examine protocols that use correlated keys while these protocols can
never achieve strong and destructive privacy classes under the model in [93]. Together
with proposition 2, we have successfully reduced the eight privacy classes into three
major classes, as follows.
Strong

⇒

Forward

⇒

Weak

Our result simpliﬁes the previous privacy classiﬁcation due to Vaudenay [93]. Furthermore, in contrast to Vaudenay’s result, we shall show that strong privacy is indeed
possible, and hence this result will indeed make RFID protocols more useful in its real
applications.

4.6

Our Diﬀerent Results From the Vaudenay Model

In this section, we will present our new results in privacy model in RFID. In particular,
we shall show that strong privacy is indeed possible (cf. [93]) and we shall present our
aﬃrmative answer to the open problem posed in [93] in regards to the construction
of RFID scheme with forward privacy without requiring the public key cryptography
(PKC).
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Tag{KP , ID, KID }

Reader{KS , KM }
pick a ∈ {0, 1}s randomly
←−−−−−a−−−−−−
c = Enc(KID ||ID||a, KP ) −−−−−−−
c −−−−→
Dec(c, KS ) = KID ||ID||a′
if a′ = a, veriﬁes KID = FKM (ID)
Figure 4.3: An example PKC RFID protocol

4.6.1

Strong Privacy is Possible

One of the results in [93] is that strong privacy is impossible. This is supported by a
theorem that a Destructive-private RFID protocol is not Narrow-Strong-private. Since
Strong-private (S) implies both Destructive-private (D) and Narrow-Strong-private
(NS) by deﬁnition4 , we have S ⊆ D and S ⊆ NS. i.e. ∃p ∈ S s.t. p ∈ D and p ∈ NS
where p is an RFID protocol. However, we would like to use our results in Section 3 to
show that strong privacy is actually possible. We consider the same example of PKCbased RFID protocol provided in Section 4.3 of [93], which is Narrow-Strong-private.
By applying proposition 2, we show that it is also Strong-private.
We look at the following example PKC protocol where Enc() is IND-CPA secure
and (KP , KS ) is the public and private keys pair. For completeness, we present the
protocol in ﬁgure 4.3.
To apply proposition 2, we have to observe whether false-negative could be generated. Since c is the only message received by the reader, a false-negative can only
happen if c is malicious (i.e. ID and KID are replaced), or c happens to be the same
encrypted value c′ where c′ = Enc(ID′ ||KID′ ||a, KP ). The former is safe guarded by
the IND-CPA secure property of the PKC algorithm, which states that it is infeasible
for any computationally bounded adversary to retrieve the private key by looking at
the ciphertexts of arbitrarily chosen plaintexts only. That means, the only possible
option is to guess the private key, which happens with negligible probability. The latter will not happen as decryption is unique, otherwise both c and c′ will be decrypted
to a same value. Therefore, we can apply proposition 2 and the PKC protocol is also
Strong-private if it is Narrow-Strong-private. This gives us the result S = NS. Since
S ⊆ D, we also have NS ⊆ D. Together with the theorem in [93], we conclude with
NS ⊂ D.
4

This is easy to verify. As Narrow-Strong is Strong without the Result(π) oracle access. Destructive is Strong with additional limitation on accessing the Corrupt(vtag) oracle. Both are more
restrictive (i.e. the adversary is less powerful) than Strong. A protocol secure in Strong must also be
secure in Destructive and Narrow-Strong.
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Tag{KP , ID, KID }
pick r ∈ {0, 1}s randomly
c = Enc(KID ||ID||a||r, KP )
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Reader{KS , KM }
a−−−−
pick a ∈ {0, 1}s randomly
←−−−−
Dec(c, KS ) = KID ||ID||a′ ||r
−−−−−c−−−→
if a′ = a, veriﬁes KID = FKM (ID)

Figure 4.4: An example PKC RFID protocol providing strong privacy

4.6.2

Truly Random Source is Required

Let us observe the PKC protocol in ﬁgure 4.3 again. The protocol assumes that the
underlying encryption algorithm is IND-CPA. Due to the randomness of the IND-CPA
property, which is needed to provide indistinguishability, c is diﬀerent every time even
if the same a is received by the same tag, i.e. c = Enc(KID ||ID||a, KP ) in protocol
instance π is not equal to c̃ = Enc(KID ||ID||a, KP ) in another protocol instance π̃.
This randomness is implicitly included in the IND-CPA assumption. We can change
the notation a little bit to reveal this hidden randomness. We rewrite the PKC protocol
in ﬁgure 4.4.
In fact, even under the IND-CPA assumption, the tag still needs to pick a random
value r for every encryption (e.g. using the ElGamal scheme). This is just abstracted
in [93]. Notice that ElGamal is not IND-CCA2 secure. If we further consider a decryption oracle is available, then we cannot instantiate the encryption with ElGamal.
Hence we will have to require the PKC example to be IND-CCA2 in this case. With
the new notation, we can now consider the following question: If a tag is corrupted,
will the algorithm to generate future random values be revealed as well? If PRNG is
implemented in the tag to generate random values, the answer to this question should
be ‘yes’. It is easy to see that if the PRNG algorithm is revealed after corrupting
the tag, the adversary can easily trace the tag by computing r = PRNG(S) (S is the
memory state of the tag) and then veriﬁes that if c = Enc(KID ||ID||a||r, KP ) where
KID , ID, SID , and PRNG() are all revealed after tag corruption. Since c is unique, the
adversary must be able to trace the tag. However, if the tag has a truly random source
(e.g. another module attached to the tag), this can be modelled as a random oracle
and the answer should be ‘no’. We conclude that a truly random source (under the
random oracle model) is required for the PKC protocol to be Strong-private, which
was missing in the deﬁnition provided in [93].
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Tag{KID }
c = F (KID , a)
set KID = G(KID )
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Reader{(ID1 , K1 ), (ID2 , K2 ), ..., (IDn , Kn )}
a−−−−
pick a ∈ {0, 1}s randomly
←−−−−
for j ∈ {1, n} and i ∈ {0, t − 1}
−−−−−c−−−→
ﬁnd (IDj , Kj ) s.t. c = F (Gi (Kj ), a)
set Kj = Gi+1 (Kj )
Figure 4.5: An OSK protocol variant

4.6.3

Forward Privacy Without PKC

Besides claiming strong privacy is impossible, Vaudenay [93] also posed an open research question asking whether forward privacy without PKC is possible. We answer
the open question here. Consider a variant of the OSK protocol [74] that appeared in
[93] in ﬁgure 4.5.
This protocol is proven to be Narrow-Destructive-private in [93].

Recall that

Narrow-Destructive ⇒ Narrow-Forward, this protocol is also Narrow-Forward -private.
We note that our proposition 2 cannot be applied to this protocol because false-negative
can happen when a legitimate tag has been queried for t times by an adversary before
it is queried by the reader again. Since KID would become Gt (KID ) by then and the
reader will only try 0 ≤ i ≤ t − 1 diﬀerent Gi (Kj ) values per (IDj , Kj ) pair to ﬁnd a
matching F (Gi (Kj ), a) for c, that legitimate tag will not be identiﬁed successfully by
the reader, hence a false-negative occurs. In other words, calling Result(π) in this case
helps the adversary to gain advantage in winning the privacy experiment, which causes
this protocol to be Narrow-Forward -private only but not Forward -private. Hence,
leaving the question “whether Forward-private without PKC is possible” open.
Here, we would like to apply proposition 2, so that Forward is not diﬀerent from
Narrow-Forward, and the OSK variant protocol will become also Forward -private, and
hence, it will answer the open problem. First of all, we notice that the reason why
there can be false-negative is due to i ≤ t−15 . Next, we consider the number of queries
to a tag the adversary can make be q and we assume that q ≤ t. In other words, the
adversary can never query any particular tag for more than t times and the reader is
now always able to identify any legitimate tag, which also means there will not be any
false-negative. This implies that proposition 2 can be applied and we have the OSK
variant protocol become Forward -private.
5

In the original OSK paper [74], this limitation does not exist in the protocol description, which is
why Avoine showed that this protocol is secure in his paper [6], but later on Juels and Weis disagreed
in [49] when this limitation was considered.

4.7. Conclusion
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The only thing that is arguable is whether the assumption (q ≤ t) makes any
sense or not. Clearly, one can also argue that when q > t, then the privacy will
not be satisﬁed any longer. Hence, the problem has turned to a a scalability issue:
“Can we always have a more resourceful reader compared to an adversary?” In fact,
the ability of an adversary can be limited by diﬀerent means in reality. Limited tag
queries due to the mobility of tags and throttling [43] are some realistic examples to
support the assumption. In particular, for the low-cost RFID tag environment, it is
more appropriate to consider a less almighty adversary model. Furthermore, seeking
strong privacy in front of a powerful adversary for RFID that is known by its limited
resources characteristic seems to be impractical.

4.7

Conclusion

When we ﬁrst started our research, compare to the more than hundreds published
RFID papers, RFID modellings received less attentions, not more than ten we could
identiﬁed [5, 6, 17, 20, 43, 49, 50, 97]. But after Vaudenay published his strong privacy
RFID model in [93], it seems that many researchers have picked up this research area
since then. We could easily ﬁnd out nearly 20 piece of works [2, 3, 7, 9, 18, 21, 22,
23, 34, 39, 51, 58, 65, 70, 77, 88, 91, 92, 99], including two of our papers [70, 71] are
also inspired by the Vaudenay model. We were the ﬁrst to ﬁnd out the issue of the
impossibility results in the Vaudenay model and provide a ﬁx to that. Some later works
[2, 3, 7, 22] also show supportive results to our ﬁndings. In this chapter, we examined
the Vaudenay model in a great detail and presented some new results. Firstly, we
examined the eight diﬀerent classes presented in [93] and applied some reasonable
assumptions to simplify the classiﬁcation. Then, we presented a counter argument
to [93] by stating that strong privacy in RFID is indeed achievable. In summary, to
achieve strong privacy, tags are required to perform not only public key cryptography,
but also require an additional reliable random source, which was missing from the
description provided in [93]. Nonetheless, this results in a high manufacturing cost
for RFID tags. However, in contrast to Vaudenay’s result, we have shown that strong
privacy is indeed achievable. Furthermore, we believe that in the future development of
RFID, privacy will have to be sacriﬁced to keep the cost low. Hence, it is worthwhile to
reconsider whether RFID should face such a strong adversary model. Due to the short
communication range and infrequent access properties of RFID tags, we believe it is
not necessary to assume the presence of powerful adversaries. Henceforth, an adequate
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and appropriate privacy model, which takes into account the constraints of RFID is
still missing.

Chapter 5
Family of Synchronised Authentication
Protocols in RFID

Chapter Overview
In the previous chapter, we presented our works on RFID privacy modellings. We critically reviewed some of the early works on this ﬁeld. We
showed their inconsistencies and suggested a strong privacy model by Vaudenay. Based on his model, we proposed our reﬁned version and proved our
diﬀerent ﬁndings from his results. This gives us new tool to evaluate the
performance of RFID protocols eﬃciently. In this chapter, we will look at
a new RFID protocol classiﬁcation proposed by us, namely the family of
Synchronised Authentication Protocols (SAP) in RFID. First we will deﬁne
what they are and we will use our reﬁned version of the Vaudenay model
to evaluate their privacy protection performances. Then we will suggest a
new RFID protocol construction method, which is a variant of the family of
SAP that has a better privacy protection performance then the rest. Part
of the results in this chapter has been published in [71] at ESORICS 2009.
We have the following contributions in this chapter:
• We create a new RFID protocol classiﬁcation that captures most of
the RFID protocols proposed nowadays
• We evaluate the performance of the RFID protocols within this new
classiﬁcation using our reﬁned Vaudenay model
• We propose a new RFID protocol construction method that can provide a better privacy protection
• We suggest some application scenarios for this new protocol
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Synchronised Authentication Protocols in RFID

Many RFID authentication protocols with randomised tag response have been proposed
to avoid simple tag tracing. These protocols are symmetric in common due to the lack
of computational power to perform expensive asymmetric cryptography calculations
in low-cost tags. Protocols with constantly changing tag key have also been proposed
to avoid more advanced tag tracing attacks. With both the symmetric and constantchanging properties, tag and reader re-synchronisation is unavoidable as the key of a
tag can be made desynchronised with the reader due to oﬀ-line attacks or incomplete
protocol runs.
We are going to classify these synchronised RFID authentication protocols (SAPs)
into diﬀerent types and then examine their highest achievable levels of privacy protections using the reﬁned Vaudenay model we have discussed in the previous chapter. We
are the ﬁrst to provide classiﬁcation for synchronised RFID authentication protocols
based on their construction methods, their structures and prove their limitations on
privacy protections.
First, we will look into the general constructions of symmetric key RFID authentication protocols. Both tag-to-reader and mutual (i.e. tag and reader) authentication
protocols are examined. We deduce that all of these protocols unavoidably require tag
key update in the tag side and tag key synchronisation between tag and reader at some
point of the protocol in order to provide better untraceability against stronger attacks.
Then we classify these protocols into four main construction types based on when the
tag key update and tag key synchronisation operations are carried out. We adopt the
reﬁned privacy model from chapter 4 to prove the highest privacy levels that can be
attained in these protocols for each construction type. We do this by combining the
results of [93] and [77] and constructing a universal generic attack for each construction type targeting a higher privacy level. Notice that our attacks are purely taking
advantages of the adversary model deﬁned in [93] but not exploiting various ﬂaws in
protocol designs. Our new privacy results show the separation between weak privacy
and narrow-forward privacy in these protocols, which eﬀectively ﬁlls the missing relationship of these two privacy levels in Vaudenay’s paper and answer the question raised
by Paise and Vaudenay in ASIACCS 2008 [77] on why they cannot ﬁnd a candidate
protocol that can achieve both privacy levels at the same time. We also show that
forward privacy is impossible with these synchronised protocols.
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Privacy Experiment

Let us recall the privacy experiment deﬁned in [93]. The setup of privacy experiment requires a hidden table T to be maintained whenever the oracles DrawTag() and
Free(vtag) are called. This hidden table is not available to the adversary until the last
step of the privacy experiment (to be reviewed below). When DrawTag() is called, a
new entry of the pair (vtag, ID) is to be added into T . When Free(vtag) is called, the
entry with the same vtag handle is to be marked unavailable. The true ID of the tag
with handle vtag is represented by T (vtag).
The privacy experiment that runs on an RFID protocol is deﬁned as a game to
see whether the adversary outputs True or False after seeing the hidden table T . At
the beginning, the adversary is free to access any oracles within his oracle collection
according to his own attack strategy (which deﬁnes the maximum targeting privacy
level to attack). Once the adversary ﬁnishes querying, the hidden table T will be
released to him. The adversary will then analyse the (vtag, ID) entries in the table
using the information obtained before from the queries. If the adversary ﬁnally outputs
True for the question whether T (vtag) = ID in a non-trivial sense (i.e. not blindly
outputs True because T (vtag) = ID as listed in the table), then he has successfully
traced a victim tag of identity ID and won the privacy experiment. We say that the
RFID protocol being experimented is not L-private where L is the highest privacy level
achievable from the oracle collection of the adversary.

5.1.2

Achievable Privacy Levels

As pointed out in [93] and by us in [70], (narrow-)strong privacy for tag authentication
protocols is only achievable with PKC under the asymmetric key setting. The same
result is supported by [77] for mutual authentication protocols. From the results we
obtained, which will be presented below, we also agree to this impossibility result for
RFID protocols under symmetric key setting. Hence, this will leave us with these six
privacy levels:
Destructive
⇓
Narrow-Destructive

⇒

Forward

⇒

⇓
⇒ Narrow-Forward

Weak
⇓

⇒

Narrow-Weak

We have also proved in [70] that the destructive levels are only distinguishable from
the forward levels as long as the RFID protocols share correlated secrets (e.g. global
key, partial group key, etc.) among tags. Corrupting one tag in these protocols will also
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reveal (partial) secrets of related tags. The majority of RFID protocols do not belong
to this special protocol category. Hence we will only focus on RFID protocols where
each tag is independent from each other and does not store any correlated secrets. This
leaves us with four main privacy levels to be examined:
Forward

⇒

Weak

⇓
Narrow-Forward

5.1.3

⇓
⇒

Narrow-Weak

Protocol Constructions

We look at diﬀerent constructions of RFID authentication protocols (both tag-to-reader
and mutual) under the symmetric key setting with or without tag key update and tag
key synchronisation. We show the limitation of each of the constructions on achieving a certain privacy level in tag tracing. Before we deﬁne our protocol construction
classiﬁcations, we have these notations:
• OT ag (), OReader () : A collection of operations denoted as an oracle following the
protocol speciﬁcation carried out on the tag and reader sides respectively.
i
0
• KID
: The tag key at instance i where the initial key is KID
.
i
i
: The tag state at instance i denoted as an encapsulation of the tag key KID
• SID
i+1
i
and other per instance generated and received values. If SID
is updated to SID
,
i+1
i
KID
is updated to KID
as well.
i
) : A tag key update oracle performed on the tag side which takes
• OU pdate (SID
i+1
i
SID
as input and outputs an updated KID
.
i
• OSync (SID
) : A tag key synchronisation oracle performed on the reader side which
i
d
takes SID
as input and outputs a synchronised KID
. It is a recursive function

which has an upper bound n where n + i ≥ d > i or d = i − 1. The upper bound
is added to reﬂect the side-channel attack eﬀect described in [49].
It is important for us to state that we do not concern about how RFID authentication protocols are implemented. Some may use simple bitwise operations like XOR,
some may use hashing functions, some may even use symmetric encryption/decryption.
i
We only classify them based on how and when OU pdate (SID
) is executed. For an RFID

authentication protocol to fall into one of the following construction types, the bottom
line is that the protocol has to be at least correct (i.e. when the protocol is started
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with π ← Launch(), then by calling Result(π), it should output 1, with overwhelming probability, for legitimate tags and 0 otherwise). Protocols that fail this basic
requirement should not be deﬁned as authentication protocol at all. We classify RFID
authentication protocols into the following four construction types:
• Type 0 : Protocols that are correct and lack tag key update mechanisms or
i
) implemented it can not be executed properly
equivalently even with OU pdate (SID
i
remains static at the end of the protocol 1 .
as if it is not there, which causes KID
i
• Type 1 : Protocols that are correct and OU pdate (SID
) can be executed properly,
i
which causes KID
to change every time the protocol is executed.
i
• Type 2a : Mutual authentication protocols that are correct and OU pdate (SID
) is

executed properly after the ﬁnal reader authentication message is received, which
i
causes KID
to change after the reader is authenticated.
i
• Type 2b : Mutual authentication protocols that are correct and OU pdate (SID
)

is executed properly before the ﬁnal reader authentication message is received,
i
which causes KID
to change before the reader is authenticated.

5.2

Our New Privacy Results on SAPs

We can now formally analyse the four symmetric RFID protocol construction types.
For each of them, we will prove the impossibility for it to achieve a certain privacy
level with a universal attack. It is important to note that these attacks are generic and
universal as they are only constructed using the oracles deﬁned in previous section. We
do not need to exploit any design ﬂaw in the protocols in order to make the attacks
success. Hence the attacks are valid as long as the same adversary model is applied.
Also, as our results are about the highest achievable privacy levels, not the lowest,
there can be some protocols of the same construction type that only achieve a weaker
privacy level. For protocols that do not provide privacy protection at all, we represent
them with a special class Nil. Since we are not claiming the lowest achievable privacy
level for the protocols, we do not consider the separation between any weaker privacy
1

Some protocols, for example the YA-TRAP [85], although they have some tag key update mechanisms, they are known to have design ﬂaws that eﬀectively render their key update mechanisms useless
(i.e. as if the tag key is never updated), we do not classify these protocols to have tag key update.
Readers can refer to [6, 49, 90] for more speciﬁc attacks on existing protocols based on their design
ﬂaws.
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Tag{KID }
v: random value
SID : {KID , c, v}
Response ← OT ag (SID )

Query, c
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Response
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
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Reader{ID, KID }
c: random challenge
r: Response
∀i ∈ {ID}, Si : {Ki , r, c}
Verify if r = r̃ ← OReader (Si )
if F OU N D, set Result(.) = 1
else set Result(.) = 0

Figure 5.1: Type 0 SAP construction

levels weaker than Weak privacy as deﬁned in [93] and just group them all into the
special class Nil.
For each of the construction types, we abstract the common form of that type of
protocols in a ﬁgure for illustration purpose. There can be variations on how the reader
veriﬁes legitimate tags responses and how the messages ﬂow. But what in common is
whether there is tag key update or not and if there is, when is it executed? Again, our
universal attacks do not concern the implementation details of these protocols, hence
they are universal.

5.2.1

Type 0 Protocols Can Never Achieve Forward Privacy
Levels

Construction
Type 0 represents the most basic form of an RFID authentication protocol that uses
symmetric key without tag key update. Protocols in [19, 54, 55, 63, 64, 69, 79, 85,
94] are some examples. It should be trivial for most readers that forward privacy is
impossible in this type of construction, since tag corruption will reveal the static tag
key. It still serves as a base in our classiﬁcations because we will reduce some other
construction types to this type in the following sections. Here we look at the common
construction of this type of protocols in ﬁgure 5.1.
i
Since there is no OU pdate (SID
), both tag and reader keep the same KID value

through out the life time of the tag. Without tag key update, protocols with this
construction can never achieve forward privacy and narrow-forward privacy. Because
forward privacy is harder than narrow-forward privacy, we only need to show that
narrow-forward privacy is not achievable. Consider the following attack:
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1. CreateTag1 (ID0 ), CreateTag1 (ID1 )
2. vtag ← DrawTag()
3. π ← Launch()
4. c ← SendReader(π, Init)
5. r : Response ← SendTag(vtag, c)
6. (Forward r to reader to close π) null ← SendReader(π, r)
7. Free(vtag)
8. vtag ′ ← DrawTag()
9. KIDx ← Corrupt(vtag ′ )
10. Queries ended, receive T (vtag) = IDb
11. Let SIDx : {KIDx , r, c}, if r = r̃ ← OReader (SIDx ) then x = b. Otherwise x = |1−b|
12. Output whether T (vtag ′ ) = IDx
The idea of the attack is to record a protocol instance between a legitimate tag and
a reader. A random tag is then corrupted and its tag key is exposed. By simulating
a protocol run using the exposed tag key, if the result is the same as the recorded
one, then the same tag is found with high conﬁdent. An adversary running the attack
above will only fail (i.e. T (vtag ′ ) ̸= IDx ) if OReader (SID0 ) = OReader (SID1 ). This
should only happen with a negligible probability, otherwise the protocol is simply
incorrect, which produces wrong identiﬁcation. Hence the adversary will succeed with
overwhelming probability. Since there is no further oracle access after Corrupt(vtag ′ )
and no Result(π) in the attack, this is a signiﬁcant narrow-forward privacy level attack.
We have shown that RFID protocols without tag key update is not narrow-forward
private and hence not forward private.
Remark 1.
A Type 0 construction RFID protocol presented in [93] using pseudorandom function
(PRF) has been proved to provide weak privacy. Hence it is the highest privacy level
that can be attained by RFID protocols with Type 0 construction. Our conclusion
for Type 0 construction summarised in table 5.1.
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Type 0
Non-narrow levels
Narrow levels

Forward levels
-
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Weak levels
X
X

Nil
X

Table 5.1: Achievable privacy levels of Type 0 construction

i
Tag{KID
}
v: random value
i
: {KID
, c, v}
i
Response ← OT ag (SID
)
i+1
U pdate
i
KID ← O
(SID )
i
SID

i=i+1

i
Reader{ID, KID
}
c: random challenge

Query, c
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Response
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→

r: Response, ∀j ∈ {ID}
Kjd ← OSync (Sji ), Sjd : {Kjd , r, c}
Verify if r = r̃ ← OReader (Sjd )
if F OU N D, set Result(.) = 1,
Kji = Kjd ; else set Result(.) = 0

Figure 5.2: Type 1 SAP construction

5.2.2

Type 1 Protocols Can Never Achieve Non-Narrow Privacy Levels

Since the static tag key has limited the highest achievable privacy level of Type 0
protocols to weak privacy only, tag key update is incorporated in the construction
of protocols to help rising the privacy level. Protocols in [10, 37, 74, 75] are some
examples. Type 1 protocols are Type 0 protocols with tag key update and tag key
synchronisation. See ﬁgure 5.2 for their construction.
i
Since OU pdate (SID
) is executed every time on the tag side, the stored KID inside the

tag is always changing 2 . Although now there is tag key update, an adversary can cause
desynchronisation between tag and reader so that protocols with this construction can
never achieve forward privacy and weak privacy. Because forward privacy is harder
than weak privacy, we only need to show that weak privacy is not achievable. Consider
the following attack:
1. CreateTag1 (ID0 ), CreateTag1 (ID1 )
i
Notice that OU pdate (SID
) is executed before the tag response is sent out. Although updating the
key after response does not change the protocol result, this is a good practice to avoid tag corruption by
i
an adversary at the moment right after the response is captured but before OU pdate (SID
) is executed
(i.e. keeping the old tag key in the memory).
2
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2. vtag ← DrawTag()
3. π ← Launch()
4. c ← SendReader(π, Init)
5. r : Response ← SendTag(vtag, c)
6. (Forward r to reader to close π) null ← SendReader(π, r)
7. (Use the same c to query vtag) Repeat n times:
8.

r : Response ← SendTag(vtag, c)

9. Free(vtag)
10. vtag ′ ← DrawTag()
11. π ′ ← Launch()
12. c′ ← SendReader(π ′ , Init)
13. r′ : Response ← SendTag(vtag ′ , c′ )
14. null ← SendReader(π ′ , r′ )
15. z ← Result(π ′ )
16. Queries ended, receive T (vtag) = IDb
17. If z = 0 then x = b. Otherwise x = |1 − b|
18. Output whether T (vtag ′ ) = IDx
An adversary running the attack above makes use of the maximum desynchronised
n+1+i
i
key states n such that KID
becomes KID
. The desynchronised tag will not be
i
recognised by the reader anymore because OSync (SID
) will not run recursively beyond

n (or even if n is inﬁnity, desynchronised tag can be distinguished with a side-channel
attack on the time taken for the reader to recognise that tag as described in [49]). The
adversary will only fail if Result(π ′ ) still outputs 1 for the desynchronised-beyond-nn+1+i
tag (i.e. the tag is still authenticated). This means KID
= Kjm for some j ∈ {ID}

and 0 ≤ m ≤ n (i.e. a duplicate tag key), which should only happen with negligible
probability. Hence the adversary will succeed with overwhelming probability. Since
there is no Corrupt(vtag ′ ) in the attack, this is a signiﬁcant weak privacy level attack.
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Type 1
Non-narrow levels
Narrow levels

Forward levels
X

83

Weak levels
X

Nil
X

Table 5.2: Achievable privacy levels of Type 1 construction

We have shown that RFID protocols with tag key update is not forward private and
not weak private.
Remark 2.
A Type 1 protocol presented in [93] using random oracle model has been proved to
provide narrow-destructive privacy, which is equivalent to narrow-forward privacy since
the protocol does not have correlated secrets among tags. Hence the highest privacy
level that can be attained by Type 1 protocols is narrow-forward. We conclude the
result of Type 1 construction in table 5.2.
Remark 3.
Another interesting remark is the separation result of the weak privacy level and the
narrow-forward privacy level, which was not obtained in [93] and it was asked in [77] if
achieving both privacy levels with symmetric key only is feasible or not. Clearly, there
are only protocols that either do not update the tag key (Type 0) or protocols that
update it (Type 1). They span the whole protocol set and we do not have overlapping
between weak privacy level and narrow-forward privacy level according to our results
in 4.3 and 4.4. Hence we have shown the separation here and answered the question.
Remark 4.
As pointed out in [70], let q be the number of queries in the above attack and assume
that q ≤ n, then there can be protocols, using symmetric key only, that achieve forward
privacy level. This is the highest privacy level for symmetric key protocols. However,
we do not consider that assumption here.

5.2.3

Type 2a Protocols Can be Reduced to Type 0 Protocols

Without reader authentication, any adversary can keep querying a tag with any compatible reader until it is desynchronised with legitimate reader. Mutual authentication
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i
}
Tag{KID
v: random value
i
: {KID
, c, v}
i
Response ← O1T ag (SID
)
i
SID

a : Auth, Verify if
i
)
a = ã ← O2T ag (SID
if M AT CHED,
i+1
i
),
KID
← OU pdate (SID
i=i+1

Query, c
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Response
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
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i
Reader{ID, KID
}
c: random challenge

r: Response, ∀j ∈ {ID}

Kjd ← OSync (Sji ), Sjd : {Kjd , r, c}
Verify if r = r̃ ← O1Reader (Sjd )
←−−−−−−Auth
−−−−−−−−−− if F OU N D, set Result(.) = 1,
Kji = Kjd , Auth ← O2Reader (Sjd );
else set Result(.) = 0

Figure 5.3: Type 2a SAP construction

protocols add an additional authentication message for the reader in the protocol construction to safeguard the query is in fact coming from a legitimate reader. Type 2a
protocols update the tag key after such reader authentication message is received. Protocols in [24, 38, 41, 52, 60, 61, 76, 82, 95] are some examples. Their construction can
be represented in ﬁgure 5.3.
With tag key update after reader authentication, it protects the protocol from the
desynchronised-beyond-n attack discussed before because each update must now come
with a valid reader authentication message, which can be hard to forge. As a result,
the tag key can only be desynchronised within one update. If the reader stores both the
updated tag key value and the previous tag key value, in case the tag fails to update its
tag key (most likely because of adversarial attacks), the reader can still authenticate
the victim tag using the previous tag key in the next protocol instance. This measure
is enough to provide weak privacy to this type of protocol construction.
However, imagine an oﬄine attack to tag where invalid reader authentication message is sent. This has the same eﬀect as if the valid reader authentication message
is blocked or intercepted in an online attack but of course the former one is easier to
i
launch. These kinds of attacks cause the tag fail to execute OU pdate (SID
) because the

reader is never authenticated. It is not hard to see that the protocol is now reduced
i
to Type 0 protocol as if there is never an OU pdate (SID
) oracle being implemented in

the protocol construction. As inherited from Type 0 protocol, forward privacy levels
cannot be achieved. A formal description of the attack is presented below:
1. CreateTag1 (ID0 ), CreateTag1 (ID1 )
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Type 2a
Non-narrow levels
Narrow levels

Forward levels
-
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Weak levels
X
X

Nil
X

Table 5.3: Achievable privacy levels of Type 2a construction

2. vtag ← DrawTag()
3. π ← Launch()
4. c ← SendReader(π, Init)
5. r : Response ← SendTag(vtag, c)
6. (Forward r to reader to close π) Auth ← SendReader(π, r)
7. (Replace Auth with a random value a ̸= Auth)
8. null ← SendTag(vtag, a)
9. (No OU pdate (.) is executed) Free(vtag)
10. vtag ′ ← DrawTag()
11. KIDx ← Corrupt(vtag ′ )
12. Queries ended, receive T (vtag) = IDb
13. Let SIDx : {KIDx , r, c}, if r = r̃ ← OReader (SIDx ) then x = b. Otherwise x = |1−b|
14. Output whether T (vtag ′ ) = IDx
Other than the negligible case where OReader (SID0 ) = OReader (SID1 ), the above
attack will only fail if the random value a is accepted by the tag such that OU pdate (.)
is executed to update the tag key. This should also happen with negligible probability,
otherwise the reader authentication message can be easily forged. Hence the adversary
will succeed with overwhelming probability. Since there is no further oracle access after
Corrupt(vtag ′ ) and no Result(π) in the attack, this is a signiﬁcant narrow-forward
privacy level attack. We have shown that RFID protocols with tag key update after
the reader is authenticated work as best as the Type 0 protocols. We conclude the
result of Type 2a construction in table 5.3.
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i
}
Tag{KID
v: random value
i
: {KID
, c, v}
i
Response ← O1T ag (SID
)
i+1
i
KID ← OU pdate (SID
)
i
SID

i=i+1
a : Auth, Verify if
i
)
a = ã ← O2T ag (SID

Query, c
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Response
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
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i
Reader{ID, KID
}
c: random challenge

r: Response, ∀j ∈ {ID}

Kjd ← OSync (Sji ), Sjd : {Kjd , r, c}
Verify if r = r̃ ← OReader (Sjd )
if F OU N D, set Result(.) = 1,
i
d
Reader
(Sjd )
←−−−−−−Auth
−−−−−−−−−− Kj = Kj , Auth ← O
else set Result(.) = 0

Figure 5.4: Type 2b SAP construction

5.2.4

Type 2b Protocols Can be Reduced to Type 0 or Type
1 Protocols

Type 2b protocols update the tag key before the reader authentication message is
received. Examples are in [59, 77]. We acknowledge that the reduction from this
construction type to Type 1 is simple: an adversary just needs to block the last
reader authentication message and the protocol is identical to a Type 1 protocol. In
fact, it is very uncommon to see protocols with such construction. It is only included
in here for completeness. The construction can be represented by ﬁgure 5.4.
With tag key update before reader authentication, it makes sure that the tag key
is changed even if the reader authentication message is blocked or incorrect, such that
when facing a (narrow) forward privacy adversary, the corrupted tag key cannot be used
to relate to any previous protocol instance. However, this is true only if tags update
their keys regardless of the correctness of the reader authentication result. This means
that the tag key is updated as if there is no reader authentication or a failed reader
authentication does not aﬀect the next protocol instance (e.g. a stateless RFID tag).
An adversary can launch a desynchronisation attack to these protocols because they do
not take advantage of reader authentication. Clearly, this performs as best as Type 1
protocols (an example in [77]). The only exception we can think of is when the tag
takes the reader authentication result into account (e.g. rewinds back to the previous
tag key if the reader authentication is failed) or the result will aﬀect the next protocol
instance (e.g. a stateful RFID tag). However, an adversary can still use the same
attack described in section 5.2.3 to freeze the tag key or tag state and the protocol is
reduced into a Type 2a protocol. We do not repeat the same attack here but conclude
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Type 2b

Forward levels

Non-narrow levels

-

Narrow levels

X
(stateless tag)

Weak levels
X
(stateful tag)
X

Nil
X

Table 5.4: Achievable privacy levels of Type 2b construction

the result of Type 2b construction in table 5.4

5.3

Seeking for a Better Solution

We deﬁned four RFID authentication protocol constructions and investigated on their
highest achievable privacy levels. From the results we obtained, forward privacy cannot
be achieved by any type of synchronised symmetric protocol constructions. Furthermore, there is no privacy improvements at all with an extra reader authentication
message. After all, under the symmetric key setting, RFID authentication protocols
have limited privacy protections against tag tracing and a candidate that provides both
weak privacy and narrow-forward privacy protections does not exist. This provides us
a potential answer to the open question in [93], which is, forward privacy without PKC
is impossible. This claim remains valid until some special symmetric protocols that do
not fall into one of our four constructions types can be found, then we need another
examination. However, it is important for us to make ourselves clear that we do not
claim our results on all the symmetric RFID protocols, instead, all our ﬁndings are
bounded by the current adversary model deﬁned in [93], [70] and [77]. This leaves
the possibility that there may exist some symmetric RFID protocols not included in
or well described by the Vaudenay’s model where our results do not apply on them.
Hence, one may be able to ﬁnd alternative ways to overcome the limitations of RFID
protocols by choosing more expensive cryptographic primitives in the design of RFID
protocols or tweaking the privacy model where diﬀerent assumptions are used in order
to reﬂect some other RFID applications or scenarios. With this in mind, our results
are still valid as long as the RFID protocol being examined has the same settings and
assumptions as stated in this chapter.
We have shown there are two powerful attacks that make tag tracing possible,
even when the tag secrets are constantly changing. Ironically, it is the changes that
aided the attacks. There were no oﬃcial names for these two attacks. Based on
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their nature, we will refer them as the querying-attack (by a querying-attacker ) and
the blocking-attack (by a blocking-attacker ), both of these attacks can be classiﬁed
as some denial-of-service (DOS) attacks. The idea is to make the reader and the
victim tag desynchronise (i.e. adding a “mark” onto the victim tag) such that the
attacker can spot the abnormal behaviour of the reader to a suppose-to-be legitimate
tag. Such subtle diﬀerence reﬂects the fact that the victim tag is there and hence
being traced again. As their names suggested, querying-attack is an attack that tries
to desynchronise reader and tags by issuing queries repeatedly. Since a tag will change
its secrets after each query, there will be a point that the reader cannot catch up
with the changes. For example, the reader may store or conﬁgured to search up to
next n tag secrets per tag due to resource, performance and user experience issues, a
querying-attacker can successfully desynchronise the reader and tags by sending out
n + 1 queries. Even if the reader has inﬁnite resource, the extraordinary time required
to process the much advanced tag compares to other ordinary tags provides a sidechannel information to the attacker [49] and the result remains the same. On the other
hand, blocking-attacker tries to desynchronise reader and tags by blocking the readerto-tag authentication messages. Without the reader authentication message to conﬁrm
the reception of the tag response, the tag may choose to keep the current tag secrets
without changing them in order to avoid desynchronisation. Combining such blockingattack with a forward-attacker (i.e. a blocking-forward-attacker), the same old tag
secrets can be used to decode the communication after the last successful query.
To protect RFID applications from forward-attack, RFID tag is made to change
its symmetric tag key constantly to provide unlinkability. However, this introduced
blocking-attack and querying-attack, which remain to be the strongest and unsolvable
attacks. We notice that the main weakness in SAPs is that RFID tags can be easily
made desynchronised with the reader. This is mainly because the tags cannot authenticate the reader ﬁrst at the very beginning when the reader sends out the query. As
RFID tags are mostly passive, they are powered up by the reader query signal and
hence the reader will always be the ﬁrst to send out the message in an RFID protocol. As a result, RFID tags will response to every reader query, no matter the reader
is legitimate or not. Consider this, if the query message from the reader contains a
veriﬁable value such that the tag can use it to authenticate the reader, knowing that
this query message is originated from a legitimate reader, then the tag will not be
made desynchronised because the attacker lacks the knowledge to create valid queries
to launch the querying-attack. Of course the solution is not as simple as this. Next
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we need to make sure a valid query cannot be replayed, otherwise the attacker can
simply record a valid query and launch querying-attack with it. This can be done in
two directions: ﬁrst, update the tag key after each reader query. Second, embed a
random nonce in each reader query. Now, since the reader authentication is sent ﬁrst,
before a tag gives out valid response, blocking-attack will not be success as a tag will
take no action if the reader message is blocked. A blocking-attacker may now turn to
block the reception of the tag-to-reader response, in order to desynchronise the reader.
This can be easily ﬁxed by storing both the previous and the current tag secrets.
This twist, moving the reader authentication message to the beginning, seems to be
a promising anti-tag tracing measurement, but it is not as easy to carry out as it seems.
The reader now needs to authenticate itself in the ﬁrst message to the tags. If all the
tags can verify such message, that means a common long-term secret is shared among
all the tags. This is dangerous in a symmetric key system: once a tag is compromised,
the revealed common secret can be used to jeopardise the whole system. Hence the
authentication message has to be unique per tag (ideally to be unique per tag per
query). If it is unique per tag, that means the message must contain a value computed
using also the secrets of the receiving tag such that only the receiving tag can verify
it. As the tag changes its secrets after each query, the reader authentication message
can be made unique per query. There is just one major question remains: “How do
we let the reader chooses which tag secrets to use to authenticate itself before any tag
has identiﬁed and authenticated itself to the reader?”. As a common saying, this is the
chicken or the egg dilemma and we are going to investigate on this.
In order to strengthen the privacy protection in RFID applications, provided that
the previous SAP constructions have their weaknesses and limitations, we propose a
new SAP construction method. The new construction diﬀers from the others in a
way that we consider RFID applications using SAP with the protocol structure where
the reader authentication is done before the tag responses, in contrast to SAPs where
there is no reader authentication (cf. Type 0, Type 1 protocols in [71]) or the reader
authentication is done after the tag has authenticated itself (cf. Type 2a, Type 2b
protocols in [71]). We ask a simple question : “If the reader can authenticate itself
to the tags ﬁrst, does that help strengthen the privacy of the application?” and we
show the answer in the following sections. Our ﬁndings turned out to be positive.
For applications where reader authentication is done ﬁrst, it can protect the RFID
tags from being traced even in front of strong and powerful adversaries like forwardattackers, querying-attackers, blocking-attackers and a hybrid of them. We give formal
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proves to these claims. Instead of only staying on the theoretical level, we also provide
practical example applications where our new SAP construction can be applied.

5.4

Our New RFID System Model

We deﬁne our RFID system model in a traditional way like many others have commonly
deﬁned. There are three entities in the system: a back-end server, a reader and a
collection of tags. Our main focus is on the wireless RFID communication between the
reader and the tags, so we have the following assumptions on our system model when
we do privacy evaluation to simplify its complexity.

5.4.1

Core Assumptions

An RFID system can be composed of multiple readers, each with its own back-end
server. Since we are only interested in the performance of tag tracing protections of
the SAP, without loss of generality, we assume there is only one legitimate system
reader in the system and every RFID tag will be communicating with it. A legitimate
system reader is the only reader that can access (and hence connected to) the system
back-end server. The access to the server is done through a secure channel as such,
no attack to the back-end server is possible. Compromising the reader is not possible
either as the back-end server is separated from the reader in practice. No secrets will
be revealed from the reader too thanks to its tamper-proof protection. In other words,
all the secrets stored in the back-end server remain unaccessible from the adversaries.
Since the reader and the back-end server are linked up through out the lifetime of the
system, we refer to them as a single entity denoted as R from now on. RFID tags,
on the other hand, are much more vulnerable. We assume there is no tamper-proof
protection installed on RFID tags: when a tag is captured by the adversaries, all the tag
secrets can be extracted promptly. Hence the security of the system cannot be based
on the secrecy of the tag secrets. The adversaries, however, can use the compromised
tag secrets to create a clone of the compromised tag to spoof the system. Whether
these clone tags can be caught is beyond the scope of this work, after all we only focus
on tag tracing protections. Each tag T has its own unique ID, which is only known to
R. We will use the notion Ti to refer to the tag with ID i. What is stored in a tag is
some tag secrets, denoted as Ki , that provide enough information for R to ﬁnd the true
ID of the tag where the tuple {i, Ki } is stored and maintained inside R. We assume
there are no false positive (i.e. misidentiﬁcation) on fake tags nor false negative (i.e.
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Reader
{Ki,i=1...n }
Picks a random nonce
← Auth1R (Ki,i=1...n , nonce, resp)
ver ← Auth2R (KID , nonce)
′
KID
← Auth3R (KID )
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Query,Challenge

−−−−−−−−−−−→
Response
←−−−−−−−−−−−
Verification
−−−−−−−−−−−→

Tag
{KID }
Generates a random value rand
resp ← Auth1T (KID , nonce, rand)
P ass ← Auth2T (KID , nonce, ver)
′
KID
← Auth3T (KID )

Figure 5.5: Traditional three-round RFID mutual authentication protocol construction

unidentiﬁable) on legitimate tags to happen in the system under normal circumstances
unless it was the work of the adversaries.

5.4.2

System Setup

At the beginning of the system start up, SetupReader(1s ) is called to properly setup
R. It generates the required public system parameters param and the reader secrets
O with the inputting security parameter s. param is available to anyone including
the adversaries to properly setup their own reader to be ready to communicate with
the system tags. Each system tag is empty in the beginning and is being setup with
SetupTag(ID, param, b). It generates per tag unique secrets KID for tag TID using a
unique ID and the public parameters param as input. Adversaries can also call this
to setup their own tags. b is used to indicate whether this tag will be recognised by
the system or not. If b = 1, the tag TID will be created as a legitimate tag and its ID
and KID will be stored in R; otherwise it will not be registered with the system (i.e. a
fake tag) and is only used by the adversaries to communicate with R. The underlying
RFID authentication protocol Auth() is prepared during system setup as well. We use
AuthiT (.) to indicate the i-th operation of the protocol on the tag side and AuthiR (.) for
the reader side.

5.4.3

RFID Authentication Protocol Construction

Since the RFID tags are passive devices, which are powered up with the reader query
signal, the reader will always be the ﬁrst to initiate a communication. Figure 5.5 shows
the traditional three-round RFID mutual authentication protocol construction.
This construction is classiﬁed as a Type 2a SAP in [71] and is shown to fail forward
privacy in front of a blocking-forward-attacker. In this type of SAP, the reader ﬁrst
picks a random challenge and broadcasts it together with the query message. Using
its own secret key KID , the tag generates a response with the received challenge. The
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reader then search through its list of Ki to look for a matching tag key that will
compute the same response with the challenge. Once the matching tag key is found,
the reader can generate a veriﬁcation for that particular tag using the found tag key.
If the veriﬁcation is correct, the tag knows that it has been communicating with a
legitimate reader and the tag key will be updated to a new value. A blocking-forwardattacker can trace the tags in this type of SAP by ﬁrst recording the challenge from
the reader and the response of the target tag and then block the tag from receiving the
veriﬁcation message, such that the tag will keep the same tag key unchanged. In the
next round, a tag is compromised to see if the stored tag key can generate the same
recorded response with the recorded challenge. In case there are only two tags left, the
adversary can always tell if the compromised tag or the other tag was the one being
queried previously and hence, the adversary has successfully traced the target tag.
We now propose an alternate SAP construction where the reader authenticates itself
in the ﬁrst message together with the query. For now, we just assume that the reader
has already picked a tag key to use. We will discuss how can this becomes practical
in later section. Notice that we do NOT assume the tag key that the reader picked
is ALWAYS CORRECT and we think it is too strong an assumption for a practical
privacy model. A trivial example is that since the reader is broadcasting the query,
some of the receiving tags must have a diﬀerent tag key than the one the reader picked,
which is an incorrect tag key for these tags. We also allow the situation that the reader
and the receiving tag may be desynchronised and possess diﬀerent states of the tag key
even though the receiving tag in fact has a matching ID on the reader side database.
i.e. what we assume is merely the action that a tag key is picked by the reader, there is
no guarantee that the tag key is correct, hence it is totally possible that Auth1T (.) will
output ⊥ instead of P ass with the received message. This is very important as we do
not want to make our model unrealistic with such a strong assumption and turns out
to be impractical. The alternate SAP construction is presented in ﬁgure 5.6. Following
the tradition, we will refer this as a Type R SAP since the authentication order is
now reversed.

5.5

Our New RFID Adversary Model

We adapt the ﬂexible adversary model proposed by Vaudenay in [93]. Since we have
a new system model, the original adversary model is properly modiﬁed to reﬂect the
changes. From now on, we will denote the adversary as A.
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Reader
{KID }
Picks a random nonce
ver ← Auth1R (KID , nonce)

Tag
{KID }
Query,Challenge,

P ass ← Auth2R (KID , nonce, resp)
′
KID
← Auth3R (KID )

←−−−−−−−−−−−

Verification

−−−−−−−−−−−→
Response

P ass ← Auth1T (KID , nonce, ver)
Generates a random value rand
resp ← Auth2T (KID , nonce, rand)
′
KID
← Auth3T (KID )

Figure 5.6: Type R SAP construction

5.5.1

Adversary Abilities

The abilities of the adversaries are modelled as oracle accesses. Based on the diﬀerent
attack strategies of the adversaries and which oracles are accessed, we can classify
them into diﬀerent types of adversaries. The following are the oracles provided in our
adversary model:
• CreateReader(param) equips A with a non-system reader R̄ ready to communicate with the system tags. param is the public parameters obtained from the
system during system start up, which is the output of SetupReader(1s ).
• CreateTag(ID) equips A with a non-system tag T̄ID on A’s choice of ID ready
to communicate with the system reader. SetupTag(ID, param, 0) is called to
properly setup the tag and returns the tag key K̄ID to A. Note that b = 0 and
hence T̄ID is not registered with the system. It is assumed that the IDs of all the
non-system tags created with this oracle are not the same as any of the system
tags.
• DrawTag() returns a virtual reference vtag to one of the tags randomly picked
from the system. This oracle models the scenario when A needs to get access
to a tag that is anonymous to him. Otherwise A can always request access to a
known ID tag using TID as the reference.
• Free(vtag) invalidates the virtual reference to one of the system tags. The next
call to DrawTag() may or may not return a virtual reference to the same tag
again. This models the scenario when A loses contact with the accessing tag.
• Exec(vtag) initialises the reader ready for a new protocol instance and returns
π as the handle to it. Then it runs the full protocol faithfully until the end
without any interruption with the tag vtag. The full transcript containing all the
messages exchanged are given to A. Notice that Exec(vtag) may or may not be
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executing a query with the correct ID of the vtag. i.e. the reader may issue a
query for TID while the true ID of vtag is ID′ , resulting a failed authentication.
This models an adversary who eavesdrops on the communication between reader
and tags of unknown IDs (the tag ID is part of the tag secrets).
• Launch() initialises the reader ready for a new protocol instance and returns π
as the handle to it. The initial broadcast message mπ generated by the reader
is given to A. Calling Launch() does not guarantee the completion of the whole
protocol if there is no subsequence calls to SendTag(.) and SendReader(.) to
complete the protocol. This models an active adversary who records a valid
reader veriﬁcation message (in which the adversary cannot create by himself
since he lacks the knowledge of the tag secrets) and possibly replays it at a later
time using the following oracle. Again A has no information about which mπ is
for which tag ID.
• SendTag(vtag, m) sends vtag a message m. The tag response m′ (if there is any)
is returned to A. vtag can be replaced by TID in case it is known to A. Notice
that the oracle does not require π to indicate which protocol instance as a tag
can only handle one instance at a time.
• SendReader(π, m) sends the reader a message m for the protocol instance π. We
allow the reader to have incomplete protocol instances withholding in its memory.
i.e. the reader can handle multiple protocol instances at the same time without
requiring any previously launched protocol instances to complete ﬁrst. e.g. A can
call Launch() twice to obtain both mπ and mπ+1 . A can call SendReader(π, m)
later to indicate m is for instance π even though the instance π + 1 has begun
already. Since the reader will not give out any response in our Type R protocol
structure, there will be no output for this oracle.
• Result(π) provides A with the authentication result of the protocol instance π.
It outputs 1 if it was a success (a legitimate tag has been authenticated) or 0 if the
authentication failed. If SendReader(π, m) is not called before Result(π), the
output is undef ined. Notice that in our protocol structure, the authentication
result is not released and is known to the reader only. Hence this oracle models
the real situations where the result can be obtained as side channel information,
e.g. an electric door lock opened.
• Corrupt(vtag) outputs the current tag key Kvtag of vtag to A. vtag can be
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replaced by TID in case it is known to A. Notice that Corrupt(vtag) can only
be called before or after the protocol in our Type R protocol structure. i.e.
corrupting a tag in between the ﬁrst and second messages is not allowed 3 . Some
may argue that if the tag corruption is done right after the tag has received the
ﬁrst message, not only the tag key but also all the other intermediate values can
be revealed. Such data can be used to simulate the full memory state of a tag,
which may or may not jeopardise the security of the system. We believe such
powerful corruption is impractical to pull oﬀ because i.) it is diﬃcult to predict
what the current tag state is when the tag is performing computations. ii.) the
tag will give out the response (second message) within a fraction of second, it
is hard to freeze the tag within that short period of time. iii.) RFID tags are
powered by the reader signal and the intermediate values are not stored in the
permanent memory section like the tag key. Once the power source is lost, these
values will be vanished. It will be very diﬃcult for an adversary to maintain the
power source while corrupting the tag.
The strongest adversary is deﬁned to be the one who has no limitation on accessing all of these oracles except Corrupt(vtag), where this restriction is imposed:
Corrupt(vtag) has to be the last oracle to access or in other words, once Corrupt(vtag)
is called, there can be no other subsequence oracle accesses 4 . This resembles the
strongest adversary, the wide-forward-attacker, deﬁned in [93] for RFID protocols using symmetric key only. According to [71], all the four construction types of SAP are
not strong enough to stand against this adversary in the tag tracing attack. We are
going to show that our Type R protocol construction remains secure in front of this
attacker.

5.5.2

Privacy Experiment

Before analysing the security of our new protocol construction, we have to deﬁne the
tag tracing privacy game ﬁrst. Before the game starts, the system is properly setup by
running SetupReader(1s ) once and n times the SetupTag(i, param, 1) where |n| is the
number of legitimate tags in the system. The tags are collected in a list L, i.e. Ti ∈ L
3

Corrupting a tag in between the protocol is allowed in other protocol structures like Type 2a and
Type 2b because the reader veriﬁcation (the third message) can be blocked such that the corruption
made between the second and the third message is done while the protocol is not completed yet.
4
Originally in [93], more calls to Corrupt(.) are allowed as they consider also the RFID systems
where tags have correlated secrets. We assume every tag has a unique tag key in our system model
hence we think that more calls to Corrupt(.) are redundant.
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for i = 1 . . . n.
The game is hosted by a challenger and runs in two stages. During the ﬁrst stage,
A is given access to L using any adversary oracle that is allowed within the ability of
A. Once A is satisﬁed interacting with the tags in L to obtain enough information
about the tags, the ﬁrst stage concludes. This is called the learning stage. A is now
requested to submit an uncorrupted tag as the challenge tag vtagC to the challenger.
vtagC is added into a separate list C. Notice that in order for A to gain the most
information, A will most likely not access Corrupt(vtagC ) during this stage as there
can be no other oracle access for A in the next stage once Corrupt(vtagC ) is accessed.
In the second stage, k ≤ n−1 uncorrupted tags are randomly picked from L−vtagC
and added into C as well. The k+1 tags in C are relabelled as TC0 , TC1 , . . . , TCk . Now A
is allowed to make more oracle accesses to the tags in C. Once A is satisﬁed interacting
with these tags, the second stage concludes. This is called the guessing stage. A is
now required to output a tag TCb where b ∈ {0 . . . k} that he thinks was vtagC . The
winning probability of a blind guessing A is

1
.
k+1

Hence a secure protocol requires for

any A to have gained only negligible advantage ϵ from the interaction with the system
such that A’s winning probability to the tag tracing game

1
k+1

+ ϵ is only negligibly

better than a blind guess.

5.6

Security Analysis of the Type R Construction

In this section, we will look at the improvements of the Type R protocol construction compares to the other four construction types. There are several trivial security
improvements from the construction and we will ﬁrst list them here.

5.6.1

Type R Protocols Can Resist Querying-Attack

We have this proposition: If there exists no A who can forge a valid veriﬁcation message, then a Type R protocol is safe from querying-attack.
In order to launch a querying-attack, the adversary requires to send queries to a
target tag repetitively such that the tag will keep changing its tag key to a new value
until a point that the reader can no longer authenticate the tag. For A to successfully
launch this attack on Type R protocols, he is required to generate valid veriﬁcation
messages per each query such that only when the message is veriﬁed will the tag changes
its tag key. Since A lacks the knowledge of the tag key, which is needed to compute a
correct veriﬁcation message, the tag will not be made desynchronised in this way. This
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is based on the assumption that A cannot forge a valid veriﬁcation message.
Another way for A to launch a querying-attack is to get a valid veriﬁcation message
by calling Launch(), which returns the ﬁrst message mπ of the reader to A. Since mπ
is a valid message of an unknown tag, A has to call SendTag(vtag, mπ ) for all the
uncorrupted tags such that the matching tag Ti will change its tag key to a new value.
To avoid synchronisation on the reader side, SendReader(π, m′ ) is not called. Now to
carry on the attack, A is tempted to resend mπ to Ti . But since mπ was computed
using the previous tag key of Ti , T will not verify it and no tag key updates anymore. A
may try to call Launch() again to get mπ+1 . But as the previous tag response was not
sent to R, even R does not know Ti has updated its key and hence mπ+1 is computed
using the previous tag key of Ti too, which will fail the veriﬁcation. This implies that
A can at most desynchronise the tag and reader one key state ahead on the tag side.
Resynchronisation is easy, the reader just need to send two consecutive queries using
the current and the next tag key to compute the veriﬁcation messages when the tag
wearer ﬁnds out the tag does not authenticate recently.

5.6.2

Type R Protocols Can Resist Blocking-Attack

A blocking-attack tries to desynchronise a tag and the reader by blocking the reception
of the other party’s response such that the uninformed party may not update its tag
key. In the tradition three-round mutual authentication protocol, this attack can be
easily launched. If the second message is always blocked, a Type 2b protocol will
have the tag keeps changing its tag key while the reader is lagged behind. This will
not happen in Type R protocols. Of course, it does not make sense to block the ﬁrst
message. So if the second message is blocked, as we have discussed above, it can at
most desynchronise the tag and the reader one tag key state only.
In fact, even though A can desynchronise a tag one step ahead, A has no way to tell
which tag has been desynchronised. Notice that the tag IDs are unknown to A, so as
the intended recipient of the ﬁrst message mπ obtained from Launch() is also unknown
to A. If A broadcasts mπ to all the tags and forwards their responses to R, the
intended recipient Ti can be spotted by calling Result(π) as 1 will return. However,
this means that Ti and R are synchronised. If the second message is blocked (i.e.
SendReader(π, m′ ) is not called), A cannot call Result(π) to test for the authentication
result and A cannot identify the intended recipient Ti .
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Tag
{K̄ID }

If H(K̄ID ||c) = v then
picks a random n, r ← H(K̄ID ||c||n)
r,n
If H(KID ||c||n) = r then ←−−−
else picks a random r
−−−−
′
′
KID ← H(KID )
KID
← H(K̄ID )
v,c

−−−−−−−→

Figure 5.7: A simple Type R RFID mutual authentication protocol

5.6.3

An Example Protocol

Let us give a simple example protocol that use the Type R protocol construction in
ﬁgure 5.7.
Here H() is a one-way and collision free hash function and || means concatenation.
We have the following claim: This simple protocol is strong against querying-attack,
blocking-attack, forward-attack and a combination of them.
Proof. First we show that the veriﬁcation message v, c is unforgeable. Notice
that v is computed from H(KID ||c) and after v is veriﬁed, the tag key is updated
′
′
to KID
= H(KID ). In order to forge a v ′ , c′ such that v ′ = H(KID
||c′ ), either A

has guessed the hash value H(KID ), which is negligible, or A has found a collision of
H(), which violates the assumption. Without a valid veriﬁcation message, A cannot
desynchronise the tag using querying-attack. Next, the resistance to blocking-attack
is automatically provided by the protocol construction where desynchronisation stops
right after the blocking of the second message, no subsequence blockings can cause the
tag to update its key further.
Now, for the protection against forward-attack, the one-wayness property of H()
provides unlinkability among changing tag keys in the hash-chain. On the other hand,
this attack takes advantage from the static tag key by using it to decode any previously
recorded communication between the tag and the reader. The only case where the tag
remains with the same tag key is when the veriﬁcation to v, c has failed. This can
happen if v, c is a failed forging attempt of A or v, c is not intended for K̄ID . Either
case, the tag will only output a random response, which cannot be used to related to
any tag key. The last possibility is when the reader has been “desynchronised” after
a blocking-attack (we are reluctant to call this a desynchronisation as the reader is
only one tag state behind). As discussed in 5.6.2, even after A has desynchronised a
victim tag, A has no way to tell which tag has been desynchronised. Hence there does
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not exist two tag responses r, r′ such that they are computed from the same tag key.
Calling Corrupt(.) does not help tracing the tag because there is no tag response that
′
was computed using the updated tag key KID
for reference. 

Next, we have to recall the tag tracing game to proof the security of Type R
protocol against wide-adversary, which is the adversary who can access the Result(π)
oracle to obtain the side-channel information of the authentication result of a tag [93].
We are aware that this extra piece of information may help the adversary to trace a tag.
We have the following claim: This simple protocol is not secure against wide-adversary
in our tag tracing game for k = 0 and k = 1. The attack becomes infeasible when k is
suﬃciently large.
Proof. It is trivial when k = 0, i.e. only the challenge tag vtagC is presented for
A to guess. The mere fact that when TC0 gives a response reveals its present and
the winning probability of A is

1
.
0+1

When k = 1, there are two tags presented for

A to guess: the challenge tag and another random tag. It ﬁrst seems that each of
their response is independent to each other and appears to be random, the winning
probability of A is no better than 12 . We proof with the following attack strategy where
A will win with slightly better probability.
1. System starts up: param ← SetupReader(1s ), T0 ← SetupTag(0, param, 1),
T1 ← SetupTag(1, param, 1)
2. vtag ← DrawTag()
3. {π, mπ } ← Exec(vtag)
4. θ ← Result(π)
5. If θ = 1 then quit; otherwise proceeds (mπ is a valid query for tag Ti ∈ L − vtag)
6. Concludes stage 1. Submit vtag as the challenge tag
7. Free(vtag)
8. vtag1 ← DrawTag()
9. vtag2 ← DrawTag()
10. m′1 ← SendTag(vtag1 , mπ )
11. m′2 ← SendTag(vtag2 , mπ )
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12. Free(vtag1 )
13. Free(vtag2 )
d ← DrawTag()
14. vtag
d
15. {π + 1, mπ+1 } ← Exec(vtag)
16. θ ← Result(π + 1)
d was vtag
17. If θ = 0 then goto 15; otherwise vtag
The attack take advantage of the authentication result: if T1 was not authenticated
using mπ , then mπ must be a valid query message for T0 . Since T0 did not received mπ
in the ﬁrst stage, forwarding mπ to it in the second stage will desynchronise it. If the
authentication result is 1 in the second stage, the querying tag must be T1 , otherwise
d repeatedly until 1 is obtained. The winning probability of
A has to call Exec(vtag)
A is

1
2

+

1
.
n·k2

Hence this tag tracing attack becomes infeasible when k is suﬃciently

large.

5.7

Example Applications for Type R Protocols

In contrast to the other SAP constructions where the reader is required to undergo full
key space search to look for the matching tag key (and hence the tag ID), Type R protocol assumes the tag ID (and hence the corresponding tag key) is already determined
at the beginning. When we have this assumption, there are a few identiﬁed applicable
areas where this assumption is practical, otherwise this new protocol construction will
not be of much use. We consider three diﬀerent applications where this is possible.
Ownership transfer. When a buyer and a seller come to an agreement to transfer the ownership of an RFID tagged product, they must have veriﬁed and examined
the product so that it is at its good state. In order to do so, they have to obtain the
tag information before the ownership transfer is carried out, which also provide them
with the tag ID and the current tag key of the tagged product. In that sense, the
tag ID is known already at the beginning. Type R protocol can be used here to aid
the ownership transfer by authenticating the validity of the tagged product, e.g. it
is of the claimed tag ID associated with the claimed tag information and the seller
actually knows the current tag key so that it does not appear to be a stolen product.
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A practical use of Type R protocol for RFID ownership transfer is presented in [72].
Tag search. Instead of asking which tags are within the signal range of the reader,
there can be other use of a tag scan, like asking if a particular tag is within the signal
range. i.e. instead of issuing a query of “Who are there”, the reader issues a query “Are
taga , tagb , tagc , . . . here?”. In this case, the tag key of those particular tags are picked
from the database and a speciﬁc tag search query is broadcasted to look for these tags.
This is particularly useful in a warehouse to locate speciﬁc RFID tagged items when
some signaling devices like alarms and buzz lights are attached to the source.
Tag query for small and large group. If there are only a small number of tags
within the system, we can identify all of these tags by issuing them each a tag search
query. The eﬀect is the same as a broadcasted tag query message but provide better
security protections as we have discussed. This is good for systems where there are
not many legitimate tags but a higher standard of privacy protection is needed. On
the other hand, Type R protocol provides better side-channel attack protection in a
large group while it remains an open problem in other SAP constructions.

5.8

Conclusion

We have classiﬁed ﬁve types of SAPs in this chapter. Out of the ﬁve, four of them
do not perform very well on privacy protection. We have shown that the ﬁfth type of
authentication protocol structure has its strength over other traditional construction
types. It provides better protections against querying-attack, blocking-attack, forwardattack and any combination of them. The side-channel attack problem is also mitigated
under this construction type. We also identiﬁed several potential application areas
where they can beneﬁt from this new tool.

Chapter 6
Ownership Transfer Protocol in RFID

Chapter Overview
In the previous chapter, we proposed a new classiﬁcation for RFID protocols, called SAP. Since SAPs do not perform well in privacy protection, we
suggested a new RFID protocols construction method and we proved its
privacy protection abilities. In this chapter, we will introduce a new area
in RFID protocols. We have seen mostly authentications and now we will
look at ownership transfer. First we give a brief introduction to this topic,
then we will go onto present our ownership transfer protocol. Our protocol is based on the new construction method we suggested in the previous
chapter. Part of the results in this chapter has been published in [72] at
RFIDsec Asia 2010 and in [73]. We have the following contributions in this
chapter:
• We review some recently proposed works on RFID ownership transfer
and identify their common security properties
• We introduce four new security properties for RFID ownership transfer
• We propose our new RFID ownership transfer protocol using our new
construction method

6.1

RFID Ownership Transfer

Another aspect to look at the secret key issue (so as the privacy issue) of RFID is the
possession of the key: i.e. who should know the secret key. The most used RFID system
model consist of three components: a centralised trusted back-end database server, the
RFID reader and the RFID tags. We refer to it the centralised server model. Under
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this model, all the tag secret keys are stored and maintained in the back-end database
server. Every RFID reader is assumed to have a secure connection to this server in
order to access the tag secret keys. Every time a query is broadcast by the reader and
some tag response is received, matching secret key will be fetched to properly resolve
the response. If constantly changing secret key method is used, this may follow up with
key update and synchronisation between server and the tag. This model implies that
only the centralised server should possess all the secret keys. Of course, most likely
the owner of the server would be the product manufacturer or the underlying company
who runs the RFID application. This would not be a great privacy issue as long as the
tags are still the company’s assets.
In the future, smart home appliances will become more and more common. Personal
RFID readers are expected to go into everyone’s pocket and RFID tagged products will
be all over the places. To be able to resolve the tag responses at home, personal RFID
reader should also gain access to the matching secret key of the corresponding RFID
tagged product. It is by no means impossible to require personal readers to connect to
the product company server every time a query is needed, only less convenient, not to
mention the heavy burden of the server to handle all the incoming requests. Also, there
exists one major problem now: the trust issue. As the company is fully capable to read
and scan all of its RFID tagged products because it possesses all the secret keys, it
is not hard to see the consequence of using this centralised server model. Privacy of
the product buyer (it is rather inappropriate to call him the product owner for now as
we have not deﬁne what is an owner), especially his whereabouts, his trail, his usual
places, etc. can be proﬁled by the company easily (refer to the battleﬁeld example
above). If we deﬁne the ownership of an RFID tag as the one who knows the tag secret
key (we have a diﬀerent deﬁnition in the context), then we see the need of ownership
transfer in this scenario. It is not only an issue between the product company and the
buyer, but also between buyers when the product changes hands.

6.2

Motivation

The aim of this work is to provide a practical and secure RFID ownership transfer
scheme. Most of the previous RFID ownership transfer schemes that we reviewed in
the literature are designed for a single-mined purpose: transfer the tag key from one
owner to another owner securely. These limited schemes are not suitable in practice.
In this work, we look into the privacy needs of every involving entities in an ownership
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transfer: the company, the buyer, the previous owner and the new owner. To make
our scheme practical, we also consider what will happen in front of a cheating seller in
order to provide protections to the potential buyer. Or if the previous or new owner
is later found out to be cheated, our scheme can also provides some protections to
the victim. Besides ownership transfer, a subclass of it called ownership delegation is
also considered in this work. Diﬀerent from ownership transfer, where the ownership
is fully transferred from one entity to another, delegation only transfer part of the
ownership (this is essentially the right to read the tag) from the owner to a delegate.
This delegated partial ownership will expire by itself or it can be explicitly taken back
by the owner.
We will ﬁrst have a brief review on what have been done in those previously proposed
RFID ownership transfer schemes. Seeing what are missing in the literature, we show
our contributions in the following subsection.

6.2.1

Previous Works on RFID Ownership Transfer

Compare to RFID authentication protocols, RFID ownership transfer schemes have
received less attention in the literature. During our work, we can easily ﬁnd a lot
of works about the former, while only around ten pieces of work, to the best of our
knowledge, are related to or have mentioned about the latter. We give a brief review
of these works in this section.
Molnar et al. [67, 68] are the ﬁrst to discuss RFID ownership transfer and ownership
delegation explicitly along with their pseudonym RFID authentication protocol in their
papers. Ownership transfer and controlled delegation are the new security properties
they introduced for RFID applications. In their scheme, a trusted centre (TC) manages
all the tag secrets in a tree structure. Each tag has one unique key and multiple shared
keys with other tags to aid faster tag lookup. Pseudonyms are generated per each
query using these keys such that only the TC can disambiguate tag responses and
identify each tag. Controlled delegation is done by giving authorised reader a derived
key, obtained by running a pseudo-random generator on input the unique key of a
tag. The tag will use also the derived key in generating the next q pseudonyms as
controlled by an internal non-volatile counter. Delegation expires automatically after
q queries. Ownership transfer in fact is done with two controlled delegations. When
a tag changes hands, the new owner requests delegation from the TC and asks for the
remaining number of delegated tag queries of the previous owner (say p). The new
owner then repeatedly queries the tag p times or send a new counter value to the tag
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that is greater than the current counter value plus p. This prevents ownership overlap
between the new and the previous owner. Fouladgar and Aﬁﬁ use a similar setting as
Molnar et al. in [29, 30, 31] where the role of TC is replaced by a centralised database
(CDB). Each tag has an internal counter that increases per each query. Once this
counter reaches its ﬁxed maximum value, the current tag key will expire and the CDB
must be contacted to renew the tag key. Delegation is done by releasing the current
tag key to an veriﬁed user by the CDB. Ownership transfer is done by setting the tag
counter to its maximum value ﬁrst (to invalidate any delegation) and then renew the
tag key, followed by a delegation to the new owner.
Since the TC or the CDB still holds all the tag secrets, tag queries made by future
owners could still be monitored, which violates their privacy. Lim and Kwon [62]
only consider these centralised management methods as temporary ownership transfer
schemes and proposed “perfect” ownership transfer, which requires the previous owner
to transfer all the tag secrets to the new owner and allow the new owner to secretly
update them so that new owner privacy is preserved. Saito et al. have a similar idea
in [80], however, the security of their scheme is only based on the short read range of
the backward channel (tag to reader communication) by assuming that it is hard for
adversaries to eavesdrop on this channel.
Instead of using a centralised server, Soppera and Burbridge [84] adopt the scheme
of Molnar et al. by replacing the centralised TC with some distributed local devices
called RFID acceptor tag such that delegations are done with them instead of the TC.
Koralalage et al. [56] also suggest to use some key card reading devices to aid customers
to directly overwrite the stored tag secret by swiping an universal customer card and
inputting a PIN as the new tag secret. Both of these systems require the distribution
of external devices, which adds extra cost and introduces new trust issues.
Previous owner privacy is another important security property in ownership transfer
but it has not been addressed properly until Osaka et al. [76] proposed their scheme. In
their scheme, both the previous and the new owner’s privacy are preserved by allowing
the previous owner to change the tag key ﬁrst, then send this new (temporary) tag
key to the new owner via a secure channel, and ﬁnally let the new owner to change
this (temporary) tag key privately. This message ﬂow pattern if designed correctly
can protect both owners’ privacy. However, a ﬂaw in their ownership transfer protocol
allows an attacker to break previous owner privacy if the tag is compromised, hence
their scheme failed forward security. We adopt this message ﬂow pattern in our scheme
and at the same time we provide forward security.
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Song [83] introduced a new property called authorisation recovery. In situations
like after sales services or warranty purposes, a tag may be required to send back to
its previous owner. For example a factory needs to access the tag to verify the product
before providing any repairing service under warranty. This property ensures that ownership recovery is possible and does not involve another instance of ownership transfer
between the current owner and the previous owner. The idea in [83] is fairly simple.
The new owner just needs to record the (temporary) tag key given by the previous
owner when ownership transfer was carried out. At times when authorisation recovery is needed, the current owner executes the key change protocol with the recorded
tag key as input rather than using a random value. As the previous owner knew and
recorded such key also, his/her authorisation to the tag is recovered. However, we see
the way the author achieved this property as a side eﬀect of running the key change
protocol only. As a matter of fact, changing the tag key to some already known value
only means sharing the ownership (if ownership is deﬁned as possession of the tag key)
with someone else. Although this authorisation recovery method saves the owners from
needing to run the ownership transfer protocol (which is however a more proper way
to do in our opinion), there is an unwanted eﬀect that comes with it: the ownership
to the tag becomes unclear now. If later on the tag is to be returned to the original
owner, who is sharing the ownership with the previous (now current) owner, a new instance of ownership transfer protocol must be executed in order to ﬁx the now unclear
ownership. Dimitriou [25] also proposed a similar property called tag release where the
current owner can issue a special command to let the tag restores back to its factory
default key, which is always stored in the tag memory, allowing the manufacturer to
gain back the access to the tag. But then again, to regain the authorisation, the original
owner requires the manufacturer to delegate the updated tag key to him/her followed
by a new instance of ownership transfer. One may think that a controlled delegation
would probably ﬁx this dilemma. But delegation requires a secure channel to deliver
the delegated key, which does not enjoy the advantage of knowing a previously known
shared secret (the temporary tag key used in previous ownership transfer). Hence
we suggested a modiﬁed property called temporary authorisation recovery, which is a
combination of controlled delegation and authorisation recovery that provides instant
authorisation recovery to the previous owner and still maintains the full ownership to
the tag by the original owner at the same time.
Recently, Deursen et al. [89] presented a formal model for RFID ownership transfer.
They deﬁned secure ownership and exclusive ownership where the former states that
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the tag holder must be the tag owner and the latter states that there cannot be other
tag owners beside the tag holder. However, they did not consider controlled delegation
nor authorisation recovery where a tag holder may not be a tag owner and hence their
model cannot be applied in our scheme as we provide both of these properties.

6.2.2

Our Contributions

In addition to the previously discussed RFID ownership transfer security properties:
controlled delegation, previous owner privacy, current owner privacy and temporary
authorisation recovery, there are some new security properties that are ﬁrstly introduced by us. We consider these new security properties as some practical needs for
users during everyday RFID ownership transfer. To help illustrate our ideas, we have
the following scenario in mind when we construct our scheme:
“Bob would like to buy an RFID tagged item currently owned by Alice.
After agreeing on the price, they are about to begin the ownership transfer
procedures. Alice ﬁrst scans and authenticates the target item among all of
her other RFID tagged products. The item is now taken out and isolated
from the others. Alice changes the tag key of the item to a temporary value.
Bob is now given the ID of the tag along with the item description and
the temporary tag key. Although the item has been authenticated by Alice,
from Bob’s point of view, he cannot be sure about this, as the ID, the item
description and the key are all provided by Alice. So instead of jumping
right into the ownership transfer process, Bob may want to check on the
item himself ﬁrst. Bob may be able to verify that the tag and the item
are not fabricated, but he cannot be sure if the ID truly belongs to the tag
(i.e. same brand, same product, diﬀerent item). Hence what he needs is
tag assurance, to guarantee the tag is the same one as the one Alice has
described. If Bob is satisﬁed, they can carry on the ownership transfer
procedures. Now the money is paid and the ownership is transferred, but
Bob immediately found out that the item is defective. Bob requests a refund
but Alice now denies ever selling Bob such item. What Bob needs the most
now is undeniable ownership transfer, where it provides a mean to prove
Alice was the previous owner of the item. With such proof, Bob shows to
the authorities that Alice was actually the one who sold him the item. Now
Alice cannot deny the fact that she last owned the item, instead, now she
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claims that Bob stole the item from her. What can clear Bob’s name is a
current ownership proof to the item. Bob presented such proof and the case
is adjourned.”
With the scenario above, we propose a new RFID ownership transfer scheme that
has all the security properties deﬁned according to and adapted from previous schemes,
these including : controlled delegation, previous owner privacy, new owner privacy and
temporary authorisation recovery. Also, we introduce four new security properties
for RFID ownership transfer. Some of them have been mentioned in the scenario,
which are tag assurance, undeniable ownership transfer and current ownership proof.
Furthermore, we provide owner initiation to guarantee all the reader-to-tag commands
are executed only by the owner and never the delegate nor adversaries.

6.3

Preliminaries

In this section, we outline the models, assumptions, security deﬁnitions and the building
blocks that are required to construct our scheme. We stress that readers should follow
closely to our models and assumptions in this section before jumping to section 6.4,
where our ﬁnal scheme is presented.

6.3.1

System Model

We do not use the centralised server model in our scheme. Instead, we allow each user to
have their own personal reader, which has their own personal database either connected
wirelessly or built internally in the reader. This model removes the need of the trusted
centner (TC) that is required in the centralised server model to maintain the current
(sometimes also previous) ownership of each tag. From now on, we will simply refer
to the combination of the reader and the connected database as the reader, since their
connection is always considered to be secure in our system model. It is also assumed
that the reader cannot be compromised (or in other words there is no advantage gained
by compromising the reader) because in fact the database can be separated and located
in a diﬀerent physical location from the reader.
The manufacturer
To begin with, there is a special system role called the manufacturer, who is responsible
to initialise the system, create and setup the tags. It is equipped with the following
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functions:
• SetupReader() – initialises the system by inputting the security parameter 1k
and prepares the pre-deﬁned tag authentication protocol Auth()
• SetupTag() – creates and setups a tag by inputting an unique ID along with the
tag descriptions Inf oID . This outputs the corresponding tag secret KID
• Auth() – allows tag authentication to carry out between reader and tags
The manufacturer ﬁrst executes SetupReader() with a security parameter 1k to
properly setup the reader and initialise the system to use Auth(). We deﬁne Auth()
as one of those constantly changing symmetric key authentication protocols discussed
above. Since the use of Auth() is not necessary in our scheme, we will skip the details
about it, it is only mentioned for a complete description of the system model. After the
setup of the reader, the manufacturer further creates and setups the tags by running
SetupTag() with an unique ID together with some axillary tag related information
Inf oID (e.g. product description, origin, manufacture date, etc.) for each tag as
input. This function outputs an unique tag secret KID , which is used as the initial tag
key.
The RFID communication
Whenever a reader requires to authenticate a tag, it will execute the tag authentication
protocol Auth() by ﬁrst sending out a query and then relay the tag response to the
database via a secure channel. After the database has processed the response, it will
send back the result to the reader. Any user (including attackers) with a compatible
reader can also setup their own reader by running SetupReader() using the public
security parameters and start interacting with the tags, however, the user cannot access
the other’s database. Likewise, any user (mainly attackers) with a compatible tag can
setup their own custom tag by running SetupTag() with some random or chosen ID,
Inf oID and start interacting with the other readers.

6.3.2

Ownership Transfer Model

In case of ownership transfer, there are new roles we refer to the previous owner, the
current owner, the potential owner and the delegate. Every potential owner is equipped
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with his/her own system compatible reader, together with his/her own database connected via a secure channel (personal readers may even have it installed internally).
Each role have their own power to execute a certain functions as detailed below:
The current owner
The current owner is the basic role in the ownership transfer model. Originally, the
manufacturer is the ﬁrst and current owner of every RFID tag. Basically, the current
owner is the one who has all the control over his/her own tag and is equipped with the
following functions:
• Auth() – authenticates the owned tag
• OwnerTrans() – transfers the ownership to a new owner
• KeyChange() – changes the current tag key explicitly
• Delegate() – delegates the tag access right to a delegate
• AuthRecover() – temporary reverts the ownership to the previous owner
• PreOwner() – proves the ownership of the previous owner to the tag so that the
previous owner cannot deny ever owning (selling) the tag
• CurOwner() – proves the ownership of the current owner to the tag so that any
third party can be convinced that the tag was not stolen but actually owned by
the current owner
Auth() is always used by the owner to access the tag, only the one who knows the
current tag key can successfully execute this function. When an ownership transfer
is required, the current owner and a potential owner will run our ownership transfer
scheme OwnerTrans(). If it is a success, the roles will change: all the tag related secret
and other information will be passed along to the potential owner, who becomes the
current owner ; the original owner now becomes the previous owner. KeyChange() can
be run at any time to refresh the current tag key to some random value, which is useful
to guarantee owner privacy. When it is needed, the owner can allow a delegate to
gain temporary tag access right by executing Delegate(). Temporary authorisation
recovery by running AuthRecover() is an added feature to the application at times
like product maintenance to allow the previous owner to gain back the tag access right
temporarily. Finally, PreOwner() and CurOwner() are the new features ﬁrstly provided
by us and we will provide more details when we present our ownership transfer scheme.
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The delegate
If the current owner executes the controlled delegation protocol Delegate(), there is
an additional role called the delegate, who will receive the tag key and as a result,
gains the access right to the tag. However, diﬀer from the current owner, who has full
control over the tag, the delegate can only authenticate the tag under a pre-deﬁned
number of times using the supplied tag key given by the current owner. For example,
a shop keeper may delegate a worker to help stock taking, where tag reading is already
enough to fulﬁll the task. Hence, the delegate can only execute the Auth() function
temporarily:
• Auth() – authenticates the delegated tag

6.3.3

Basic Assumptions

As there can be diﬀerent settings in the same system model, we have the following
basic assumptions to characterise our model from the others. Our scheme and security
proofs are also built upon these assumptions.
Capability assumption
We consider RFID tags as very constrained devices. They can at most perform some
light-weight cryptographic hashing functions; on the contrary, readers are much more
capable to perform more expensive cryptographic operations like asymmetric encryption and decryption, signing and signature veriﬁcation.
Memory assumption
Tags are vulnerable to key compromise attack. We always assume all the internal
secrets stored in tag memory are also available to competent adversaries. The base
requirement of RFID tags is some incorruptible memory or delicate memory, i.e. adversaries can read the memory by compromising the tag but they lack the ability/tool
to corrupt the memory or write back some chosen value. Even better is that once
the tag is compromised, it will not be functioning anymore. The best they can do
is to use the compromised memory content to create a clone by simulating the responses of the compromised tag. Whether this simulation or cloned tag can be caught
is beyond the scope of our work. Hence we generalise this to an assumption “once a
tag is compromised, its memory can only be read and the tag no longer responses to
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other commands”. This resemble the forward attacker as deﬁned in [93], which is the
strongest adversary deﬁnition for non-PKC capable RFID tags. On the contrary, tags
are built with memory update mechanism but it only functions when the pre-deﬁned
protocols implemented in the tags are executed and followed faithfully.
Fixed target assumption
Unlike tag authentication protocols where the reader needs to search for the correct
tag ID from its database by matching the tag response generated by the corresponding
tag secret, we assume that in our ownership transfer scheme, there is always a target
tag, which has been authenticated already, such that the reader knows exactly the ID
of the tag and which tag secret KID to use to communicate with it. This assumption
makes sense as both the seller and the buyer are trading a particular item they are both
interested and selected. For this assumption to be applicable, we require the trading
item to be authenticated ﬁrst by Auth() and then separated from other RFID items
so that it will be the sole item involved in the ownership transfer scheme before the
scheme can be carried out.
Communication assumption
For the communication between reader and tag, we always assume that all the reader
to tag messages can be delivered although these messages can still be eavesdropped,
recorded and replayed by adversaries but are never blocked (notice that this does not
mean all the reader to tag messages are originated from an honest reader, they can
come from the adversaries or replays too). This assumption is logical since the reader
always broadcasts strong wireless signals, which is hard to block. Also, due to the
previous assumption, the intended recipient tag is always participating in the scheme,
which eliminates the situation that the reader is broadcasting valid commands to a fake
tag ONLY and resulted in simple record and replay (or relay) attack later on. On the
other hand, this assumption can be easily removed if we require the tag to generate a
random nonce for the reader ﬁrst, and embed this nonce in the reader to tag message.
Then the tag can verify the freshness of the message using the embedded nonce. Since
this assumption is not too strong, we just leave it here to keep our scheme simple and
avoid the necessity of adding a random number generator in a tag.
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Adversary Model

We adopt the adversary model proposed by Vaudenay in [93] and simplify it with the
following adversary abilities:
• SetupReader() – allows the creation of a fake reader to interact with other tags
• SetupTag() – allows the creation of a fake tag to interact with the reader
• SendReader() – sends a message to the reader. A reply message from the reader
may be returned depending on the protocol
• SendTag() – sends a message to a tag. A reply message from this tag may be
returned depending on the protocol
• Corrupt() – returns all the internal secrets stored inside the tag and virtually
removes the tag from the application
We do not assume users are honest in our system, hence it is possible that either
the previous owner, the current owner, the potential owner or the delegate is cheating
in the scheme. However it is not realistic to consider when both sides are cheating (i.e.
at most one adversary during any transaction), otherwise both can simply collogue and
there can be no security property enforceable.

6.3.5

Security Properties

We identify the following security properties from previous RFID ownership transfer
schemes:
• Previous owner privacy - At the completion of the ownership transfer scheme, the
privacy of the previous owner is preserved. Meaning that no future owners can
relate or trace back any previous communication between the previous owner and
the RFID tag even though a full history of transmitted messages is eavesdropped
and recorded.
• New owner privacy - At the completion of the ownership transfer scheme, the
privacy of the new owner is preserved. Meaning that no previous owners can
relate or track any current communication between the new owner and the RFID
tag even though all the transmission is being eavesdropped.
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• Controlled delegation - The current owner of the RFID tag has the authority to
execute a delegation protocol, which temporary delegates the access right of the
tag to anyone without forfeiting the ownership to the tag. The delegate cannot
overtake the ownership while the owner can cancel this delegation at anytime.
Moreover, the delegation will automatically expires once a pre-determined number of queries value is reached.
• Temporary authorisation recovery - The current owner of the RFID tag can
allow the previous owner to gain back the access to the RFID tag without going
through another instance of the ownership transfer protocol. At the same time,
the current owner can cancel the recovered authorisation at anytime without the
help from the previous owner.
We further introduce four new security properties ﬁrstly proposed in this work:
• Tag assurance - During the ownership transfer scheme, the buyer can be assured
that the RFID tag undergoes the ownership transfer is the tag claimed by the
current owner and requested by the buyer. This property guarantees that the
current owner cannot randomly pick any tagged product he/she owns and sells
it to the buyer. Together with the assumption 6.3.3, we provide in our scheme a
way for the buyer to verify the ID of the tag.
• Current ownership proof - The current owner can prove to any third party that
he/she is the current owner of the RFID tagged item.
• Undeniable ownership transfer - The current owner can prove to any third party
that the RFID tagged item was owned by a previous owner and the previous
owner cannot deny ever owning the tag.
• Owner initiation - The current owner and only the current owner can initiate
an ownership transfer, key change and delegation. Unlike most of the other
ownership transfer schemes where anyone who holds the current tag key can
initiate an ownership transfer, we explicitly limit this to the current owner only
(i.e. the delegate is excluded).

6.3.6

Building Blocks

To build our proposed scheme, we assume there exists a cryptographic hash function
H() : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k that has the following properties:
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• One-wayness - The computation of the hash value is eﬃcient while it is hard to
ﬁnd the pre-image.
• Collision resistance - Given any hash value, it is hard to ﬁnd another message
not equal to the pre-image but gives the same hash value.
We also assume that there exists a public key cryptosystem (PKC) for the users to
create publicly veriﬁable digital signatures such that for any given message m, a public
key P K and a corresponding private key SK, we have
σ = Sig(m, SK) and OK ← Ver(m, σ, P K)
where Sig() is the signing operation that hash the input message m into proper length
and outputs the signature σ signed with the private key SK on the hash of message.
Ver() is the signature veriﬁcation operation that outputs OK if the signature is truly
signed with the corresponding private key of the public key P K on m and outputs
⊥ otherwise. We require that the signatures generated are unforgeable. As one may
expected, the signature (together with the assumption 6.3.3) is used to provide current
and undeniable ownership proofs.
The PKC is also capable to generate encrypted message from any given message
m by an encryption function Enc() using the public key P K and decrypt encrypted
message by an decryption function Dec() using the corresponding private key SK. i.e.
we have
c = Enc(m, P K) and m = Dec(c, SK)
These functions are only used to establish a secure channel to safely transfer the current
tag key from the owner to the buyer. If there exists other form of secure channel (i.e.
direct linkage between the readers of the owner and the buyer), these encryption and
decryption functions are unnecessary.
Finally, as we mentioned in the assumption 6.3.3, there is a secure RFID authentication protocol Auth() such that after its execution, it outputs T rue if and only if the
tag response r matches with the result generated using KID , otherwise it outputs ⊥.
Afterward, the real ID of the tag can be looked up by the reader using KID as the
reference key from the database.

6.4

Our Ownership Transfer Scheme

We use the building blocks described in section 6.3.6 to construct our ownership transfer scheme. Our scheme composes of a setup and four protocols: key change protocol,
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controlled delegation protocol, ownership transfer protocol and temporary authorisation recovery protocol. Each protocol has its own security goal to achieve. Notice that
during the protocols, some messages are intended for the tag only (e.g. the commands)
but we still use message ﬂow arrows between the current owner and the potential
owner/the delegate to indicate that such messages can always be overheard by the
participating parties. We give details of our scheme below.

6.4.1

Setup

Before anyone can apply our scheme to aid RFID ownership transfer, users (including
the manufacturer) are required to obtain their own public key P K and private key SK
of the PKC. The manufacturer chooses a security parameter 1k and runs SetupReader()
to setup the reader and prepares the authentication protocol Auth() and the hash
function H(). The output bits of H() is set to k − bits. The manufacturer then chooses
an unique ID for each tag and runs SetupTag(), which outputs a k − bits random
number KID as the initial tag key. For each of the tag entries, the reader records and
maintains the following values:
• ID : The ID of the tag.
• Inf oID : The information about the tag.
• KID : The current tag key.
• KH0 = KID : The tag session key used in generation of O.
• σ0 ← Sig(VS0 , SKM ) : The signature of the manufacturer (ﬁrst owner) for a tag
signed using its private key SKM . VS0 ← H(ID||Inf oID ).
Each tag is then assigned the following values:
• KID : The symmetric key of the tag shared with its current owner.
• VS0 ← H(ID||Inf oID ) : The hash (chain) value of the tag ID and its information
used in signature generation.
• O ← H(σ0 ||KH0 ) : The hash value of the current owner’s signature.
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Owner
{KID , KHi , σi }

Tag
{KID , O}

R

r ←− {0, 1}k ,
T ← H(r||KID ||KC),
O ← H(σi ||KHi ), u = O ⊕ T ,
KID = H(r ⊕ KID )

KC,r,u

−−−−−−−−−−−→

If u ⊕ H(r||KID ||KC) ̸= O,
then F ail; Otherwise
KID = H(r ⊕ KID )

Figure 6.1: Key change protocol

6.4.2

Key Change Protocol

First of all, we present our key change protocol in ﬁgure 6.4.2. There are two main
instances where this protocol should be executed, one before and one after the ownership transfer protocol. Changing the current tag key before the ownership transfer
protocol can eliminate all the linkage of the previous communications between the current owner and the tag when the current tag key was used. This eﬀectively provides
previous owner privacy. Later when the ownership transfer protocol is completed, the
new owner must change the tag key again such that the current tag key obtained from
the previous owner can be overwritten with a fresh new key unknown to him/her. Since
there is no secret shared between the tag and the new owner yet, it is unavoidable to
preform such key change in a private environment free from the interception of the
previous owner. This private key change eﬀectively provides new owner privacy. The
protocol is presented in ﬁgure 6.4.2. (notice that assumption 6.3.3 applies here). We
will violate the notation a bit from now on and use bold letters to indicate the type
of command being sent in the protocol. Here we have KC to indicate the command
“Key Change”.

6.4.3

Controlled Delegation Protocol

Next, we present our controlled delegation protocol. Using a similar idea in [29], a
counter c is kept in the tag memory if the tag received a delegation command. Each
time when the tag is queried the value will increase by 1. Once c reaches cmax , the
delegation is automatically expired and the delegated key will be replaced with the
original tag key that was backed up at the start of the delegation. There is also a
delegation cancel protocol, which invalidates the delegated key despite the current
value of c and restores the backed up key as the current tag key. This eﬀectively
provides controlled delegation. To complete the protocol, the current owner has to
send the delegated key to the delegate via a secure channel. In our setting, the public
key of the delegate can be used to encrypt the key in a secure manner thanks to the
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Owner
{KID , KHi , σi , P KD }
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Tag
{KID , O}

Delegate
{SKD }

CD,max,r,u,e

KD ← Dec(e, SKD ),
cmax = max, c = 0

R

r ←− {0, 1}k , pick max,
T ← H(r||KID ||max||CD),
O ← H(σi ||KHi ), u = O ⊕ T ,
KD ← H(r ⊕ KID ),
e ← Enc(KD , P KD )

Subsequent tag queries:
Delegate
{KD , c, cmax }
If c = cmax , then F ail;
Otherwise c = c + 1,
executes Auth(KD )

−−−−−−−−−−−→
m = r||KID ||max||CD,
if u ⊕ H(m) ̸= O,
then F ail; Otherwise
KB = KID ,
cmax = max, c = 0,
KID = H(r ⊕ KID )

Query

−−−−−−−−−−−→
Response
←−−−−−−−−−−−

Delegation cancel:
Owner
{KID , KHi , σi }

Tag
{KID , O, c, cmax , KB }

R

r ←− {0, 1}k ,
T ← H(r||KID ||DC),
O ← H(σi ||KHi ), u = O ⊕ T

Tag
{KID , c, cmax , KB }
Executes Auth(KID ),
if c < cmax , then
c = c + 1, if c = cmax ,
then KID = KB , KB = 0k

DC,r,u

−−−−−−−−−−−→

If u ⊕ H(r||KB ||DC) ̸= O,
then F ail; Otherwise
KID = KB , KB = 0k

Figure 6.2: Controlled delegation protocol

PKC. The protocol is presented in ﬁgure 6.2. Notice that when the delegated key is
replaced by the backed up key at the end of delegation, the backed up key is zeroed
out with k 0-bits to clear any possible trace of the old tag key (in case the tag is
compromised).

6.4.4

Ownership Transfer Protocol

Following the assumption in 6.3.3, an intended RFID item has already been authenticated using Auth() and singulated from other RFID items. Its ID and Inf oID are
obtained and its corresponding tag key KID is selected. Before the protocol begins,
the owner will forward the ID and Inf oID to the buyer (notice that the buyer can
only verify the validity of ID and Inf oID until phase 5.). They also exchange their
public keys P KO and P KB , allowing the other party to verify the validity of the public
key with the PKC before actually starting the ownership transfer protocol. Our ownership transfer protocol contains several phases. One nice feature of this is that users
can cancel the ownership transfer at any phase without sabotaging the security of the
whole system. The ﬁrst three phases are in fact the key change protocol, controlled
delegation protocol and an execution of Auth(). At the end of the protocol, the new
owner should execute the key change protocol in a private environment. The protocol
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is presented in ﬁgure 6.3.

6.4.5

Temporary Authorisation Recovery Protocol

This protocol is very similar to the controlled delegate protocol as the previous owner
can be viewed as a delegate. Instead of using a new random tag key, the current owner
can take advantage by making use the previously known secret shared among him/her
and the previous owner, which was the temporary tag key KP being used in the last
ownership transfer protocol. This way the current owner is saved from contacting the
previous owner to execute an ownership transfer protocol or from sending the previous
owner the new delegated tag key via a secure channel in order to recover the previous
owner’s authorisation to the tag. Comparing to [83] and [25] where the ownership will
be taken by the previous owner once authorisation recovery is executed, our scheme
allows the current owner to regain the ownership by executing the delegation cancel
protocol without going through another ownership transfer instance with the previous
owner. We present our protocol in ﬁgure 6.4.

6.5
6.5.1

Security Analysis
Previous Owner Privacy and New Owner Privacy

We have already mentioned about the security properties previous owner privacy and
new owner privacy, which are achieved by the key change protocol described in section
6.4.2. By running the key change protocol before and (secretly) at the end of the
ownership transfer protocol, any trace of the previous tag key is eliminated thanks to
the one-wayness property of the hash function H(). We prove this by contradiction:
suppose there is an attacker who can output the previous tag key KIDi−1 given the
current tag key KIDi as input (i.e. it is a forward security attacker who compromises
the memory of the tag to extract the current tag key), one can use this attacker to
ﬁnd the pre-image of KIDi in H() by computing r ⊕ KIDi−1 , where r was the random
number used in the last instance of the key change protocol sent in plaintext. This
contradicts the assumption that ﬁnding the pre-image of a hash value is hard under
the one-wayness property. Hence either the output of the previous tag key KIDi−1 is
only a blind guess (which only has negligible probability 2−k to be a correct guess) or
the attacker knows the previous tag key from other source. There are two cases for the
attacker to obtain the previous tag key: i.) by compromising the tag before the key
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Owner
{P KO , SKO , P KB ,
KID , KHi , σi }
Phase 1. Key change
R

r ←− {0, 1}k ,
T ← H(r||KID ||KC),
O ← H(σi ||KHi ), u = O ⊕ T ,
KID = H(r ⊕ KID )

Tag
{KID , VSi , O}

Buyer
{P KB , SKB , P KO ,
ID, Inf oID }

KC,r,u

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
m = r||KID ||KC,
If u ⊕ H(m) ̸= O,
then Quit; Otherwise
KID = H(r ⊕ KID )

Phase 2. Delegation
R

r ←− {0, 1}k , max = 1,
T ← H(r||KID ||1||CD),
O ← H(σi ||KHi ), u = O ⊕ T ,
KHi+1 ← H(r ⊕ KID ),
e ← Enc(KHi+1 , P KB )

CD,1,r,u,e

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
m = r||KID ||1||CD,
if u ⊕ H(m) ̸= O,
then Quit; Otherwise
KB = KID ,
cmax = 1, c = 0,
KID = H(r ⊕ KID )

KHi+1 ← Dec(e, SKB )

Phase 3. Authentication
Query

←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Response
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Executes Auth(KID ),
KID = KB
Phase 4. Ownership transfer starts
R

r ←− {0, 1}k ,
T ← H(r||KID ||TS),
O ← H(σi ||KHi ), u = O ⊕ T

Executes Auth(KHi+1 ),
if returns ⊥, then Quit;
Otherwise proceed

TS,r,u

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
m = r||KID ||TS,
if u ⊕ H(m) ̸= O,
then Quit; Otherwise proceed

Phase 5. Tag assurance
VSi+1 ← H(VSi )
TA,VSi

←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→

Phase 6. Buyer signature verification
If Ver(VSi+1 , σi+1 , P KB )
VR,σi+1
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
returns ⊥, then Quit;
Otherwise proceed
Stores σi+1
Phase 7. Ownership transfer ends
TE,r,u,σi ,K
K = KID ⊕ KHi+1 ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
R
k
r ←− {0, 1} ,
m = r||KID ||TE,
T ← H(r||KID ||TE),
if u ⊕ H(m) ̸= O,
O ← H(σi ||KHi ), u = O ⊕ T ,
then F ail; Otherwise
records KID as KP
VSi = H(VSi ),
O = H(σi+1 ||KHi+1 )

Let VS0 = H(ID||Inf oID ),
for j = 0 . . . n,
VSj+1 ← H(VSj ),
until VSj = VSi
If not found, then Quit;
Otherwise proceed
σi+1 ← Sig(VSi+1 , SKB )

If Ver(VSi , σi , P KO )
returns ⊥, then F ail; Otherwise
KID = K ⊕ KHi+1 ,
records σi+1 , KHi+1 ,
KID as KP

Figure 6.3: Ownership transfer protocol
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Temporary authorisation recovery:
Owner
Tag
{KID , KHi , σi , KP }
{KID , O}

Previous owner
{KP }

R

r ←− {0, 1}k ,
T ← H(r||KID ||AR),
O ← H(σi ||KHi ), u = O ⊕ T ,
KD ← H(r ⊕ KID ),
e = KD ⊕ KP

KID = KP
AR,r,u,e
−−−−−−−−−−−→
m = r||KID ||AR,
if u ⊕ H(m) ̸= O,
then F ail; Otherwise
KB = KID ,
KID = H(r ⊕ KID ) ⊕ e
Authorisation taken back (same as delegation cancel):
Owner
Tag
{KID , KHi , σi }
{KID , O, c, cmax , KB }
R

r ←− {0, 1}k ,
T ← H(r||KID ||DC),
O ← H(σi ||KHi ), u = O ⊕ T

DC,r,u

−−−−−−−−−−−→

If u ⊕ H(r||KB ||DC) ̸= O,
then F ail; Otherwise
KID = KB , KB = 0k

Figure 6.4: Temporary authorisation recovery protocol

exchange protocol was carried out. However, this violates the assumption 6.3.3 that
once a tag is compromised, it is not functioning anymore and would not have completed
the key exchange protocol. ii.) the attacker is the previous owner who always know
the previous tag key. Since the previous owner will not attack his own privacy, he will
only target on attacking the new owner privacy. Hence the only ﬁx to this is to require
the new owner to carry out the key change protocol in a private environment away
from the interception of the previous owner, such that the random number r becomes
a secret added into the computation of the new tag key. Guessing r would take the
same eﬀort as guessing KIDi as they are both k-bits.

6.5.2

Controlled Delegation and Temporary Authorisation Recovery

Since these two properties are more like security features rather than security protections, it is trivial enough to verify their correctness from the protocol description. The
only thing to keep in mind is that the delegated key computation is the same as the new
tag key computation (i.e. H(r ⊕ KID )), one should not reuse the same random number
r for the key change protocol after the controlled delegation protocol. Otherwise the
delegate can instantly obtain the new tag key, which was in fact the delegated key he
received before. Also, notice that as long as the current tag key does not change, the
delegation message CD, max, r, u, e and the delegation cancel message DC, r, u can be
replayed. e.g. the delegate may want to gain additional access to the tag after the
ﬁrst controlled delegation has expired. Hence one may want to execute the key change
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protocol to renew the tag key after a delegation has expired.

6.5.3

Tag Assurance

Tag assurance is guaranteed in phase 3. and 5. of the ownership transfer protocol. In
most of the previous ownership transfer schemes, the buyer can only choose to believe
the RFID tagged item presented by the current owner is the item he/she wants and
not something else (consider a cheating owner who swapped the trading item with
something else that looks similar to the original item but at a lower quality). In phase
3. of our protocol, it allows the buyer to make sure the owner actually knows the tag
key of the trading item. This avoids someone trying to sell stolen goods. Next in phase
5. by verifying the hash chain value VSi generated from ID, Inf oID gives the buyer
conﬁdence on the true identity of the tag (under the assumption 6.3.3). Together they
guarantee to the buyer that the owner owns the item and the information ID, Inf oID
supplied by the owner is the correct description of the item. Thanks to the collision
resistance property of H(), it is hard for the owner to ﬁnd another message/pre-image
ID′ , Inf o′ID′ (to replace the description of the swapped lower quality item with some
exaggerated information) such that it gives the same hash chain value VSi after hashing
it several times with H() provided that n (the maximum acceptable number of previous
owners/number of hash chains) is reasonably small. Again, we prove this by contradiction: suppose there is an attacker who can output a fake description ID′ , Inf o′ID′
of the trading item by inputting a hash chain value VSi , where i <= n. One can use
this attacker to ﬁnd a collision in H(). Let ID, Inf oID be the original message and
VSj = VSi is the hash chain value of it under H() where j <= n, then the collision
is VSj−1 and VSi−1 . This contradicts the assumption that ﬁnding a collision in a hash
function is hard under the collision resistance property. Hence either ID′ , Inf o′ID′ is
in fact the correct description of the item (i.e. ID, Inf oID ) or VSi must be fake as
well. There can be two cases: i.) the attacker has overwritten the hash chain value
stored in the tag with VSi . However, this violates the assumption 6.3.3 that the tag
has incorruptible memory. ii.) the whole tag is a fake tag created by the attacker
by running SetupTag(ID′ ). Whether a fake tag can be spotted or not is beyond our
scope.
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Current Ownership Proof and Undeniable Ownership
Transfer

Tag ownership cannot be deﬁned simply as the one who holds the tag or someone who
knows the tag key, especially when delegation is implemented. Our scheme requires
a tag to store the value O, which is the hash value of the owner’s signature. Hence
ownership in our scheme is deﬁned as someone who knows both the pre-image of this
hash value and the current tag key. Since the pre-image is a signature, it can be tightly
bound to the owner as he/she is the only one who can generate such signature. To bind
the owner to the tag, the message signed is the hash chain value VSi . To prove previous
ownership and current ownership, it is suﬃces (together with the assumption 6.3.3) to
present VSi , σi and VSi+1 , σi+1 to any third party. One cannot deny ever created the
signatures and hence they become the evidence of ownership transfer and the proof of
current ownership.

6.5.5

Owner Initiation

Since both the current owner and the delegate may hold the current tag key, the owner
must possess some additional secret to distinguish the owner’s role from the delegate’s
role, so that only the owner can issue commands to the tag but not the delegate. We
use the hash value of the owner’s signature O as the additional key to initiate tag commands. Notice that in each of the commands of the three protocols in our scheme, the
owner is required to compute O ← H(σi ||KHi ) and T ← H(r||KID ||COMMAND).
O remains the same throughout the ownership of the same owner, while T changes
every time when the current tag key changes and its freshness is guaranteed by the
random number r. As σi is sent in plaintext in the ownership transfer protocol, the
secrecy of O is protected by KHi , the delegated key sent via a secure channel to the
current owner when ownership is transferred. Hence to break owner initiation, one
must obtain KHi , which is impossible because it is sent in a secure channel, or O. To
obtain O, one may guess on the value of KHi , which has negligible success probability.
One may also compromise the tag as the tag stores O. But once the tag is compromised, it will be virtually dead and rendered the acquisition of O useless. Otherwise
one may try to compute O from O = u ⊕ T . But to compute T , the knowledge of the
current tag key KID is required. At the end, we have guaranteed owner initiation.
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Conclusions

We presented a new RFID ownership transfer scheme in this chapter. Our scheme
consists of four protocols: key change protocol, delegation protocol, ownership transfer
protocol and temporary authorisation recovery protocol. Our scheme combines these
four protocols to provide a secure method for users to transfer their RFID tags to
new hands. We also considered some practical needs users may request in ownership
transfer. For example, we have tag assurance to deal with cheating sellers. Current
ownership proof creates a tight binding between the current owner and the tag. Undeniable ownership transfer is aimed to handle dispute that may occur when the previous
owner denies selling a faulty item to the current owner. Owner initiation guarantees
only the current owner can give various commands to the tag. We believe this will
open up new research directions in this area and allow more new ideas to come and
strengthen the development of RFID applications.

Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this whole thesis, we have studied the privacy issues surrounding low-cost RFID tag
systems. From RFID authentication protocols to privacy modellings and then from
protocol construction classiﬁcations to practical ownership transfer protocol. This
whole RFID privacy journey give us the impression that we cannot expect a overly
constrained device to attain a high level of privacy standard like other more decent
devices. Although through model tweaking, one can prove a better system on its
privacy performance, but this either has additional assumptions on the system or the
adversary is being restricted. We have been using the Vaudenay model in most of our
works and we believe this is a very good model to be used on RFID. However, the
impossible results tell us that RFID has its limitations at its current form and hence,
we have found our solution by proposing the Type R construction. This is a way out
because it changes the current form of RFID protocols. With the advance in RFID
technology, we hope that someday these tiny RFID devices can ﬁnd its position in our
everyday life, without any privacy concerns.
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[21] Ivan Damgård and Michael Østergaard Pedersen. RFID Security: Tradeoﬀs between Security and Eﬃciency. In Tal Malkin, editor, The Cryptographers’ Track
at the RSA Conference on Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2008, volume 4964
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 318–332, San Francisco, California,
USA, April 2008. RSA, Springer.
[22] Gerhard de Koning Gans and Flavio D. Garcia. Towards a Practical Solution
to the RFID Desynchronization Problem. In Siddika Berna Ors Yalcin, editor,
The Sixth International Workshop on Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation: Security
and Privacy Issues – RFIDsec 2010, volume 6370 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 203–219, Istanbul, Turkey, June 2010. Springer.
[23] Robert Huijie Deng, Yingjiu Li, Moti Yung, and Yunlei Zhao. A New Framework
for RFID Privacy. In Dimitris Gritzalis, Bart Preneel, and Marianthi Theoharidou,
editors, The Fifteenth European Symposium on Research in Computer Security –
ESORICS 2010, volume 6345 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 1–18,
Athens, Greece, September 2010. Springer.
[24] Tassos Dimitriou. A Lightweight RFID Protocol to protect against Traceability
and Cloning attacks. In The First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks – SecureComm 2005, pages
59–66, Athens, Greece, September 2005. IEEE Communications Society/CreateNet, IEEE Computer Society Press.
[25] Tassos Dimitriou. rﬁdDOT: RFID Delegation and Ownership Transfer made simple. In The Fourth International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Netowrks – SecureComm 2008, Istanbul, Turkey, September 2008. ACM
Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

130

[26] Martin Feldhofer, Sandra Dominikus, and Johannes Wolkerstorfer. Strong Authentication for RFID Systems Using the AES Algorithm. In Marc Joye and
Jean-Jacques Quisquater, editors, The Sixth International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2004, volume 3156 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 357–370, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, August 2004. Springer.
[27] Martin Feldhofer and Christian Rechberger. A Case Against Currently Used Hash
Functions in RFID Protocols. In Mário Freire, Sim ao Melo de Sousa, and Vitor Santos, editors, The First International Workshop on Information Security
– IS 2006, volume 4277 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 372–381,
Montpellier, France, October–November 2006. Springer.
[28] Martin Feldhofer, Johannes Wolkerstorfer, and Vincent Rijmen. AES Implementation on a Grain of Sand. IEE Proceedings on Information Security, 152(1):13–20,
October 2005.
[29] Sepideh Fouladgar and Hossam Aﬁﬁ. A Simple Delegation Scheme for RFID
Systems (SiDeS). In IEEE International Conference on RFID, Grapevine, Texas,
USA, March 2007. IEEE Communications Society.
[30] Sepideh Fouladgar and Hossam Aﬁﬁ. A Simple Privacy Protecting Scheme Enabling Delegation and Ownership Transfer for RFID Tags. Journal of Communications, 2(6):6–13, November 2007.
[31] Sepideh Fouladgar and Hossam Aﬁﬁ. An Eﬃcient Delegation and Transfer of Ownership Protocol for RFID tags. In The First International EURASIP Workshop
on RFID Technology, Vienna, Austria, September 2007. European Association for
Signal Processing (EURASIP).
[32] Keith B. Frikken, Marina Blanton, and Mikhail J. Atallah. Robust Authentication
Using Physically Unclonable Functions. In Pierangela Samarati, Moti Yung, Fabio
Martinelli, and Claudio A. Ardagna, editors, The Twelfth International Information Security Conference – ISC 2009, volume 5735 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 262–277, Pisa, Italy, September 2009. Springer.
[33] Flavio D. Garcia, Gerhard de Koning Gans, Ruben Muijrers, Peter van Rossum,
Roel Verdult, Ronny Wichers Schreur, and Bart Jacobs. Dismantling MIFARE
Classic. In Sushil Jajodia and Javier Lopez, editors, The Thirteenth European

BIBLIOGRAPHY

131

Symposium on Research in Computer Security – ESORICS 2008, volume 5283 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 97–114, Málaga, Spain, October 2008.
Springer.
[34] Flavio D. Garcia and Peter van Rossum. Modeling Privacy for Oﬀ-Line RFID
Systems. In Dieter Gollmann, Jean-Louis Lanet, and Julien Iguchi-Cartigny, editors, The Ninth International Conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced
Applications – CARDIS 2010, volume 6035 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 194–208, Passau, Germany, April 2010. International Federation for
Information Processing (IFIP), Springer.
[35] Henri Gilbert, Matthew J. B. Robshaw, and Yannick Seurin. Good Variants
of HB+ Are Hard to Find. In Gene Tsudik, editor, The Twelfth International
Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security – FC 2008, volume 5143
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 156–170, Cozumel, Mexico, January
2008. International Financial Cryptography Association (IFCA), Springer.
[36] Henri Gilbert, Matthew J. B. Robshaw, and Hervé Sibert. Active attack against
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